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The Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII) is the primary
DoD automated data base containing personnel security information. The
DCII is delivered quarterly to the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC),
Monterey, California.
The DCII file was carefully reviewed and edited by Dr. John Goral at
the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and several problems were revealed.
For example, the records were ordered by phonetic name (making them dif-
ficult to link to other personnel security files), approximately 15 per-
cent of the records lacked social security numbers (SSN), and another 15
percent of the records contained redundant information.
Software was developed by BDM Services Company at DMDC to edit the
DCII file. The improvements included reconfiguring the file so that the . ,
records were arranged by SSN. Duplicate SSNs and duplicate investigative
data were dropped. This editing reduced the DCII file from eleven to six -''
tapes, while providing a more accurate and efficient-to-use data base.
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EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE
DEFENSE CENTRAL INDEX OF INVESTIGATIONS (DCII) -- AN
EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS PROGRAM FOR THE
U.S. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
A. PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND
The purpose of this effort was to develop an improved Defense
Central Index of Investigation (DCII) file. This file is very important
in that it is the primary DoD automated data base containing personnel
security information.
The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) serves as a central facility
within the Department of Defense for collecting and integrating personnel
data. DMDC receives the DCII each quarter from the Defense Investigative
Service (DIS). OMDC links the DCII to other manpower data bases using
the social security number (SSN). DMDC then conducts personnel security
analyses on these data.
An in-depth examination of the DCII data base was conducted by [,r.
John R. Goral of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and several problems
were revealed. Software was developed to generate an improved data base
by severely editing the DCII records, removing redundancies, and correct-
ing errors such as invalid SSNs.
This report presents a description of the DCII file and the problems
with the file before modification. It also presents the methodology and
software developed to review and edit the file to create a data base
greatly improved for both operational and analytical use. Pertinent
personnel security reports written by Dr. Goral are presented in Appendix
A.
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE DCII FILE
As of March 1985, the DCII data base included 15.5 million variable-
length records. Each DCII record consists of a master or base section
and one or more content segments.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
The base section contains the following personnel identification
data:
(1) First, middle, and last name;
(2) Social security number;
(3) Date of birth; and
(4) Place of birth.
The content segments contain information on past or pending DoD per-
sonnel security investigations. There are six types of content segments;
each is referred to by a segment number. The segment numbers and the
information the segments contain are as follows:
(1) Segment 0: Tracing of dossier data;
(2) Segment 1: Pending national agency checks (NAC);
(3) Segment 2: NAC history;
(4) Segment 3: Clearance;
(5) Segments 4 through 7: Not applicable;
(6) Segment 8: Current name; and
(7) Segment 9: "Also known as" (AKA) names.
Each segment is described in more detail below. The content seg-
ments that are of primary interest at DMDC are Segments 0, 2, and 3.
1. Tracing or Dossier Segment (Segment 0)
This is the most common segment in the DCII. The data base
contained 8.6 million of these segments. The data included in this seg-
ment are the submitting agency; the context, retention and status codes;
and the year of the file. The retention code is the length of time the
segment is to remain in the DCII before being purged. Most of the DIS,
Air Force OSI, and Air Force investigations transferred to DIS are to
remain in the DCII for 15 years. Most Naval Investigative Service seg-
ments have a 25-year retention code. Almost all Army Criminal Records
Division segments are coded for 40-year retention. Overall, 99 percent
of the status codes refer to tracing segments, with the remaining seg-
ments open cases.
12
.r~~~p .* ** * *. . .. . *..***
2. Pending NAC Segment (Segment 1)
The DCII file contained about 100,000 segments indicating
pending National Agency Check (NAC). This segment also gives the start
date of the NAC. Most of the NACs requested by the Services were
ENTNACS; the others were standard military NACs. NACs requested by DIS
were equally spread among military, civilian, and industrial personnel.
3. NAC History Segment (Segment 2)
The DCII file contained about 7.4 million NAC history segments.
9 .'- These segments give NAC completion dates and a status code indicating
6whether the NAC is closed or incomplete. Each segment includes space for
identifying up to 11 agency files that may have been checked during the
NAC. A total of 52 such files are described in the DCII documentation.
4. Clearance Segment (Segment 3)
3.2 million clearance segments were found: 1.5 for the Army
segments and 1.7 for the Air Force. The Navy and Marine Corps do not
submit clearance data to the DCII. The clearance segment contains a
clearance status code, clearance basis code, adjudication date, investi-
gation date, and review action code. The clearance basis code identifies
the level of investigation on which a clearance decision is based. The
review action code pertains only to Army segments. It, along with the
status and basis codes, fully defines an Army clearance action.
5. Current Name and "Also Known As" Segments (Segments 8 and 9)
Over half of these segments resulted from NAC information.
Another third came from the DIS and the Army's Investigative Records
Repository.
C. PROBLEMS WITH THE DCII FILE
An examination of the DCII revealed instances of erroneous, dupli-





2.3 million records contained missing or incorrect social security
numbers. This creates a problem in the operational use of the data base
(i.e., in locating a certain individual when doing a security check) as
well as in the analytical use of the data base (i.e., in linking the DCII
with other DMDC data bases for various personnel security analyses). .
It was also found that over 4.7 million records existed with redun-
dant or overlapping data. Individuality in the DCII is defined as a .
single social security number (SSN). All data for one individual should -
exist in one record with that person's SSN. While this was true for 8.4.- * -
million records, other cases were found where some individuals were
identified in over 100 different records.
The records in the DCII were arranged phonetically; this arrangement
sometimes made it difficult to locate an individual. Also it made the
file cumbersome to link with other DMDC personnel security data bases.
Active and inactive files were included in the same data base.
Operational on-line searches of the DCII typically involve situations
where the current status of an individual (e.g., active military) is - "
known. Searching the entire file would be unnecessary if the file were
divided into active and inactive subfiles.
Important personnel actions were missing in the DCII. This infor-
mation can be added to the DCII from other DMDC data bases. Examples of
these personnel actions are reason for separation, character of service,
reenlistment eligibility, and changes in paygrade, marital/dependent
status, or occupation.
14
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D. METHODOLOGY FOR IMPROVING THE DCII FILE
3 1. Improvements
Based on Dr. Goral's evaluation, several improvements were
noted that would make the DCII f 1>. more accurate for operational use and N
more compatible with other personnel security files for analytical pur-
poses. These improvements are listed below.
(1) Reorder the records by SSN; previously they were arranged pho-
netical ly;
(2) Correct invalid or missing SSNs where possible by matching DCII
records with other DMDC files using name and date and place of
birth;
(3) Drop duplicate data;
(4) Divide the DCII into subfiles based on current active and
inactive status;
(5) Incorporate important personnel actions (e.g.., reason for
separation) from other DMDC security/suitability data bases;
and
(6) Develop an historical DCII file.
2. Developing the Improved Data Base
The BDM Services Company was tasked to develop an improved DCII
data base based on the list of requirements above. The DCII file from
DIS consisted of eleven tapes. The edited DCII consisted of six tapes.
Nine software programs were developed by BDM for this effort. Figure 1
gives the function of each of the programs.
The flow charts in Figures 2 and 3 show the procedure used to
audit and edit the DIS tapes to develop the improved data base. Also
shown is the procedure used to merge the DCII data with DMDC's Master-,
Enlisted and Master Officer Files. OMDC continues to use these pro-
cedures to edit DCII data tapes received from the DIS.
15
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Name of
Progra Function
DCIICOPY JCL Copies of 11 DCII tapes received from DIS onto DMOC
tapes
DCII SPLIT Splits the base section from the content segments in.-'
each record
DCII BREAK Breaks the segments into the following groups: b A-.




DCIISEGO PL1 Drop invalid SSNs on the corresponding segment
DCIISEG2 PL1
DCIISEG3 PL1
DCIIMAST PL1 Drops invalid SSNs for the base records
DCIISORT PL1 A sort program sorts the base records by descending
SSN and date; DCIISORT PLI then keeps only the latest
base record for each SSN
DCIISRTO PL1 A sort program sorts segment data by descending SSN
DCIISRT2 PL1 and date. These programs then keep only the latest
DCIISRT3 PL1 segments (0, 2, 3) for each SSN -
DCII JOIN Merges the base record with segments 2, 3, and 0. A
base record is written only if there is at least one -'.
segment. A base record can have only one of each
segment but doesn't have to have all three segments.
DCII MERGE Merges the DMDC Master Enlisted and Master Officer
files with the DCII record. Each Enlisted and
Officer record is written and if no DCII record is"-
found, blanks are inserted. The officer and enlisted
files are then merged.
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PL I ONE BASE RECORD PER SSN ''
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DCII MERGE DCII MERGE
I!#17 ENLISTED W/DCII #18 OFFICER W/DCII
SYNC SORT
* MERGE
#9 DOD MASTERj1 WITH DCII
m/000/0.911~s
*Figure 3. Procedure for Merging DCII With DMDC Master
Enlisted and Master Officer Files
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E. PERSONNEL SECURITY ANALYSES
Several pertinent analytical studies on personnel security were con-
ducted by Dr. John Goral from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Each
of Dr. Goral's reports is written as a stand-alone report. A list of his 9
reports is given in Figure 4. The reports are presented in Appendix A in
the order shown in Figure 4.
22~-
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DOD PERSONNEL SECURITY RESEARCH PROGRAM REPORTS
1. Personnel Security Investigation and Clearance Contents of the
Defense Central Index of Investigations, 84-1, March 1984
2. Defense Investigative Service Investigations and Army and Air Force
Adjudications Contained in the OCII, 84-2, May 1984
3. Army and Air Force Adjudications During FY83 and DIS Investigation
and Clearance Status of DoD Personnel as of the End of FY83, June
1984%
4. Investigation and Clearance Status of Those in Army Personnel W
Security Screening Program Occupations, 84-4, July 1984
5. Identification of Army Top Secret and SCI Eligibles Not Included in
DCII Clearances, 84-5, July 1984
6. Navy Security Clearances, 84-6, August 1984
7. Projections of Military Periodic Review Requirements, 84-7, August
1984
8. Security Clearances Among Army and Air Force Reserve Component
Personnel, 84-8, September 1984
9. Comparison of Investigations and Adjudications During FY83 and the
First Half of FY84, 84-9. September 1984
10. DIS Investigations and Clearance Eligibility of Air Force Enlistees
Requiring BIs and SB~s, 85-1, October 1984
11. The DoD Personnel Security Research Program: Initial USAF Findings
and Future Areas of Study, 85-2, November 1984
12. Identi fication of Unnecessary Background Investigations, 85-3,
December 1984
13. Personnel Security Investigations: Service Differences for SimilarV
Occupations, 85-4, December 1984
14. Most Recent DIS Investigation and Clearances Information in the DCII
at the Beginning of Fiscal Year 1985, 85-5, March 1985
15. Continued Top Secret and SCI Status of Former Army Personnel with
* Unsuitability Discharges, 85-6, April 1985
16. Continued Top Secret and SCI Status of Former Air Force Personnel
with Unsuitability Discharges, 85-7, April 1985.
17. Security Investigations and Clearances in the DCII at the End of
Fiscal Year 1984: A Profile of 2.1 Million Activa Duty Military
Personnel, 85-8, May 1985
18. A Census of Key Data Elements in the Defense Central Index of
Investigations (As of 1 April 1985), 85-9, June 1985
19. Cleaning Up the Periodic Review Backlog: Estimates of the Numbers
and Location of Military Subjects, 85-10, August 1985
20. Extent of National Agency Checks on Active Military Personnel, 85-
11, September 1985
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wherein the names were essential [v the saine and the dates arid
places of birth matched e>xactl,. This means that it is r, ot cur -
rently possible to state the exact nurbe.'r of idividuals contained I
in the 8.4 million record extract of the DCII.
Manual rev iew al so readi I' revealed niumerous cases in which
records with eliqhtlv different D .SPI, had the same name, date. and "
place of birVh. and were thu:: presuT, mabl te sAe i nd idual
The slight SSN -. riations consi vted of one of the nine digits di f-
fering between the isrIs o  two ;,nd three diqit combinations being
transposed. These inizt,nces -:ugqgest manuial or keypunch err ors 
either- by those c,:-irpl eting the forms or those entering the in+or
i mation into the DC .1.-"
"73pecial attention was gi. ren to those 2. 1Oo records in which
SSNs occurred more than aight ti me-S. Thee' were re-viewed manually
and their relevant characteristic: were ,:categorized. Discussion
of results will first fC s CL :, n 0 1 ...... appearing '?--4 1 times and then
or-, the fO.tr situations where ( -re 3SN was found more than 10)0"
tines in the DCII. These an ayI re %Vealed that not only is the
same irdi. i dulI Curd more thn ,:: 'cfie in the DCII but that some
L of these i fns, the a.ame i ,e n !t igation agment i- repeated, while
other ti c. Ic di Fe r-er t i nv,..st i catt ons :,r c. earaces are r-efer- - -:
* enced.
Tab t h C) '., f: cr each I"'.Ui'ber" ' duplI ications, how many
totai i trn," . there were td {..s:-r each ;ar-actei. stic tud:i :d-z.
.... i.rde;. ,: . n I::I r tencv. aI o11 i Ch ; -h s : e ::o(tel rumber and numbiEr
TABLE 3 - haracteristics :f Du1i cate SSNs
_d ex 0f Z o S, st _erc
lines SSN Number of Year of Month of Day of Place 04 Last ",r-t Middle ota1l Unique
in DCII instances Birth Birth Birth B1rt Nime Nxmie Nale Semerts Sements- .
Z. 1.3 .73. .
1),12 e.4 1.4 ,.: , 4.1 2 4.4 21 !5
r4922 1 6 4.7l
,'1.4 !.4 1.6 1 0! ,J. 5 . . o
63 b 1.5 1.8 i. a -
14 9 1.5 1.5 2 .: ., .0 5.5 28
15 3 2.7 1.3 1.3 . C.' 2;5. ?.' -
1 1. 0 1. 0 ±. 0'  .': . 0 !,*'.' 1__ -
17
1 7.0 .. , 4. 10'; , .6. 13 4
.. j~~~~ ~ ~ ..... -0: £ ! -., 2I 1 ." ., I :5. .) 20 .V-
.- 25 1 1.0 1.*3 u. 2.) >.:', 5.0 25 1 : '
...1 o . . J L .5 4.0 2.5
41 7., 4. 0 C t ~
--------------- ---- ---- ----- ------- ----- ---
Overall 105 1. 2 4': 4.: 11,91 ..
A-1-4
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The consi stency i ndex< used i n TablIe 3reflIect -s th F- av era e
number ofdifferent Values taker an in each instance of duplica-
tio. Fr xamle cosidr he 1Binstances in which a 3
occurred in 10 di fferernt DCI I records. In 12 of those :Lr:tances,
the day of birth dataz element was. identical for all D) records.
while in the other si % irnstances, two di. f 1erernt days of bir th were
-Found ainong the 10 records. This could nCC~r- for exairipl e, if in
nine records, a da-Y' of birth was= carried 's12" and in the tenth
i~t was coded -21' or if five were coded as '3' and the othr iive
.I0 'in either exzif4ple, twoc differ-enit days of birth were fou)Lnd
in the 10 records and the consi stetcy indE>--. computation and inter-
prectation would be the samve. Here it is figured ~sthe total nuiLT-
ber of d~i f f erei-,t d ays o b Li r t 1- (1l2 i ni's L ai-,c es. wjit1.h 1 ei-ach plus 6-
instances withi 2 eahFor a tTi.of '2.4) di vided by the total nuir-
ber of instances 189) , which1- come'sF~i to '24 div~ided by 13 or 11 aL
w shown on Table
B3y J e-f :L ni ti o n, the min imu, contsi sten~y index. is 1.0, which
9 .indicates-a si:ngle value for- all reco-rds with the samne SSN. rThe
iar~pr th--e consist-ency inde,.X, -the qreater -the variation in values
found for a qii er da.ta etenert. Table7 indicates that the date
oQ b ir th d t el ements were soehtmore conSistent thani place%
ofbirth. wIU1-ite name data c-,linentw were far- less consii -tent.
I t aISoa -hc-w- h t L 0f tI 1e E? Ct -Al I.Unmb er of- 4 1 --9 1 i i nve s1 i ga ti orn arid - .
.1 rar iti-rt otindi n 1:hese r ec:r ds. onlIy 5 55 Ar e%5 irn i. que. 7 :j 4 d d s tdo[uble-. ---c outL i n4 of H' C.4ifn t t p es as a n o t h er
* - putent~ti A I. 'bt Im ___
app r cr - e::fr 3 Ns -ai
r~oe Lt he f-oLr aop a-iCI I r: ,r i tht 1a1 p p earn
- ~ ~ M i For c-e C-f -F i.e i-f pcil es icjtirn ( I --- -- -- --- -- -- -- --- -- -- -- - ,ei ts and
i nr, Jr , t. I I 1Y I E'l~at ed S:N's a:nd T ..1 a I' I- t aal t "vi th
i.A (J' d (iit Inl - li, V
e - o r ds ..15-5 -_ e- Ci
I, i n L li sjd ( 'd S-c-. S t b J G. -.- d 1' l , 4.. 4i~-c--a
JU or .1o aI f d -E.,- E,, -i j. C. i v ,J~ , IJ
*~~~~~~~~~~~~s.I a Th Ite c-A ' I -i- e, ~ ~ d - rc: uh :i~z4lKuI
Li on's (142 t i i-, e E0 x .k_ pr-;,.(t.A i. L wrmr i j.1jp I e - . crs f) E i 1. C.0-
.;tject eiv si~ toa, 4~- %/ r cj t . ' n .7 1.~ oi Lt:e. :4i j
nam .in C-4 S. rI e I cad' t. iT!V e 1. .E!4_z orF -.4
W pI t I-, ;ti- E t.. 14 1 V, -: C41' Y' tIj I e C i 4J ~
J i t.-- I ( 1 -!dI t 1
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approach is expected to mini mize, i. F riot eliminate, t'.he :,:obles..;
previously discussed. It .J i]l great I. sif.pli.'fy DCII wor -;: .incl L
in return for deletin c:er Lain i nvsi i gat ion ,nd t:. lear arni ,,:, --
ments. Time can then be :spent purs:uing ke.y analytic tak- rather "
than designing methods to bypass pri-lervs with the curr-I"e-n t f il-.
As shnh o'i on TiaIe I , mos-,t records in the ,3.4 milliosn reccrd-
-file contain onl, one or two se ent. Iet, a .few c:,::,ns - sted cf
as many as 1 segmentE. A total of 964 records, with SSI'4s, con I
tained more-, than six !-segments. The. .jer. -_ studied in detail t
determine the s=ource of ,ach seigmet. I-eble 4 1 i st the nu mber S
and relevant perc-entages ocot:,iributed by ,ari US sourc:es. Of
greatest import.aro *e is the rvelat:Lvelv .ma].1 nu.r-ber of DIS i. nve s
tigations and the Fac-t. tht ,t in cri; 1 I C) D .. 4 .76 records con-- .
taining D13 f,gmer-, ts wa. mLre:, t:.han a . 4rgl e D I segment -found
lso.~w~ith regard to clearance .egment of the 51 records c:on.
taining hem, only hr ee car-r 'ed ma;re tr h An one.
TAIBL.E 4 04rctr si~.so Records- (wjith SIls
T I. w .a.ii...ri, More Tian " i "-"ents".... ... ....... .... .......... ... ..-.... L c .f. ... o r d il. " ... ... .. ,
Percent
Ferc:ent of Cf Total
O~re eC:o dc. Reco rds e g frenrit s Segments
Army Criminal Records 644 5,-. S :,.,. -4 5
Di vi si on
Air Force Of.f:i. ce of :7 5. .4
Special In-eticatio :s"".-.
; ,erfe In,.'es .: at i v: 4 6.-'::. 44,.,
eServi ce
A rv "1 : e s t i 4 t r) r y4 -. ...
Sr For-ce For ,onv- , ,...
t.t, ..ur i tvy I n es- t i a L iors
Arfim.. Centr-al .1 eara nc e 34 ' " '
Faci I i ty
Air Force Securi tv 1"'. i . I 2.4
Cl earance Off i ce
TOTAL '64 . "[ .
A~~~~.. maa ... e ,i e" ,, F :C ,u .. 4 1 ,1
m ranua 1 I-' a, e 0-f: r -c: r'cI s.,e,:: tam t [:! :.. ,a :..- i [ ;c, .onecrs r ;:: I --
i r S t I, 1 Ci o -d ivj L 1 .1 tj t ].IV
he .eq(Tier-,.s i , I 'D
t e ..:- : r i" , r . : m- t . ., f. I J,).- OfI i- I :, C' . =. ./ ) . 1 -C4
Sie DCI 1 1 1. i I k: 1, t I . F. s ( I '
th ei nt o wI - oh i ., .. F.. -- I. - , - - : , m -- ,J -11 .. c
,.:1 aF ar :: ad.i ud i .; !:.-i ,::,- -. f -:, :: :: , ,- ].rc i -rv ,.vr- Irrci ::: v--.' 11 I-. L,:
1 4 J ... ,nj l i. , :,:,r:s t4 ' I J. ,lr ..t-:.-"" :12, '. , .- - -
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Part ial conf irmation of this projecti on is seen in Trable 5.
which presents the SO~irce of a].l t-ype t)secjmentz f ound f :r ~~)__
thousand non-SSN records with yvear- of birth between 19.3 and 1?67.
Note that the DIS segfmren-ts (-con-,:titutte less than I",- of the tot .l
number of segments in this DCI I S~ibiip.
ITiIPLE 5 QQC~U1rcecfx Inl.eSti gati or- S3eqMRent
Number of F:ercent of!
Source ernertg Segmnt~s
Army Criminal Pecords Eiviioi:. 05 4C 81
Ar-My Tnj, Stqtr 1: P'cords R.ep-'.Js--iLor-v 0. 9 25 5 -
Naval Investigative Service 7:'-7' 02139
ir Force Personnel ESeC~ri ty 1 627 0. 5
Invest igations
TOJTAL-...... 656 10. .
Since DIS backqr-ound invesatiqjations ar-c of primary interest.
mn anal %/sia onf The e ntire '3.4 willion record file was aiade to
determine. by year,* the nUfnter of. -a r i o u c kin d a of t>13 in vesti gz-:
rl 1-1- I ,I Dt ; -. t in a - :1~s
D[ reniwJl. Tll- 1 7 . ined b-., either (:I. thioz*EL
d o u m e n e e Fd..- i :-nrJ'- il -,rC f 1 cr aton.
T a t. %3 j .~- i' r -- u- '.4 c n, L n 1 c e r --. o w
TABLE q - os regqe: ,15 Case L'te.:rv .:aes
Code Number Percent Description Ccde Sumoer Percent :escriotion
!A! "29.020 !7.8 Nilitar-, B! 18 F. '1.57 20 C.la B
A-1 24 0,3'93 1" .0 N4ilitary Sal ID5 34.5"1 1.1 Military SBI-PR
15 1 2215. "98 124.2 Militar-i Entrance NAC I B1 32.853 1.2 Civilian B1
1G2 171.:15 9.3T M. Iitar i Stan~dard NAC 1 12 72,251 1. Industrial ENAC
~K1 1:2.,997 6b.7 Mi1ltari Entrance ENAC 1'V9 '24,240 13 industrial ENAC, Suitability
IA7 o6.65' 6. M iiar i Sal, Supplemental !". 2 l5 13 ilitary Standard ENAC
J'4 52,320 2.8 Industrial NAC 1C" ',9 I.1 Industrial E31
46.25c '. c Industr~a: ^-27 42 Ot ,r; 271.% '61 1.~ 5 20,000 Segments
A 45, S!,) M. Mi 1itirl ESl 7:: ,-tiers :,~ I. ?9 cegents
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Table 7 provides a look at how the 13 most frequentit.' to.,und -:"
case category codes have varied in terms ,of percent.iQe c.- t.Gta1
annual cases since 1972 when DIS b--,an crdu:t i n, persoric, __
security investigations.
TABLE :Percent oi Year1l DIS Codes -, *- V
"! ode 1972 1973 !?'4 12Z5 1!7~6  1977Z 197 8  197 9  1980 1981 !981 198.1
IAI 13.3 20.6 18.7 22.9 25.1 25.4 23.5 20.7 18.0 19.3 9.5 0.1 "
I.A2 7.0 15.5 13.1 12 11.2 11.5 13.7 13.1 13.5 13.0 12.4 16.5
161 39.5 21.9 30.9 19.1 16.1 7.6 5.3 4.8 4.3 3.9 3.8 2.6 ,'. -
162 8.7 8.0 9.6 18.3 7.6 8.4 7.6 8.6 8.8 8.9 9.0 7.7 .
IKI 13.7 8.4 4.4 2.7 2.8 7.1 5.5 5.6 6.1 9.9 9.3 .2
1A7 - - 0.1 .8 5.8 5.9 5.0 4.9 3.6 5.7 7.1 2.0
ICI 1.2 2.4 2.0 2.7 3.7 4.1 4.3 4.9 6.7 5.4 4.2 0.
1J2 5.3 4.2 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.3 3.0 1
IC2 0.5 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.6 2.3 2.2 3.4 3.9 3.7 3.8 .8
IA3 0.1 0.7 0.5. 0.5 0.8 0.4 - - - - 7.5 16. "
I82 0.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.2 2. 26
15 0.2 1.6 3.3 3.7 4.2 4.0 3.8 1.8 0.0 0.0
181 1.0 1.6 1.4 1.9 1.. 2.1 1.9 1.6 1.9 .7 1.8
i12 1.0 1.0 0,4 0.3 0.3 1.0 2.7 2.3 2.2 2.5 3.0 . .
IV9- - - 0.5 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.9 7.11K2 1.4 0.7 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.8 1.5 1.4 1.1 1.7 1.9 1.9
iE5 - - ).6 2.4 1.5 2.0 2.a :.8 !.2 a. .
-. 0 .,:-, - - ;--.8 S. .I::,
%54 Others .4 12. 'M .1 I 1.5 11 . 1.4 ib.2 !4.4 14.9 20.'
i , .: 1---  e L -
r .J ;"#t c,"' T - ' Q .. E'r] (: c ::.-.... , tl ih ,.t K e...'e J - t . e L n -, l l.5 + ZIetw (:- . _.
e e r t ) ;t. -. c : -< .,:. a c . : , m,:.. h i c :h d Fe 1. p::.p ad a .t n .,J i - c r
fi a ~ i o nl .-. r. -. - , ":? 'ii Ij.R~ I
t-, f) 0" . .4 fit.. ... . .1 1::l::.:_ i. 1 L L. ,= -:: i ,'j, -.. 4-' e'*.:';i::
r )  s, ,::.................................,, 1 , I,, : .- ..... - .,-... ,. ...
! I i i p 1 I I-, I
WOU~~~~~.; o.d e1: .
he .4 mi f- t,:,- ," .:i:: ' r:,'I Fi , L :., ....- -:. , , ! .r ,:, , .,: .....
[. r l ]
"J  r i . ... .  .' i . " " ' . .. 1 , F ! ,.,:, E i'. .. , . ' - , ."
j t e '- 2.I4 -' j ' 1.I I -'If"L I"T-I-.-.  If'. )" l- - ," h .J
..ji 'a ar .: . .. , ..,tiv -: .:'
1A-1-8i
.A- 1-8"
_A_ - ___,__j W ~ . W 'nf_ I .'- J " :: -.' '_ F i.r '-w-
which will be deleted. Additionally, {jivo it-,vc1 ve di rrn 2
segmnents on di fferent reco--rdJs with the t jyain t\e.I -1 cRld 17 tL~ he
same DIS or clearance segi-nerfs on di f f er-ert reCord. K:ittn*
of duplicate segmnents and retenii or of con![ the Tiost rec: nt ~III
redUce these 22 records -to T i ne FiAl1. *se-ve*n recor-ds runt.:;tirII ni qUe DI13 and clearance seqvient:= -v which when, or-iy the- MOSt. re cert
*Er i r a tained willi yield two recordss Ta b I e '3 prc Lvi des a~ suriea 14. r
of th Ese ma~inipulati ons an d a Ol cL~I E- 01- i-n ~i t--1h he infIi taL I a-i I _
ion.
T ab 1 E. 8 i pa.c: . )r of Pl1arn-ed -jdjk ii e r .En to DC1I
Won-wi n- - F°
r i 9 ... .....
7. 13 ~~Efoa -.n d qc rstm ErtI w i f t E-.v*d' I U S crne r-ts
Totazl records L41
' Total DIS segfi-ints 4:-26
To :3tal1 c I -tr a -. , e qec(r e nt
Uni que DIS segment~sL
hUniqhe cl e -rce semente• )i
For t n d orednt e, wth h of m-amP i f n q he 1 t1 b
de C pcatet se entsf t- 2 * 1 C r - i r , f: E nty h o F f -,ur 1a and -•-
z.1.e a r an a s -e rect Fors to 1ive 41. 1 1C-1, i n a L ad. r
1:nih ue 1 - di. sn laraie t-e1 . #ie s,., wi ch- when It c-I r- t-h m r ecen i•i- i
arl~e reaie wii y.ielda tw riciecords.-I~ ITable **<:,I. mi] a c aurenr.
1> ''!- 1
''S~ ~ i].... .1. 6.j 1
, r . ..... ... .. ,
A i:r F c' I.... .. ...... ., . Fc1 c. i2 r- t
Total recor d 2. :,041-'-''.
4~~~~~1 J: L~r r, Lr
tln Ji; ue ~ l ar nc se ent. - . . ..... ', . .-..
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DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE INVESTIGATIONS AND ARMY
AND AIR FORCE ADJUDICATIONS CONTAINED IN THE DCII
(AS OF OCTOBER 1983)
Subfile Development
An earlier report described the complexities involved when
attempting to deal with a DCII subfile consisting of all subjectinvestigation and adjudication segments. Based on the findings
discussed in that document, further manipulations were accom-
plished. The resulting DCII extract, known as the "2 most recent
segments" subtile is the subject of this paper. Documentation .-
of the characteristics of this extract is important, because this
file serves as the DCII input into a series of cohort and inven-
tory matching studies now underway. Their results will be repor-
ted separately, but require a familiarity with the information
to be presented here..
The initial DCII subfile described in the first report in
this series consisted of 9.9 million segments within 8.4 mi.llion
records. The "2 most recent segments" subfile contains 4.5 mil- .
lion segments within 3.9 million records. What was discarded along
the way will be discussed next, followed by a description of the
relevant characteristics of what remains.
The intent in creating the "2 most recent segments" subfile
was to simplify the original subfile by eliminating non-DIS inves- -
tigation segments, multiple records per subject, and records with-
out valid SSNs. It was recognized that a small price would be
paid to accomplish these objectives; that price being the loss
of some unique DIS and clearance segments. The subfile manipula-
tions consisted of three main steps: 1) reducing each record to
(at most) the most recent DIS investigation segment and the most
recent Army or Air Force adjudication segment, 2) deletion of.
records without valid SSNs, and 3) concatenation of records shar-
ing the same SSN into a single record with only the most recent
DIS investigation and/or adjudication segments. Table 1 summa-
rizes the status of the subfile at each step. The total loss of
DIS segments represents 1.9% of those in the full DCII, while the
dropped adjudication segments represent 3.0, of the DCII adjudica-
tion segments.
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TAKE 1 - Dfl &tfile Q'xatestics
DIS DIS Semnts ktjxcation AdjudicationrR d st~muls Dramed Sewmts Seet Drapa
Initial 8,439,458 1,847,130 None 2,793,089 %ine
sutftle
Within re d 4.,059,812 1,8M.672 11,45B 2,781,827 11,262
o te, ticn
Deletion of 4,055,072 1,831,698 3,9a74 2,780,576 1,251
invaid~ ~
Elirznatican of 3,926,455 1,812,75 19,123 2,710,3)3 70,273
dcplicate M"
'IOI' 3L ,55F,
As predicted in the earlier report, only a small number of
records without valid SSNs contained DIS investigation or z:.judi-
cation segments. Only 4,740 such records were identified. Of
this number, 143 did not appear to be meaningful DCII records,
as indicated by nuneric data in the fields reserved for names or
such "names" as--Test Record Deletion, Input Test DCII, and Input
Test Saturday. Also, 174 instances of two or more records per
individual were readily identified, some with unique DIS and/or
.-" adjudication segments and others with duplicate segments.
Fxamination of the DIS case categories for the 3,974 segments
"... without valid SSNs reveals over 70% to be civilian investigations, --
-while few are military EIs and SRIs, which are of greatest in-
terest. Most of the 1,?51 clearance segments are either at the
, secret level or reflect no clearance being Jssued. Felatively
few are of the more analytically interesting top secret, SCI,
revoked or denied varieties.
Most of the segments that were dropped were excluded in the
final step of the process, when duplicate SS!s were eliminated.
A 200 case sample of duplicate SSNs was exarined to estimate the
relative proportions of unique and duplicate segments that would .'-
. be dropped when the duplicate SSN records were combined. Analyses
of these cases yields estimates of only about 200 of the elimi-
nated DIS segments being unique, while about 90% of the eliminated
adjudication segments are estimated to be unique. Recall that
the methodology adopted, in cases where a unique segr',ent required
deletion, always retained the most recent segment.
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Examination of the reasons for duplicate SSN records for this 200
case sample revealed three dominant causes. In 68% of the cases, the
middle name differed. Mostly, this involved one record with only a
middle initial and the other with a full middle name. A second major 7
cause of record duplication was differing last names. This was found in
28% of the sample cases and mostly appeared as a result from women chang-
ing from maiden to married names. Finally, place of birth differences
were noted in 18% of the 200 cases sampled. Here the typical situation -
found one record with a place of birth and the other with none recorded.
DIS Investigations
The 1.8 million DIS segments in the "2 most recent segments" subfile.
consist of 350 different DIS case category codes. However, most of the
segments fall within a relatively small number of these codes. Table 2 -
presents the 20 most frequent case category codes, the number of segments
containing those codes or their related added coverage code, and the
cumulative percent of the total DIS segments in the subfile. Note that
these codes account for over 90% of the DIS segments. The additional 21
codes in Appendix A bring the cumulative percent up to 98.5% and leave
only 27,414 segments to be found among 272 other DIS case category codes.
In addition to the case category code, several other attributes of
DIS type 0 DCII segments in the "2 most recent segments" subfile were
reviewed; these included year of file, retention, context, and status
code. Year of file and retention are cross-tabulated in Table 3. Virtu-
ally all DIS segments are retained for 15 years. Only for those segments
added in 1983 is this near uniformity not the case, with nearly a quarter
of the DIS segments having an unspecified retention period.
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TABLE 2 Most Frequent DIS Case Category Codes
Case Category Cumulative
Code Description Number Percent
lAl Military BI 326,754 18.0
1A2 Military SBI 255,668 32.1
IGI Military (Entrance) 220,031 44.3
File NAC •
1G2 Military (Standard) 168,497 53.6
File NAC
IKI Military (Entrance) 121,438 60.3
ENAC
1A7 Military SBI, 70,120 64.1
Supplemental
lCl Industrial BI 69,473 68.0
IJ2 Industrial File NAC 51,548 70.8
lC2 Industrial SBI 49,054 73.5
IA3 Military IBI 46,857 76.1 -"
IB2 Civilian SBI 39,456 78.3
1D5 Military SBI-PR 36,355 80.3
(Limited)
1M2 Industrial ENAC 32,718 82.1
181 Civilian BI 30,821 83.8
IV9 Industrial ENAC, 26,855 85.3
Suitability
lK2 Military (Standard) 23,392 86.6
ENAC
lE5 Civilian SBI-PR 22,273 87.8
(Limited)
IC3 Industrial 181 20,756 88.9
lXX Other Agency 19,111 90.0
. Investigations




TAME 3 - Petenticn of DIS Samm~ts by Year of File
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Total I'T
1-1C 5ea - - 1 - .5 1.3 1.3 5,405
.3
15 year 99.7 99.7 98.7 99.6 99.3 q8.2 99.3 99.5 99.4 98.5 97.8 75.5 1,754,526
96.8
25-30 years .1 .3 1.3 .4 .1 1.0 .6 .5 .6 1.0 .9 .3 11,003
.6
ifed .2 .6 .8 -. 22.9 41,60 :
2.3
TOOAL N 89.458 156,102 168,560 146,318 122,170 135,510 137,945 158,611 184,633 168,772 173,152 171,343 1,812,574* -.
% 4.9 8.6 9.3 8.1 6.7 7.5 7.6 8.8 10.2 9.3 9.6 9.5 100
*Exclxies one segmt with year of file coded as 89 and retmtcn as 25 year.
TMF[E 4 - Status of DIS Sewts by Year of File
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 Total
Trackgs 20.6 39.9 44.0 56.1 65.9 71.6 77.4 80.4 81.4 80.3 79.6 61.4 1,177,355*
65.0
Opn Cases. .4 .5 . . . . . 20.3 *,.222
2.0
LUnpified 79.4 60.1 56.0 43.9 33.7 27.9 22.6 19.6 18.6 19.7 20.A 18.3 598.997
33.0
*Excludes one trawing segint with year of file coded as 89.
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Docu.,lentation of the context codes indjicatad tnat "13,5" suoject
and blank were thne only valiJ COie'.3 Othear Lnan' "x"-Cro.3 r-er-n2fc
and "v0" victi-i. the latter two wnicn na J oeen rharoos3-fuK .y
excluded in the initial I ubfiil3 levelop..1-int phas'e. Of The 1.
-iillion D7S se-.nents in tne "? .- o-st 3acnt ent2elts 31uofile, -
only 11.5 had blank context codes, witiio of znese ( 53 ) 3 iio -4i n
in 1930 3a-3ients. .*%'A
Status code *ocu.ie ntation -.iie wo) 'ty)e3 D :3 se ie nt.3L
tracin;3 and ooen casa3. .1 .3 T a'hie 4 so1 ws, a t.ir (u n,;e. fe
code was 31,3o ancounrereiJ. T.-j rola inJ4c-3ces an .ncreasin;
percenta3e of "tra-in.73" cod es ee 197? ; .nd 1973, lf:oi 2,3
to aoout 3017. Tiiat at ur mal -ta - y un til1 1933, wilen
234 of the status codes 3 4 c oD-an ca3T2s. That ya.- '3 the
only one in which .iore than -3 nell iole n'-iiber of -')en cases
Was found.
3ecause, of the 13rra -vj.ibar of diffarent MDS c-ase c-ate-.ory
codes and the 3iiilarities3 of -Jany t o eacih othaer. 3 neCw data
ela:nent was cr-eated. Terii consoli.ared case cate-jory, it A--
will siaplify future use of the .3ufile. Table 5 opesent3 tna2
totals anJ percenta-'e. 3 within. thea pri.iar y a; ; re -ations of D's
sCT~ ents in thie consolidated cae;re.The o)ercenta~es a r -a '
co.1puteJ a;ainst thle total nu-ioer of .)7 3 3e-,nents in th':e "12
,nost recent 3e ;.ent.3"I -suofila. Tiris t-ble shows04: that lost Of
the 371 Imnvet-i.'rtions in tnis DCII 3u-,file 1~ .41) are ii ta ry
or industrial Ms,3 ';T,-, or 2AC 3.
TA 3 L 2 - Coil :3~ e zas 3te o r is
Uia r v Cvili1an .3 > sria31 To tal
1344,1 ?1 19.3 32,515 1.7 74,3.95 4.1 431,431 24 .
R 17,043 1. 4,133 .S 14 14 .3 ')7,733 1 .5
3 ')1 43,13) 13. 52,3543 ?. 34,'1,31 3. 3 13 2 )5 5.24
3-P2 3 S,91)3? ?. ? 22331 1. 3,3)1 .5 '37,914 3 .7
.9 91) .1 ?7,757) 1.5 3:3,13 4 .3 5
p M7 9,33 .5 5,)141 .3 15 14) . 3723 1.
AC 33,513 295 7,31 . 1 13,54,5 33 3,34 3.
' 1h2 r 2,33S3 .1 34 .1 14,373 3 17,337 1 .
ju G 31 , 312,7 5 9 1 .
I sc ile 331 1 .1
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The "2 most recent segments" subfile contains 1.3 million
Army and 1.4 milion Air Force adjudication segments. The major
types of clearance sttus and the year of adjudication are given
on Table 6. For the Army segments in this subfile, the predomin-
ant clearance status is -secret". Most (80%) of the Army segments
were adjudicated since 1980, while less than 1% were adjudicated
prior to 1975. The Air Force adjudication segments are similar
in that most (74%) are -secret-. However, they differ in that -
a sizeable portion (23%) were adjudicated before 1975.
In addition to the clearance status and adjudication date,
DCII clearance segments contain the basis for the clearance and
the date of the reviewed investigation. Army segments also indi- _ -
cate the reason for the adjudication action. Table 7 summarizes
the subfile contents with regard to the basis for clearance as
a function of clearance status. While the DCII documentation
lists 23 valid codes for clearance basis, the five specified in
Table 7 account for all but a few percent of the segments in the
subfile.
Over 90% of the Army's "secret" clearances were based on an
-_ NAC or ENTAC, while virtualy all "top secrets" were based on a
BI and "SCIs" on an SBI. Almost all "secret" Air Force clearances -
resulted from an MAC, ErTAC, or NACI. Two-thirds of the remainder
resulting from SBIs. Virtually all SCI eligibility was based on
an SBI.
Additional analyses involved the dates of investigation and
adjudication. The year of investigation was subtracted from the
year of adjudication to establish the approximate delay between
the two events. A result of zero would occur if the adjudication
occurred in the same year as the investigation. The larger the
K computed difference, the greater time elapsed between investiga-
tion and adjudication. The findings from this analysis are pre-
sented by clearance status on table 8.
in the Army, most adjudications occur within a year of the
-m security investigation, with 5% at six years or beyond. Differ-
ences are noted by clearance status. For SCT and revocation/de-
nial actions, over 90% fall in the same or one year difference
categories and only 1% at six years or beyond. The top secret
clearance categories were noteworthy for having the hightest per-
B" centages at six years or beyond, 28% and 11% respectively. -
Overall, in comparison with the Army, the Air Force had a
higher percentage (90% vs. 82%) within the first two difference
categories and about the same (4% vs. 5%) at six years or beyond.
The only major Air Force clearance category to differ substan-
tially from the others was the one indicating adjudication of an _
unfavorable investigation terminated with no clearance issued.
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FY 83 Army and Air Force Adjudications
The number and type of Army and Air Force adjudications enter- %, j
ed into the DCII in FY 83 is shown on Table 1. For the Army, nine
different codes were used. The "'I" and "S" secret level categor-
ies accounted for 73t of the 1°10 thousand entries, followed in
% magnitude by the 10,. of SCI level clearances. A total of 17 Air
Force codes were encountered with the "S" secret code found in
710o of the nearly 183 thousand Air Force adjudications. Also,
7*4135 were coded top secret and 8% top secret/eligible for SC-.
Table 2 displays the types of investigations utilized to ar-
rive at the various clearance status codes during FY 83. In both
U the Army and Air Force, secret clearance status was granted based
a'-most exclusively on the various types of national agency checks.
Virtually all. SC' level clearances in each service resulted from.
- special background investi.,ations. "Most top secret clearances
were based on bac,.round investigations, although 12' of the Army
"P" clearances and ?00 of the Air Force "7'. top secret clearances
showed an SPI.
Army adjudicatons in the DC7 contain a data element describ-
ing the reason for adjudicative action. Table 3 lists the reasons
for review under each clearance status. post secret and top sec-
ret clearances sh-owed "surety" as the reason for review. SCI
clearances were split about evenly tetween "surety" and "special
intellirence."-
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TAM-L17 1 7 Y 53 CLrARA!!CC A~CTIONS
CODE 1"U! B F P R CE, NC !T DES C RT PTIC.'
102,321 56.3 Secret/AR_,-5 (PFP-Surety)
S 28,698 15.9 Secret
V 18,537 10.3 SCI
X 1C,807 6.0 Pending Action at CCF
7,635 4.2 Top Secret/AR50-5 (PRP-Surety)
T 6,805 3.8 Top Secret
5.343 3.0 Revoked/Denied
F 31 0.0 Favorable/'!o clearance requested
C 13 0.0 Confidentia.
Total 180,190 100.0%
Air Force
COD. NI1rEP PFRCENT D.SCPIPT.TON!
S 129,390 70.8 Secret
T 24,530 13.14 Top Secret
V 15,132 3 .3 Top Secret/Eli-ible for SC' -
Z P,711 2.6 Terri.nated/:o clearance issued/
unfavorable investigation
3 ,517 1 . Pendin: adjudication
3,140 1.q Favorable/o clearance autLorized
L 512 0.3 Restricted to nonsensitive posi-
t ion,
443 0.2 Terminated/. o clearance issued/
favorable investization"
304 0.2 Top Cecret/!nelinible for SC
A 298 0.2 Tnvestization reopened
U 130 0.1 Top Secret/'rte-.T. accesc to
C'T C rarited
P 129 0.1 Clearance revolved
C 91 0.0 'one
I 61 0.c _fnvestication 'n-tated
D 2? O.C Clearance denied'
:(21 0.0 Ter 1' nated while pendin-, adjudi-.
1 0.0 Top ?ecret/Tne]'7itle for S-'P
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Dresents th-e results of tr'zs r:~ys or the 7' A'rr. :;nl Air
Torce clenrance Fctions. flevie.7 c, te ulatv ~ret~ec~
ur- ns on t~hi z tablc z sotis th e A ir 7 orce to ra v c auch hihrper-
centF-,e of cdjudllcztionz, s.iti very short. (at I rrth 72 vs.
4'~O ) crioc' after tl- nes~t -f.-hs 72n - ,ostly made u-s
by the 11 ;-cnt;h nerfioc wuhere it is cOnly ?~v 7S- ' and it. ds:
pears a t thre 10 ya r point., uhr : n ervicesz .3rc~. a cumulative
v 'aIue of ""
vrAr
:j1.1 - 17 .77
1 1
x.c2udes 17) czzcs Jtid, 'irvcsi- -'a fobllat : (~cdOf -rr'~) d~~atc v
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Clearance Ftatu5- of Army and Air Force Perzonne! (-n of .. .).
An - yso ,;e.re done t.o Ceterm'nei :no r. v ai !i d, of
cI ea ran c e cver'e izZued t c y nd 21r 7orce crsanrl on 'D
n t the eni cf 7T"'" . Table s urrr 2.es the fnss for offM-
cers, enlisted, and civilian personnel. T-e C 3-:ater r
... c",inr reveoled a clearance entry for hol f of the .rr.y :erson-
nel ard all but P of Air Frce :zrsonnel. Tn bot, ces t.e ',l n-.r-
certa e '..n'at- cler nce .....e r ,cr :r,or t,-e fl,.'itery than the
,% c- vi a ins "
.-:c, in .ot. services, off-car- '-2' - -- erie,,rccnt .ar
o f C cleare1nc th r. t ,i.r cn' r te ! vd 1 -4..-.n count,,rcot.
O~ r. r ,acl c. n: c v~ no :-nc c. Ct :r, rI e ~ h c Cr e.~e t.......cre 5r> .. ,, : ~ - :-':r . , : ,-re ' '"--
r..... . o seret or C7 ao - c i '. C_ .
?..~XI"ercen.rs of.c-.-
foCnd t -2 C r i C C , r.
*~ one fr c v ia no 1 c fr
no o r ' :'ci ne Cr o f f c - .
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VTF 5 - ClevraE Ctat~z Of' A jV P ir 7crce 'erniel
eaT. O', cer ZrJI i Civil' __________
'bzt in D= 42,252 ? .9 2rA 3r, -5 3r.c ?774,C'4C 7(. 0 7cr% 50.2?
1- Sct/A=-5 (T,%rety) 12,251 11.5 115130 Y14. S L3,2 12.0 2%, "6 -
S Swret 11 , ? 10.? 111,T-6 16.7 2302 55 147, 1 C. 13.0
v 'TT 22,735 21 .4 31,01!L 11*2 17 04 2. 5 2%' 59)
T Top Sert AF . 4,5 -%p 1!riq0-"-.16 .
(P'Srey ,73~? 0,74c' 1.5 3,7P 1.0 23,15? 2.0
y rbndirr Pttion a- 07 1 ,XU1 1.0 1"),1 1 .5 1rJV7 O.'3 12,T09 1.1
r7"~-C/eid7 n. 1 '!,216 0.7 :2?r0 0.1 51 C"> 0.5
M Qher Cgds 113 0.1 1 07r 0.11 7111 0.? 11 1,321 0.1
105~W'iCS 50,12 1T' ,C3 1rn ,35,315 1 rl,'
Pdr Forme Officer r2zi CiviIJ xr o~
* "ct Tr ITIT 11.1 0. 5 1,~t 0~ ,?3 ' 17,7,<7 2.
s F h''ize M-7, 4. 71,71C '2.21 P-t* 70.1
ETotal 1NlJ,'*7" 1T !3,4 1T 7Y,~ X ~ ~ 7 T
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DIS investi-ation Status of DOD Personnel (Fnd of FY -3)
Table 6 displays the overall results of analyses on the type
"0" DIS investizations conducted on enlisted, officer, and civil-
.an personnel in the Department of Defense. It shows that at the
7OD level, about half the officers, ?0* of the enlisted personnel '
and 10, of the civilian employees have one of the 350 DTS case
cate-ory coce. fcund in the DCT7. Fortunately, for the sake of
ex:position, !?ozt have one of a relatively sra]l3 number cf these
case category codes. As shown on Table 6, predorinant aron; the
DIS invezti[.tJc n:- are military !'I and Sr-T's for the officers
and en] isted personnel, and civilian rI's a.nd SIT's for the civil-
:n ,OD e',:le.yees .
A on n the .'ervices, the Air Force i;as found to have tl-e 7reat-
est cercenta;e of officer (<55), en] istel (27) and icivi zu
(10. )  perccnnel h:  DMS type "0" investi j at.on::, "a Jo tke arine
Corps had the sr. allest. Comparab. e ,ar.rc Cor.3 ff_-ur_ .ere 112
(off.cers), 127 (en]isted), and ! (civilian,:;). The 'I".r < ... -nvy
r e...i t. i. these ran-es for c of the te c tyr:cs of personnel.
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A-4-1
Investiaation And Clearance Status Of Those In Army
- ft.J
Personnel Security Screening Program Occunations
The Army currently operates a Personnel Security Screening .
Program (PSSP) which screens recruits for positions requiring -
background investigations and high level security clearances.
Key personnel in this program are security interviewers working
at the MEPS to screen applicants and military intelligence
interviewers at the basic training sites. who interview certain .
recruits before their DIS investigations are requested. The ,
PSSP currently screens for 17 enlisted occupational specialties
involving intelligence or nuclear work. The purpose of the
analyses reported here was to ascertain the DC_. status of personnel
in the PSSP occupations at the beginning of FY S4, with rer-ard
to their rost recent CI'S investigation and current Army clearance
eligibility.
Table 1 shows the types of DIS investigations found in
f..'
the specialties covered by the PSSP. The first ten occupations
(05D-98J) require SCI eligibility. Vost incumbents in each
of these specialties show an S5I type case category code, the'-
percentages ranging from ,37 (720) to 9410 (95C). Relatively
few instances were identified with no DIS dossier; the percentage w.:
ranging between 1% (C5,K) and J46 (72G). "
The rernaininz seven specialties on table 1 require secret
or top secret eligibility based on a PI level irvestication. -
Among the latter four (127-550), 5I/lIF type investigations
precominate; the percentages ranging from 71, (55D) to 95% (12F).
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TAEE 1. DIS Irvestikatic On Persnt- In Am P' Qo tions
Initial Initial Periodic--"
sm Oaler BAIOtter Feviewj
ON) BDSM' 2itter Idertifer/tocator 77.7% 17.C51 Z0 .1% 1.4l% 3.0%
05G S4721alsirity 68.~4 24~.1 .5 .1 46 2.1
05! E1.IGINr Ztbrwe Iteceptor 68.7 22.8 .4 .2 11.8 3.1
OW BI/V=T "-'orse Interveptor 72.8 19.7 .1 .2 5.3 1.9
333 Wbtatept Systam P:epirer 67.1 23.9 .4 .2 5.5 3.0
72 Data Crnmicat= Sitding Center 48.2 34.6 9.2 1.9 1.6 4.4
N 97B Coaterintelbgexe Agent 61.3 32.2 .U .2 2.3 3.6
c? E .:T Analyst 74.1 19.6 .2 .1 3.3 2.6
9F B= ,T Voice Intr t 69.9 23.4 .5 .3 3.2 2.7
98J .VR' T srrtmications Interceptor 73.0 16.2 .3 .2 6.5 4.0
; 6B ntellgme nPalyst 33.5 24.1 28.0 4.2 1.9 8.4
i
% , 6D 1-,ee Thteurte 44.5 24.7 16.9 1. 3.o F.4
...-, .. .
36L F etrt*'idcs &rit-jrg System ?Peairer 28.0 1C.J 19.4 1.1 .0 41.2
1" l ttaico Dwoition t.nitions .0 .0 F6.0 0 4.9
35: ! lear s Electrunics 2.2 .0 77.4 11.9 .0 .
%' 550 Fxplosive Odrace Disposal 4.5 .9 65.J 5.9 .8 22.4
; ' 5 r .:ep: te e 2.7 .4 7,.9 11.3 .7 5.,
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The only other noteworthy finding among these four occupations
was that 20% of the explosive ordnance disposal specialists(55D)
did not have a DIS dossier.
Those in the other PSSP occupations showed considerable
variability in the types of DIS investigations they have had. .2
For OS 96B, 5R% had SBIs and 32% P./ITs. Among image interpreters
(96D), 69% had SBIs and 18% I/IPIs. Seven percent in each
of these ocupations did not have a DIS dossier. In MOS 36L,
38% had SBIs, 20% BI/IFIs, and 33'% no DIS dossiers.
Table 2 presents the DCII clearance status of the Army
enlisted personnel in the 17 PSSP occupations at the beginning-
of FY 84. The first ten (05D-98J) require SCI eligibility and
table 2 shows that most personnel in each MOS have it. This 
f igure ranges fror 76% (72G) to 89% (05G), ,,,hile the percentage
with no DCII clearance entry goes fro- 16! (05-1) to 4% (720 an('
97F) for these ten occupations.
1-1h ile only requiring top secret eligibility, a majority
of those with :CS's 967 (50%) and 96D (64!) have SCI eligibility.
'!OS 36L requires only a secret clearance, yet 27% have higher
eligibility, while 23'% have no DCII clearance entry.
The four remaining occupaticns on table 2 also require
secret clearances, but a majority in each have top secret eligibility
ranging from: 61" (55D) to 24., (12 7). Finally, 29S of the explosive
ordinance disposal specialists (55D) have no t)CIT clearance
entry. J
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TAME 2. Clearaime Status Of Perscrre1 In Arnm PS' Opmntiis
TCP Pewked/ PenirC bt in '
05 Sigia1 Ssmrity Sowialist, 89.1 2.0 .0 .7 5.6 2.5 ~
053 P.Y=1T ~'rse Inteceptor N4.8 .5 .3 .6 12.1 1.6 y>
05 O FC YV=T ?bN4brse Interneptor 88.5 .7 .2 .7 89.6 1.3
31; EYl~terept, System Repairer E6.7 .6 .5 .6 9.7 2.0
'1 72G rbta canmxz~aticr= mir Ceter 75.6 6.0 .9 1.5 12.3 3.8
97B Caruterntelligere Aget R.5 4.3 .4 .4 3.5 3. F
§C a vsrc AwV= lyst 87.1 .3 .6 .4 10.0 1.6 .
9SJ, El-=Voice Interetor- p7.6 A*4 .5 9.6 1.5 K--
9&J ~IF.YE-T fbwruaii Interceptor OJ4.4I .3 .7 .4I 12.1 2.1
96r Tnte11igerme Pplyst 50.5 31.9 4.3 .7 7.4 5.2
96D T.~e Interpree 63.7 19.2 3.6 1.2 5.6 6.7
36L. U2crrds3tchirt Systers Repirer 21.5 5.7 30.5 i1.1 18.6 m 6
12 Atanic Demvliticn rd zticai .3 3'J.3 4. F .7 2.9 6.9
1* 35F Wear !brw '-etrics 2.7 92.S 6.5 1 .0 2. 2 5.9
5T Fbposive 0rrnance Disposal 4.2 (0.9 4.4 .1 1. 86
55G xWear Veisinteawoe 2.2 22.2 2.2 122.6 9.7
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A-5-1
Identification Of Army Too Secret And SCl Elif:ibles I
Not Included In DCII Clearances
A recent study reported that over 50% of active Army personnel ,
did not have a clearance segment in the DCII at the end of FY -.
83. Discussions with Army clearance officials indicated that
the DCII does not contain information on Army clearances issued
before 1978. The following analyses were conducted to determine
how many of these personnel might have or be eligible for top .J
secret or SCI clearance.
The procedure utilized was to deterrine the DIS case category "
code (if any) for those without clearance segments. !Uhile the
results will not be proof of clearance status, they will in
general, set limits to the level of clearance eligibility one
rmi~ht have. For example, an individual with no record of a
DTS investigation beyond a PAC history, file "AC or expanded
!*'AC would at best be eliZible for a Secret clearance. Powever,
sormeone with a PI could qualify for a Top Secret and an individual
, '.'th an SPI may have SCI eligibility.
Table 1 shows the Army officer, enlisted and civilian
irventories ir three classifications: those w,ith a DCMT clearance
segment (whose clearance status was reported earlier), those
with no DCIT clearance seirment and no DIS dossier se:r.ent (and
therefore no D.S or S?), and finally those vith no DC""
clearance e~rrent, but havinc a DTF case category code (and
possibly Top Secret or 'C status). M'ote that relatively Le.-
A-5-2
of those without DCII clearance segments have a DIS dossier
segment.
>.%i*-.
TArU 1. DCII Cla--me D 7 Dossier Stature
. Y3 Active Arm Per-el) " -
,.4 status Enise Ofie Civilian..
Yes IA 414,0,W 62.0 63,6c6 60.1 95,506 214.0 565,149 49.8 .
!b rb 46 33.5 35,075 33.1 253,0.69 73.2 523,490 46.1
.919b Yes M 4. 7,177 _'I 1.P47,176 _4.1
U Total -.5,312 100.0 105,94F, I00.0 2-0,595 100.0 1 1,135,F15 100.'o -
Tables 2 and 3 present the types of -IS investigations
most prevalent a:rong those with a D75 dossier ;eZent, but no
DCII clearance segment. '.any of these individuals would not
2.'
be eligible for a Top Secret or SC' clcarance because their
PIS dossier reflects only a IIAC or TV.
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TA-F 2. T Do= £ser Tm= For Amy, :ilitary Persorrel
!t,'it !b DCII Clear=x~ Fbtrv
1C2 Standard File NAC 9,536 31.9 ,L!7 13.2
11(1/pA Fxraxde TX~A 6,720 -22.5 eT .3
1A/A 17, initial 4. c3F8 16.2 3,=04 V1.0"
IA31C~ 7.7 initial 6142 2.1 64 5.1
Di /A 13 .U 102
1 T-r .,- sc-al covera[,e ?' 3 3.
1r7A3 /(Tnhctrial) E-1, seurityi 152 .5 27 J
1-111/ I-PR? (lifited) 117 !14 1.2
1P3,C SI, sutiity isas M7 6 ~ 17 .2
total 29,19 100.O 7,177 1C12.
A-5-4
TPJ1E 3. DIM T)wsier Types For Am~ Civilian Per~mie
'itl ~b ~ClC10=~2 Fztry
I-1C2 Staxb~rt~ File 'AC (rilitary) 1,937 19.2
112 7ile -PC (civilial) U7r0U.
!I/rSamlorr' 7xral& "IC (-7iihtary) 4 1.6
1J'p Te 'Yf (4inbiztrial) 1413 1.LI
-1AT civiliai) 2,2T, :Z5 3
1A/!1T (naitzry) 1 141T 14.0
117P (Civil ier) 1 11 1.0
1F/P TI1 (civilian)7f7
17r. SF1, SunMlE'.et01 (CiViM ) 120 1.3
K.' A-5-5
In summary, these analyses have determined that ir add'ition
to the number of Top Secret and 1CT P.rm-ry clearances previously
reported for the September 1903 active duty inventory, utn to ~
about 9 thousand enlisted personnel, 5 thousind officers, and
7 thousand civilians ray also have or be eli----iF for suc>- .±-.-h
level clearances. Furthermore, should it be decided to supplerent
the DCIT cl.earance date, P 'DC could malke individual id4entificaticnf;
by name, ran'.,, SS".' and unit identificcati-on code available to
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Navy does not input security clearance data into the DCII.
However, DMDC currently receives quarterly data submissions
from NMPC which include level of clearance, type of investigation, 1 4_.
investigating agency, and the date on which the security investi-
gation was completed. These data are available for active duty
officers and enlisted personnel.
The attached tables examine the content of data elements.4
from the December 1983 files, which are potentially useful to
the DOD Personnel Security Research Program. Table 1 shows -.
the type of clearance and identifies two major limitations of
this data base. First, there are no clearance data at all for j _
many individuals - 19% of the enlisted personnel and 4%. of the
officers. Secondly, for many others the level of clearance
is not recorded. Only the type of investigation is available.
This is true for 21% of the enlisted personnel and 38% of the J
officers. In sum, the clearance status of 40% of the enlisted
personnel and 42% of the officers is not available from this
data base.
TAELE' 1- C1lan. e Fligibility Of ctiwe Duty '. '."*-
New Persmiel As Of December 1983
CermSttsNI N
Top Secret 38,971 8.1 24,426 34.8
Sem-et 179,795 37.2 15,916 22.7
Otber 593 .1 13 .0
None 71,796 14.9 52 .1
Ulmom (BI/SE) 8,057 1.7 8,463 12.1
(a.n NAC/ENC) 93,894 19.4 18,328 26.1 77".
Not PrcDese/fb _or. 1




-. - -- --- - - . 4°w
While disappointing, this finding for the Navy is quite
similar to that previously discussed for the Army, a DCII
contributor. In the case of the Army, no DCII clearance information
was available for 38% of the enlistees and 40% of the officers.
To more closely examine the Navy data, clearance eligibility
distributions were obtained by paygrade and are displayed on
table 2. These figures exclude those for whom no information
was available. Note that for enlisted and officer personnel,""
as paygrade increases, the percent with top secret and the percent
with unknown eligibility, but a BI or SBI also increases. At -.-.
El the combined figure is 1%, while at E9 it is 35%. At the
01 level it is 17%, rising to 97% at 07 and above. Also noteworthy
for enlisted personnel is the decrease in the percentage with
no clearance as paygrade increases.
p TAME 2- QM-M Eligibility By Paygrade
IL.3 . . . -,
Pa Qi,. Top eSwxetet tChrNe(I/I)(NEW ) ,,
El .7 29.3 .2 55.6 .1 14.0
E 1.6 32.3 .1 57.6 .0 8.3
23 4.5 43.7 .1 35.1 .1 16.5
2E4 72 52.4 .1 14.7 .2 25.3
E5 12.3 51.7 .1 4.1 1.3 30.5
E B5 17.5 44.6 .3 .6 5.3 31.6
E7 21.7 41.4 .3 .2 9.4 26.9
EB 6.7 40.5 .2 2 11.1 25.8
09 22.5 3.6 .0 .1 18.6 22.1
"-' 24-A~ 3o.8 29.7 .1 .0 12.5 26.8 '-.-
",01 13.8 39.6 .0 .0 3.5 43.1 .: :.
02 ( 29.0 41.8 .0 .0 2.9 26.3 .. [
:"03 35.1 22.5 .0 .0 8.4 -32.9
. 04 45.5 13.6 .0 .1 18.6 22.1.....
05 5o.8 8.9 .0 .3 26.1 13.8
06 48.1 8.8 .0 .1 30.2 12.9
07-011 62.1 .4 .0 .0 314.8 2.7
A- 6-3
Table 3 shows the type of investigation, with ENTNAC and
NAC most numerous, followed by BI and SBI, in that order. Note
that this information is not available for many individuals. ..
While this is true for the NMPC data base, it would be possible _"""
to determine for whom there is a DIS dossier, by linking this
data base with the DCII-inventory extract currently in use.
TAa.E 3- Type Of jGvti&=c: ti DutY Navv Perscrrel (12/83)
154c86 3.1 11,215 16.0
BI 32,012 6.6 21,509 30.7
EMINC/NAC 345,589 71.5 34,464 49.2
Other 419 .1 10 .0bt Pnmesed Red 4 86 2,O .1 ....
Total 483,1M 99.9% 70,103 100.0 .-
Table 4 examines the type of investigation by paygrade.
It shows an increase in the percentage of SBIs and BIs along
with a corresponding decrease in NACs and ENTNACs as paygrade
increases. Thus while less than 1% of the Els show an SBI,
9% of the E9s have it. And while 3% of the Ols have an 2BI
code, the comparable figure at 07 and above is 82%.
A-6-
. ~A-6-4 1 "
3..-. .~...... .. "-?-
-. p r Zr. - m . p . - .. - -.
TAME 4- vMe 9C kwian By Paygade
.1 .8 98.9 .2
E2 .4 1.2 98.3 .1 .. -
E3 1.3 3.3 9.3 .1E4 2.5 5.0 924 .1
E5 4.9 8.7 85.3 .1
ES 7.5 15.4 76.9 .2 .' :)
ET 8.8 22.1 68.8 .3
t 9.2 24.2 66.4 .2
9.2 25.3 65.1 .14 .
e2-JA 11.1 31.6 57.3 .0
orr'. ~0Mer..-:-:
01 2.9 14.4 82.7 .o0 ,:
02 7.0 24.8 68.3 .003 12.4 32.0 55.5 .0 ' -
04 22.0 41.8 36.2 .0
05 33.6 42.9 23.5 .0
06 42.2 X.3 22.6 .0
-Oil 82.0 13.3 4.7 .0
Table 5 presents the source of investigation for those
with BIs and SBIs. Virtually all SBIs are attributed to DIS.
Most BIs for those with top secret clearances were also done
by DIS. In contrast, slightly more than half of the BIs with
unknown clearance status have NIS codes.
TABLE 5- Saroe Of B aid MI IMestiati
Fnicer
13DS ,12 99.7 1,879 99.4 8,447 99.5 2,674 98.5
1uS 45 .3 12 .6 43 .5 41 1.5
:wi'- - - - 2 .0 1 .0
Total 13,172 100.0 1,891 100.0 8,492 100.0 1 2,716 100.0
DIS 22,151 86.3 2,648 42.9 11,943 75.8 2,582 44.9
. ~NIS 3,506 13.7 3,243 52.6 3,813 242 3,156 514.9
2izr'1 cle - - 275 4.5 6 .0 9 .2
Total 2,659 100.0 6,166 100.0 15,762 100.0 5,747 100.0
A-6-5
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In summary. the NMPC data input to DMDC provides a continuing
source of personnel security information on current active enlisted
and officer Naval personnel. Data are available on clearance
status, type of investigation, and investigating agency. Coverage
on the key item - clearance status - is far from complete, but
no worse than is the case for Army DCII records. Over the next
several years, the coverage should substantially improve for
both services. Starting with October 1984 DCII analyses, Navy
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ProjectiOns of Military Pericdig-Review. Reouirements
Linkage of the DCII with current personnel inventory data .**
bases permits analyses to determine the number- of investigations
due, under various periodic review requirements. Current standards
call for reinvestigation after five years. However. DIS resource
constraints now limit the services to quotas, resulting in a
backlog of overdue investigations. These analyses were performed
to determine the size of the backlog and to project the number
of individuals, who would become eligible for periodic review
during FY84 and FY85. Such information is important to the - '
formulation of policy and investigatory staffing alternatives
over the next few years.
The primary findings were that:
... About 11? thousand military personnel had
DIS BI/SBI type investigations exceeding the
5 year limit at the end of FY83,
...Over 38 thousand individuals with top secret
and SCI clearance status were due to hit the
5 year limit in FY84, and
...An additional 51 thousand with such clearances
were projected to reach the 5 year limit during
FY85.
Of the 2.1 million active duty military personnel at the
end of FY83, 520 thousand were found to have DIS dossiers.
Nearly 20% of these dossiers reflected expanded or file NACs
rather than background investigations. The 423 thousand remaining
." DIS investigations served as the point of departure for the
A-7-2
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analyses reported here. Nearly 97% of these were included among
the dozen types of DIS investigations listed on table 1. Initial
BI and SBI codes alone account for 272 thousand investigations.
Table 1 indicates the fiscal year in which the investigations
turn(ed) 5 years old. Two hundred thousand of these will not
hit the 5 year mark until FY86 or later. Since many of these
individuals may leave the military through attrition or separation
. .!
after completing their initial enlistment commitment, no meaningful
projections of periodic review requirements can presently be
made for this group. Of the remaining investigations on
table 1, 113 thousand had already hit the 5 year trigger point
by the end of FY 83. However, it is not implied here that all
were overdue for a periodic review. In projecting periodic
review requirements it was assumed that not only a 5 year old
BI/SBI was necessary, but also a high level (top secret or SCI)
clearance status. This assumption made projections of the backlog
unfeasible since Army clearance data prior to 1979 is far from
complete and there are no Navy or USMC clearance data in the
DCII.
Because of the considerations just described, it was decided
that projections could best be made for FY84 and FY85. Periodic ...
,, review requirement projections for these two years were made
"., separately for those with SCI and top secret status as follows.
For each type of investigation the numbers of Army and Air Force
individuals with SCI (then top secret) status were determined
along with the fraction of individuals having that status.
These fractions were averaged and applied to the Navy and USMC
-. A-7-3 L., ,, .4 - , : ' . - . - - ' , - . -r . - . . . . - . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . ., .
kL .a _ . ? ,'.L . . . . . '. .. ] . . '. -. '; ' '. ' . '.j . ' .''""' ."."-"-. . ." . . .". " ".. . . . . .'.-.'A'7; . . .. .
totals with each type of investigation. These discounted figures
were added to the Army and Air 'Force actual figures to arrive
at the projections. The computations were done separately for .
officers and enlisted personnel since the fractions awarded .
SCI and top secret status varied.
For a simplified example, assume for a particular fiscal -
year all 100 (100%) Army enlisted personnel with a particular
type investigation have SCI status as do 80 of 100 (80%) Air
Force personnel. Further assume totals of 100 Navy and 20 Marine
Corps personnel with the same type investigation. The average
of the Army and Air Force percentages (90%) would be applied
to yield a Navy projection of 90 and a Marine Corps projection
of 18. These results would be added to the 100 Army and 80
Air Force personnel to yield an enlisted SCI estimate of 288
for that type of investigation in that fiscal year. The enlisted
estimate would be combined with the officer estimate for that
type of investigation, and the enlisted and officer estimates
for the other 11 types of investigations, to produce the SCI
periodic review requirement estimate for a particular fiscal -
year. The results on table 2 were derived in this manner.
Sizeable as these projections are, they may understate
the situation. Related analyses reveal that about 10% of the
* Army personnel and 20% of the Air Force members with top secret
*status in the DCII had no DIS dossier shown. To the extent
that certain of tlese cases reflect background investigations
thtbecome 5 years odin FY84 o FY85, teprojections o
table 2 should be higher.
A-7-4
Refinements on the current projections and expansion beyond
two years into the future could be made. The two major circumstances
necessary for such improvements would be the inclusion of Navy
clearance data into the DCII and the development of continuation
estimates for those with background investigations. With respect
providing D?4DC with periodic input that can be merged with DCII
extract files to link Navy investigations and clearance data.
The initial merge is planned for October 1984.
~ ..- lDevelopment of continuation estimates could be accomplished
by utilizing the enlisted cohort file developed at DMDC, which
* covers non-prior service accessions from FY74I through FY83.
* -~ Service specific analyses could be made of the continuation
* behavior of those in certain occupations or with certain types
of DIS investigations. From such analyses continuation rates
would be determined tlhat w~ould be used in the periodic review
projection procedure.
A- 7-5
*~~~2 J. ~ . .. .
I , . -.
Wr,, sm, s. ,p.aia- 7,365 4,106 5,726 5,38 23,3)0
1A3/C ITR, initial 1,254 0 0 0 34,079 "
T'E Mr, bri up 3,282 3,017 3,890 4,911 3,470--
1P3.t ME, szit il.ity ism 68 59 912 1,624 8,210
1I, Hr. Sdtability ime 72 713 934 1,862 3,899
1EM Perldc reviewi 60 0 0 0 7,301
M1V IM, mitabiity ism 3 0 0 0 3,075
1D1/A M, b up 823 410 52 645 524 .
lI6/v sr, svimt 148 70 101 197 2,377
M, bn p 1.694 4 5 0 0
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S=UMITY CIARA.ES AMO'1G AMY XND AIR ORCT I
RESEF MJE C YIPONI PEPSOMMIL°
A previous report in this series presented overall clearance informtion
for active duty military oersonnel and OOD civilian eriployees. This paoer *
contains similar information for military reservists. As in the earlier
study, the point in time depicted is the beginning of FY 84. The statistics
reported here were derived from an SER7 atching between the DCII maintained
by the Defense Investigative Service and the reserve conponents personnel
inventory of the Defense Manpower Data Center. Data are shown for coqonents
in tbose services which input adjudicative actions to the DCII, namely the
Ar I Reserve, Arz.y *Iational .Guard, Air Force 2eserve, and Air Mational Guard.
Overall clearance code distributions for the four coponents considered
are oresented on table 1. It shows that for ,ast Army personnel (750 of
the reservists and 52% of the guardsien) there was no DCII clearance entry.
Relatively few in the Ar.-' cor-onents had top secret o: .cI codes. In contrast, :
the Air rorce coponents, -.articularly the 'Air -'>tional Guard had lower
oercentaees not found in the DCTI (5%) and ritch higher Dercentages .ith
top secret or 3CI codes t17%)
In view of the varied corposition of the reserve co-.,onants, ,ore zetailed "
. analyses were performed to e:,adne possible differences due to such factors
as t'e officer-enlisted distinction and the 3cv;rnl reserve cor Onent
categories. lesrvists are categorizel into th:ree hasic ,lroups- reay,
standby, anJ retired reserve. The Ar:r, 'ational Guar, an. Air Mtional
Guard consist only of ready reservists.
Separate .:.*earance cole distributions for officers and enlisteJ ,)erconnal
in each of the thr,e reserve categories are zholm on table 2. In the Ary
Reserve, the ?ercent not found in -he DCII v.iz hijhest for retired r
The fe.i standby Ar.,ry -eservists hac higher ;ercents " Cith S and top secret
codes t1an the other categories ;while the highest percent waith Secoret codes
1 4 were in the ready reserve.
lost of the ready raservists co:.nrisin-j the Arriy Mtional ,uar di,
not have a clearance entry in the XII. As was thie case in the r:. .
S.. .rvc, more Army "tional luar- officers (Pl%) taLn enlisted! ersonnel - -
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'Tith regard to the Air Force Reserve, ,-st retired ;embers and officers
* with standby status had no clearance information in the OCIT. ',ost ready
reservists had secret clearances, wh.. a greater fraction of officers (35%)
than enlisted personnel (11%) had 13CI or top secret codes. Table 2 shows -.
the latter to also be true in the Air lational Guard where 57% of the officers
had SCI or top secret status conpared to only 12% of the enlisted personnel.
"i7ithin the ready reserve tlre are six iajor categories of oersonnel.
A These are selected reserve unit -nembers, full-time support (active
Guari/Reservists), military technicians, individual reservists in the selected
reserve, individual reservists in the non-selected reserve, and 3ersonnel
in tle so-callad training pioeline. See Aependix A for definitions of these
categories. Tables 3-5 contain clearance code distributions for each ready
reserve category by officer-enlisted status within compo~nent.
Table 3 covers the Ar.-my Reserve and shows t-e highest percentages without
'.i'! DCI clear Lce entries to be military technicians (74% and 83%) anud thei.'4'- '
enlisted training pipeline (75%). T-e category with the greatest percentage
of secret codes is enlisted non-selected individual rese:vists (48%). Individual
reservists in th'e selected reserve ha. the '-3 enlisted (15) and officer
(27%) rates of D.I or top secret codes.
: rny "Th-tional -uar2 findings are showm on table 4. T'he enlisted full-time-.-
sueport (activ Cuard/7eserve) personnel were notable for having the ighet--
oercent ,ith secret codes (592) and the louest aercent found w o.C
clarance codes (39"). In each categor, a hi4-her )roportion of officers
,.-, tn.n enlisted cersonnel ha ICTI and to- -) .ret codes. "e t e of '1
or too secret codes waas found for full-t-ime su-port (active uard/7escrve)
officers (15%).
In t;e Air Force 7ea'y reserve (table 5), the only catag'ory v"
.ubstantial fraction of personne"l itout 7CII adjudicative J:nor-vion
was the training pipeline (47%). jichhest percentage, amnn enlisted ersonnel,
with !.I or toe secret codes was found for the inclividual reservists in
the selected reserve (32%). Aong officers tE highest corparabL fi.3urez
were found arong full-tie support x-rzoiui (activ2 3uard2/Ttervo-73 anil
miltary tecunicians-55%).
Again in tl '\ir "Tational Cuar-d (ta: S), the training pi-eline ..
the only category wit' a high r-fta (4T.%) found wit!)out DC.I clearance jata.
Air 'Tational 2uard officers shoWed far higher rates 'ith CI or top secret
A-8-5
- - .'...:al
o D m ' 0 0 0 0 0 CD m
-4 4 -4 - 4 - 4
or N C4 0T 0~00 ON 01 0 0'
-.7 4: 0 L 103 0' m 00 C
co -0 C4 e' il'. a' 0
0 T 0 -0 -
1.0 ID 00 .'.l
oD -I 00 0 en a' N 4o ~U _
A3 0~ -1 -0 C-) a-, 0 T a% 0
r: 11 C7 1-7 0'; -41; L
C3 0% (N -7 03
e'.'0 03 '0 -




Z . Nn '.0 04 - W ~ y c'j 0- rI)
r* .7 .: Is .l .
I -4
4N M 0 N C r-4 00 (n , I
Q)~- '.04 Nd14-
w a
IT -T -% It. 03 m 0 00 0C-
0) Kt N-. C1 .7 N4 -4
fJ2 00 0 c r 'TI D
U n a a a a ar ar
Ln 000 -4 ) U r- '.0 -400C* r
0C)
0) $.A cu W4 > w w- - ~ N '
0) -4 -4HwU)qC
W (U 4 -40 W > M -4 W ~ W W .H r>-
0~ > 7 'CZ0 C7 W ' W ~ a)(1 H 0 '79 0 ) Q
E-i 01 a )E W (1t a La 0.u ()U a)"
ca En4 - m (n 04 Nv w~ m- En
r-4 ca ~ -41 1-
"o V s. 0' . z v to ~ af s.. E 0' 4 =~ 0: 4*-
a) Q) -H 'D.0 a u 1p - -4) , '.0 e a LJ -0 (
H -1 1 - -4 0 -L ' A .0 -
*0 a a aa a4 -4 - -H - )-
z) . Enr. oWk4. (1 ) < cxr J r
i. cU-2 cV2 E n z f
0) -4,--.-4~ ) A-8-6.*- 0
1 N 0  0 O % 00 0
.4 o r r.. O r-. - 4 00 %D
C 4* aA4 a
-4 -4 -4 cnc.
-,o'. '0 c,4 r- 0 Lr) LA 00 r
%04 en4 - l 0 0 r- Lr , 00 r
1 -4c I l N L) 0
4JZ4 n 'T r' 0 4 D C4 %
4~0
0 1.4e .4C4 
n C
44J
0l I' .-4 P. ON r-I .-4 Lf) c'n 0
1 . , c n V ) .- 1 0 0
V ~ en L 0 ' 04 0 C14 0l r-4 . 01
* * 0
cu4 wU Cj j C1 C '0 (NJci Lf 4
14
1- u -
Q4~ -) -44 1L c c
(n 0 O -q) 0 00
4.) I. V) C14 %0. Le r-40 ~
-4 C14 (N 0 0 C14 IT
*n ' a T (a n aCI, L) I
4-44N
CD' IT r~ c- T 0 ' u -
(I N -11 C1 C'4 Lfn Ln 00
zicro0ri . c c
(L) Z.4 0) - 11 coZ 4) H 4 )
W Q ) w 0 w , 0 -Ha) 4 ) .4 -4
an rri 0J~ ~ . 4 0 Ia
w "a) 1.) 4 v4 la. a L u a)
(A z 4z0)W 4 i
"o4 r= w
.5C 4) 40O C.W) ca -)>0 )
Ai 4.j E-4 >E-4 4J-H rn -H Q)4. Ai E4>E-4 J -4C
*1 ._4 4j -4 1 -4 -H I -1 .1- 0) -4 1 - -4 -1- I
*- *p4 4 U - "0. 0 M 4-4 -4 -4 U4-- .I
E- .- ' 1 .4) P.~
*4.. A-8-7
o  0 ON 0 0 0 0.
GJ v4 14 - -4 1 -4 - 4 4 4 -
ON). 0" &rn en tr C %D 0 n co -T
0 4) C1 C1 en' r- 01 %D ~ 0 I.T C. cn C1
E94 ZIO co) r, 0% 0 ~ .i r- 1-4 f
C; as a; al al Is a
o 4 C-) %0 %c o m C-1 N) IT
H H r- 0 CN 0 aA 0 C14 '.o 04
en~ c- 14 t 0 -; .D Ln-I
M- 0) Nmo 0 C4 00
zli C14
14-4 N4 4 -- 4 14
000 0
4)
%D C) en0 00 cLN-Co
W~ r-, %o cr0 . . '0 C - 0
ad 4) A. C'4 N N- '0 .4 0 C4 -.7 ,4 4
10co co m% Uli r Ltn '.0 IT r' -~% 0
0N 4)a 4 r a n n 10 t
01 U - ON N Ia 0
0~0;
~ '-4
I-I 00-I' r- 4 '.0 %..0 C'l C-1 0) Nc -l M
Lrl IT4 %. 0 1- Ct4 N. -4 CO L
04 '4 m- '.0 00r ID 0 IT 0
.'9 04 0; 4
(n U)r
-HO ,-M '.H N- n L ) -H~ -H -,4 Q)
0 3 *1- w.4 w w >. 0 1:4 0 a ) aix~
be $zI C --- m .= 4 NaQ 40 $ -. -C-.7U)a)E
.41 u =Q a 04 a a 3 )=Q 1 d
L) Nd- -4 U N4 -4
Q) Q) 0 IV c
Ai 41- 0" - -IU - 4 a) N- >. E- -H7 U -
-4 4-1 .. . - 14 - I..4.4 Q .4 41 14 - 14 -
r.4 E. C o Ln 4, -4
A-8-
* IL
codes than their enlisted counterparts. Tlighest were observed xngncfull-.i" I .
support officers (active Guard/Reserve-73% and nilitary technmicians-74%).
The utility of the detailed analyses presented in tables 3-55 is apparent ..
if comparisons ara made with the overall distributions of table 1. For
exarple, table 1 shom:ed 1.%of Ar.-,y -Reserve iMenters aith _3C1 codes. 3y
reviewing t.-e- detailedJ SCI figures on table 3 it is obvious that the 1.9%
value ca-rauflages a range of results from .4% for the enlisted training
?ipeline to 14.4% of the officers in the selected individual ready reserve.
Again refering to table 1, 4.91, of the A\ir 'Iational 11uardsman were found
without OCII clzarance information. Table I rev-oals that this average includes
extreres of .10% of the officer techinicians and 413.42 of the enlisted training
ipipeline. icdentification of such significant variation across -differingj
types of ;nersonnel is critical to -pinpoint possible problam areas and spotlight
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leady Rasorve Category ef inition
N SclacteJ 2--sorve Unit: Salectad
7eservists tahlo have co-:.;lated
training and are assigned to a
E'ull-Tirre Sunport (7',Qtiva -Guard/
7asarve Selectad rasarvists
wh'o have corp1etz'. trainingj and
unit or individual su-ooort. This
includes a11 -c-rr, c'la:ssifiezd
as Nct%-iva ',uarOd/Rcscrve (Y71~) and
=:clu-les MIilitary Teclinicians.
* acnician) : Train3CI Selected
?2ascrvists aho arc also federal
-):oyos of a "ilitary Department
andA occu,)y a tachnicixi .)osition In
th resarve co..naonennt thysuo-xrt.-
*'retraine Individual 7ezervists
(7pelected Reserve) * Individual
Mbilization A\ug,-n'aes .-io iav-.
cozmilatad training mni are -)ra-
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Comparison Of Investigations And Adiudications
During FY 83 and The First Half Of FY 84
This paper presents statistics on personnel security
investigations and adjudications during the first six months
of FY 84. It also contains comparisons of these figures with
complete FY 83 data. The source for these analyses is the DKDC
extract of the DCII. This extract identifies the most recent -
DIS investigative segment and the most recent Army or Air Force . ...
*.1 adjudicative segment on an individual.
DIS Investigations
Table 1 provides information on the 20 types of DIS "7
investigative dossiers which were found most frequently between
October 1982 and Zvlarch 1984. Figures for each type include
cases where added coverage was provided. In all, over 150 DIS
case category codes were found during this period. Note that
the mid-FY 84 total is half as large as the complete FY 83 total.
The totals only include segments with codes reflecting
a closed case. In addition, there were 306 FY 83 and 17,162
FY 84 cases with no completion code. Most of the cases referred
to on table 1 have a completion code indicating a finished
investigation (94%). The remainder show a change of category
at closing (2%), a closing because of a prior investigation
(1%) or a cancellation (3%)
A-9-2
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DO Am 1 m MiE it, Ii ary 31,707 16.9 14,744 15.7IV., ]A/ t n-ism SB, miitr 31,269 16.7 15,234 16.2
/ Ni-ism IM, indsda1 15,711 8.4 8,129 8.7
1G2 File tc, 1miltary 14,934 8.0 5,856 6.2
E1 apmhd M,,c, maitaLy 12,403 6.6 4,794 5.1
3Cm Nn-isu ME, kxstrial 7,178 3.8 4,235 4.5
W/I Ewaibd NC (m'iiJity), indEtrial 6,637 3.5 3,673 3.9 __-
-7 SR plemnta1 s, AlitaLy 6,251 3.3 0 .0
M Periodic MviW, militaLy 6,219 3.3 7,832 8.3
IFVA acm MC, irxstrial 5,817 3.1 3,647 3.9 - " -
1.2 File NC, inrr1rial 5,717 3.1 3,074 3.3
GI File DOC, military 5,257 2.8 2,162 2.3
=43 tbr-iue S , civilian 4,908 2.6 3,469 3.7
- P3C S (suitability), mUiitamy 3,663 2.0 1,016 1.1
1 -A nIn-issue 8, civilian 3,348 1.8 2,096 2.2
13C IMl (saitability), military 3,225 1.7 890 .9
IQI3 Daprb WT, mLlitary 3,157 1.7 1,509 1.6
1F3, Perio ic revicw, itdstrial 2,832 1.5 2,619 2.8
IEa Periodic re,"is, civilian 2,740 1.5 3,458 3.7
mc mpletion of other agmW inutation 1,813 1.0 923 1.0 .*-
• ...1254 -I 4 A




No single type of DIS investigation, other than those listed
on table 1, constituted as much as 1% of the total in either
fiscal year. Non-issue, initial military IBis and S3Is account
for about a third of the DIS investigative segments in both
time periods. Comparing the percentages on table 1 reveals
some noteworthy shifts between the first half of this fiscal
year and FY 83. Fiscal year comparisons were made with respect
to both absolute and relative percentage changes.
Increases were found in military, civilian and industrial
periodic reviews. The other increase of note was in non-issue,
" initial civilian SBIs. Compensating for these increases were
- the total disappearance of DIS codes reflecting supplemental
SBIs and IBIs. Also worthy of mention were decreases in military
file NACs, expanded ENTNACs, and Iis and S3Is with unsuitability
- issues.
Army Adjudications
The DCII shows nearly 118 thousand individuals with Army
adjudications during the first half of FY 84. The mix of clearance
status codes during this period closely resembles the distribution
for FY 83, as table 2 shows.
•0-tm M-1ad 19PA
TrE 2- 'rn, m_ _abn .rcn _kan - ._
(3rer 982-biti l984 ~
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.9 19wret 23,698 L.9 L2 T .0
V 321 18,537 1.3 11,23n 11.4
X Iarng (rF ctkn IrU7 . 8,135 8."
p S t-.garey 7,635 4.2 3,g5 3.4 -
T Lp .a crat 5,15 3. 3,214 3.3
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A more detailed analysis of FY 84 Army adjudications was
done, involving not only the status code but also the codes
indicating the investigative basis and the reason for the review.
In combination, these codes define an individual's status within
the personnel security program. In all, 76 unique combinations
of these three codes were found. Table 3 lists the dozen most --
frequent, which collectively account for 97% of the total.
Most of the actions (61%) involve a secret (M) clearance
based on some variant of a national agency check (ENTNAC, NAC,
NACI) which did not develop credible derogatory information.
The table also shows that 12% received a secret clearance in
spite of a national agency check containing credible derogatory
information. Note as well that SCI access was authorized, based
on SBIs containing derogatory information (6%), more often than
when no such negative information was found (4%). With regard
to top secret status, table 3 shows it awarded more frequently
on the basis of "clean" (3.3%) than derogatory (2.3%) BIs.
In sum, this table reflects the award of over 21,000 clearances
to personnel with credible derogatory information in the first
half of FY 84.
"17TrE 3- A=ng_ cm A-ti.m
(dnr 1983Jfh l984)
IRMS Fbr g ___
Samr EIiMC, W, MI~r Szr~y 65,440 60.6
Saet (9) emC, , a Srety 12,492" 11.6ft} (rx) cmnr %eview Rqre 8,6BS 8.0
fa M X SEM Soecial Inelieo 6,520k* 6.0]
ME (V) SBa SreLy 4,358 4.0 .- '.'-
Tp (N) aI Suey 3,529 3.3
'kp SwreM C') Barety 2,450k 2.3
"" (R4 Other (:learal 1,2Ml 1.1
-bta h77,992 L .0




Table 4 presents the FY 83 84 comparisons of individuals - "
cleared by the Air Force. As in the Army, comparisons of the
clearance code distributions revealed only minor differences ,
between FY 83 and the first six months of FY 84. A total of
16 unique Air Force clearance codes were used thus far in FY
84.
'Urber Bq8= - re Pem~1S3B
S 983t 129,30 70.8 58,534 56.-
T 'IM ret 24,530 13.4 13,167 14.8 ;
V p 9scet-lgible fbr SI 15,132 8.3 9,428 10.6z Tw aed Clemmm :-.
Ulmamble DIn'gtim 4,71* 2.6 2,8Z* 3.2
Y PMiM kd'1Wt= 3,547 1.9 1,925 2.2
F 7tmomble1.b CazaMn 3,341 1.8 2,1345 2.3
LM99 L1 7M .2 € .
Total 182,542 99.9 88,7%6 130.0.
Unlike the Army, DCII Air Force clearance data does not
include a code indicating the reason for review, howaver, table
5 -resents the most frequent of the status-basis combinations









3 Table 5 shows two-thirds (66%) of the FY 84 adjudications
to be secret clearances based on a national agency check. All
SCI clearances (11%) were based on SBIs. More than twice as
many top secrets (10%) were based on BIs than SBIs (4%).
IMPE 5- Air Erene QI~a~1OgGs
Smt(S) RM, NC, Na 58,415 65.9
S=I(9 SEE 9,425 10.6
":P =I8t T Sf 8,487 9.6%bp fte MT Sm 3,5M 4.0 ;-'
Panirn] (Y) EC, NC, 1Ira 1,231 1.4
Fryorle (F I,(3 1.2
Eaomble ROW, IPC, IO 979 1.1P e f V (Y ) S 3 "n .4. -. -.,
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13TS Tnvastiaatlons and Clearance Elicibilitv Of Air Force
-nlistaes Recuiring Ms and S'3Is
.N\:r rorce entry security screening currently covers 31
A F TCs Icraening is conciucta-d1 during b3asic training by thie
3517th Air-nan Classification SquaCron at Lacktland Air ?orce
71ase, Teacas. lackground investigation (IrM) recjuests are submitted-
to 01I! for th'ose surviving screening for 13 Arqls, while !'Is
are requirea for those entering 17 oth-.er NrSCs. *tinthe se
s-ecialtias, analyses were perforned, to 33etermine what types
of 0,11 invastigations had mnost recently been conlucted and wh11at
cleara e vels were reflecte.-. on the DIM, for thiose on boar3
the becginnia-g of FY 84.
Table? 1 -rarsents results for occu--ations rcjuiring SlIs.
Th, i 7M colu-.In includles those with D13- case catagory co-des indicating
i tit1h)- Tsitbiity, isu-.esamt 13/) inv : ig- utios (1.\/1).
r,-Is Jit sita)ilyinvstsueis (3/ an! bri- us (105i/it
Th I1/7I cateagory includles initial invest ig7ations (l-Al/A ani
SCue cases (17 T3/C andi IT3/C) , an,",ngu (D/ an:' 1D1/3).
"?r4o creview" refers to thre newer 173/C ty~einptiaio3
'"ale 1 shovis -iosltr-ne in each oc these0 ,_F! CZS 4s :inI n 1 1 In all but two of t-esze s)2ciaities, ov. ,r 211% la" oil:!
of th'e spacified] .1"M cod!es. O)nly in tl.eIsc tw.o \F.71C's (3'7 M
an,! 32,qM5) di.1 more 'Chan 15% shlow 'jI/"rII coK.'_ : or more than
52. havez no OI invcestigativo dossier.
~rz dataile3 analysi3, b)y skill 1Thvel w.ithin A!' , found'
nora non-17T codes_- at the1 high-r sk clvelS. 7o r thIe
tel ecom:iun icat ions systems control o ecialists (317-10) v r t ua11
all at thec first two si-ill le vels Wa,-ve_ an 3T code. \ h
i a r skill level ho -av )r , ma ny ezone show a /T1or4
no ")-' investigative k.'ossier. Similar finlin-js ir:) ev ;znt
'or the airb-orna co-.:,x.an-I -ost- co m:iunica- ions ez-ui'meint ecait
A-10-2
S...-
TABLE-1 Most Recent DIS Investigative Dossiers
For Personnel In Specialties Requiring SBIs
BI/ Periodic . .-
AFSC Description SBI IBI Review Other None
IIXO Defensive Aerial Gunner 93.0% 3.9% .4% .4% 2.5%
201XO Intelligence Operations 88.2 4.8 4.6 1.3 1.1
201X1 Target Intelligence 94.7 1.7 1.1 1.1 1.3
202XO Radio Communications Analysis 84.7 .5 12.7 1.3 .8
205XO Electronic Intelligence Operations 88.9 1.0 7.2 1.1 1.8
206XO Imagery Interpreter 91.8 1.2 4.2 5 2.3
207X1 Morse Systems 92.8 .5 5.6 .5 .6
207X2 Printer Systems 89.8 .7 7.9 .9 .7I "* ,- ' -.208XX Cryptologic Linguist 91.7 .3 6.4 .9 .7
209XO Defensive C3CM Specialist 89.6 1.7 6.6 1.6 .5
233XO Continuous Photoprocessing 83.4 8.9 1.9 .8 5.0
291XO Telecommunications Operations 83.9 10.3 1.8 .9 3.1
306XO Electronic Communications and 82.0 12.0 2.8 1.1 1.9
H Cryptographic Equipment Systems
306XI Electronic-Mechanical Communications 83.0 12.3 .7 1.5 2.5
and Cryptographic Equipment Systems
I 306X2 Telecommunications Systems/ 81.8 11.0 2.1 1.5 3.6
Equipment Maintenance
307XO Telecommunications Systems Control 68.4 22.2 .8 1.5 7.1
328X5 Airborne Command Post 67.8 17.7 1.4 1.4 11.7
Communications Equipment
' ' A-10-3 "
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(3 2qX5). At the 7 skill level in that NT-^% nr:! t ha n a t'i ir I
show 31/131 co~1es an" 23% no T)' I o s s ier
Clearance eligibility in the 9T1I aieci~zltics is sh.o:,n on
tabla 2. A majority in 14 o' the 17 NFICs ~refounj T*t ~
aligibility (cot:! V) , whille thie re--nainlar in the-se soocialtlies2
nrimarily haO ton secret (code T) status. Virtually all ',zf-nsiva
aerial gunners (iiO a.to-) secre-t ali-gJiDility, as Ili.' a
lar-ge n)Crcent*2g3 of thiose in the two szoecialt-iae Iiscussel] earli:?r
(3'17'1) an.] 321!5) . \tlso, air'borne- conun,. ?ost conrriunicationzs
e-.uiom~ent soecialists (32q"15) aad t'.3 lar-azt oc _rc.-nta-72 of
axi of~ those AP^3:Cs with only,, a secret (code a) li-]i:Dility status.
Analysis byv skill lavel 2 oun. littla variance ~or the 30efensivo
aerial qjunners. 'loot Lele-1communicat ions s~vste.is control s3)ocialists-
in tie lowev.r !-,ill lev,31s have ' CT ali.cri'Jl ity, w.,hile most 3-t
s~ill level 7 and' abov3 show to-) s cret status. F'or th2 airborne
co.andl nost co...unicai-ions s-inet ) aciaJlstz, :.ioro a'- z~ill *.
1~ a 1 ha .1117T z;!-a t us, i la rel a t ivel -1y Ii gh a r con ta js -at
aXill lcvils I an,' 7 only adsccre-t :?I7 :ig..*7ity.
wth- roa -. tCo A i r 7o rc s,)c ialIt i,2s r .,u ir inI g c, Ith'1r a
m u; nc) :.o r,2 vr ia !Dili tY' fou n IIha n %,,ao the caa w .i':h ~3 T
3 )aCialti::?. lis t, ile1; 3 z how,, the -.a jor-:' in 11 cC t l
-ITV~ 0~ N r T -)e T inv:?sij at i ansf-. I 1.7
I a~je ro0.-.1 -Ut o V 2r 5 1 3 f the a c:3nIt i1 ;c --. 12 1 ' c:e i Jc i a:
t o a.oC t ' -e. ns -zil elc r o n c e-u a -:.-1 0Zi -I s
contra-ft, under 31, of teli--u-1_ 31l -C~i -.nance i:1it
slhowa~l a ",I/T'T co a ~il:2 in ..io.:;;- o.' 3)ez S cialtiaz the)
a r c c nt.IC a3- Wit'1 :3T was :i 3 1: , it a cc o .nt 2,7Zor oveor an
o1. the connand an! control 3-)eciali.sts.
2ijue ino:t:ce 2 in any 0C *'7Tz calizi
-Jas un wer 2 ia only one o.2 the: '\7',Cz rz!uiri ni 71 coverayje.
c o 1 z'. iar i:3utCicn:- we.)rez annye ii ,7jil ,le.ve 2 i: -:o.7,
o cc 1_1a t ion i II i ich I- lach !of an i I res-t i a i On .,1 1:i
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TABLE 2- Clearance Eligibility of Personnel
In Specialties Requiring SEIs
AFSC Description, SCI Top Secret Secret Other
-= 112X0 Defensive Aerial Gunner 2.5% 95.9% 1.4% .2%
201X0 Intelligence Operations 73.3% 22.3 1.2 3.3
201X1 Target Intelligence 66.0 28.1 2.5 3.4
202XO Radio Communications Analysis 89.1 7.0 1.9 2.0
205X0 Electronic Intelligence Operations 89.6 5.9 2.6 1.9
206XO Imagery Interpreter 82.1 13.0 2.7 2.2
207XI Morse Systems 86.0 8.9 3.5 1.6 ',
207X2 Printer Systems 86.6 6.9 3.1 3.5 .- .
208XX Cryptologic Linguist 85.8 .6.9 5.7 1.6
209XO Defensive C3CM Specialist 86.3 7.1 2.7 3.9
233X0 Continuous Photoprocessing 59.8 28.7 7.7 3.8
291X0 Telecommunications Operations 64.8 29.5 2.2 3.5
306XO Electronic Communications and 70.5 22.9 3.2 3.4
Cryptographic Equipment Systems
306X1 Electronic-Mechanical Communications 66.9 29.9 1.3 1.9
and Cryptographic Equipment Systems
306X2 Telecommunications Systems/ 71.4 24.2 2.0 2.4
Equipment Maintenance
307X0 Telecommunications Systems Control 47.0 48.5 2.7 1.8




TABLE 3- Most Recent DIS Investigative Dossiers
For Personnel In Specialties Requiring BIs
BI/ Periodic
AFSC Description SBI IBI Review Other None
274X0 Command and Control 527.9 39.9% .8% 1.5% 5.0%
316X0 Missile Systems Analyst 3.3 81.9 .2 .9 13.8
316X2 Missile Electronic Equipment 2.1 82.1 .0 1.0 14.7
316X3 Instrumentation Specialist 5.5 47.8 .3 1.8 44.7
341X7 Missile Trainer 1.6 74.5 1.5 .8 21.8 -
443XO Missile Maintenance 1.2 80.7 .1 1.1 16.8 -
445XO Missile Facilities 2.3 63.3 .0 1.8 32.6
462XO Aircraft Armament Systems 1.5 71.8 .2 1.8 24.7
463XO Nuclear Weapons 1.9 75.8 .0 .9 21.4
464X0 Explosive Ordnance Disposal 2.7 63.0 .1 .9 33.3
545X1 Liquid Fuel Systems Maintenance 1.1 2.8 .0 2.8 93.1
99105 Scientific Measurement Technician 24.9 50.2 1.2 .8 22.9
99106 Scientific Laboratory Technician 15.4 63.1 1.3 .4 19.7 "-' "
A...-
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noticeable. For instrumentation specialists (31GX3) and enposiva
P ordnance disp)osal soacialists (454X)) , very high nercenta-,es
without background investigations were fouria at the Tntry and--
upper (7 an! above) skill levals, wh'ile most at the 3 anI 5
leval3 haJ a "PI or IflI. M!ost missile facilities specialists
(4451%11) at the 1 an(. 3 sk ill levels showedal' no back~ground
investigation. 'lost at the 5 and 7 levels had a code indicating
a -)I or IMJ. in tlhe liquidO fuel systems maintenanc2 spccialty
(545%1) the situation shows little sk-ill level variance. larclly
anyone with this NMPC had a T)IS backqground investigation.
Table 14 Presonts the findings on clearance eligibility
for the flI s'aecialties. M'ost -ersonnel, in all but the liquid
fuel system-s -maintenance specialty, hell top secret (code T)
eligi:bility. These- percentages ran'ec-_ from '3% of the
instruma~ntation s-:ecialists to 94% of the missile systems analysts.
lmost all, o" the liq-uid fuel system.-s maintenance soecialists
haJ secret (co-!, 3) status. D)ther A7.SCs with relatively high
-earcanta-3a3s wito'secret eligi:hili ty aare inmst rumentat ion specialists
(352) 3 isile f ac il1ities seiits (311%) ,aircraft ar-inamant
s ys t 3ms z - ociaist (2l 1 a n I 01 o S Iv oo r-n a n c .3di Cpo s al
qk1 le v:l 3iztribut ions of cloarance status .,iore aimine
.or ho s C a~c I -11t i,20 i th thea: ~r c a".es I vanr alilJli _Jt y Diffe ront
-atte rn; ar2 evi. ent. 'ost entry lav-a2 inztru iv-mtation 1lt.
(31lM3) hia.. secret status, wiethe m:ajor-ity at t 12 3 and
G s.ill levels3 a.ossessO'3 to--. szecDe. 2-olo )_rznt-o
of tose at the 7 leval hal to-: s-cret- aand sncre-t i j.i
lIost misslea facilities (445*.D') andI alrcra~t ar.-a'-,nt z-st3:,.,
s;necialists (451:',) at tho 1 and 3 s-l.~ee~n. scret" 3taituz,
;aile3 most a.hov- tihose levals h a, to _ socret *lost -2ntr/ le vel
... znlosivtc or.7nance 3icaozal se~lzs(~.) a sce
el.~ibl . yandl virtually% all ot~ers in ti a 1c1at;' ha o)
socret statuS.
E n only% thiree of the 1a a~cata 'or than f a
o)ercant of -aersonnel1 h-ave a Meiiii; 3hs eecrin
a.d control s-)ecialistc (14,1) ain' scient-iic .oue'n 12
A-1 0-7
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TABLE 4- Clearance Eligibility Of Personnel
In Specialties Requiring BIs
A.
AFSC Description SCI Top Secret Secret Other
274X0 Comnand and Control 14.1% 83.5% .9% 1.5%
316XO Missile Systems Analyst 2.3 94.1 3.1 .5
316X2 Missile Electronic Equipment 1.0 90.0 7.6 1.3
316X3 Instrumentation Specialist 1.8 63.4 34.6 .1
341X7 Missile Trainer 1.5 91.0 5.3 2.3
443X0 Missile Maintenance .2 87.2 11.2 1.3
445X0 Missile Facilities 1.3 66.6 31.0 1.1
462X0 Aircraft Armament Systems .5 77.5 21.2 .8
463X0 Nuclear Weapons .9 93.1 4.8 1.2
464X0 Explosive Ordnance Disposal 1.2 75.9 22.3 .6
545X1 Liquid Fuel Systems Maintenance .2 3.1 94.8 1.9
99105 Scientific Measurement Technician 14.9 83.5 1.6 .0
99106 Scientific Laboratory Technician 6.1 93.4 .0 .4
A- 10-8
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and laboratory (5%) technicians.
In summary, these analyses have shown that there are sizeable
differences among Air Force specialties which currently require
3I and 31 coverage. Differences were noted both across specialties
and between shill levels within specialty. They are reflected
both in the type of OIS investigation and the Air Force clearance .
eligibility recorCed on the DCII.
A.-0..
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THE DOD PERSONNEL SECURITY RESEARCH PROGRAM:
Initial Air Force Findings and Future Areas of Study
The project about which I will be speaking today is, in
effect, a response to a 1982 select panel report to the Deputy 4
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The panel's review of
the DOD Personnel Security Program was made to determine how
the 'program might be strengthened. Three major points from
that report lead to my discussion of the Personnel Security
Research Program. They are the finding that little data were
-~ available for program evaluation use; the call for research
in the use of psychological techniques during pre-screening
and investigation; and lastly, the need for study of the adjudicative
process.
The DOD Personnel Security Research Program began operation
about a year ago under the sponsorship of Bill Fedor and Pete
-Nelson in OSD. Housed in Monterey, California at the Naval
Postgraduate School, the project is a joint effort of the school's
Manpower Research Center, the Defense Manpower Data Center,
and a consulting firm, BDM. The Naval Postgraduate School has
set up a research professorship and provides the office space;
the Defense Manpower Data Center, known as DIDC, contributes
* programming and data processing support; while BDM has been
called on to assist with analytical, programming and clerical
* assistance.
As alluded to earlier, the specified objectives of the
Personnel Security Research Program are linked to the select
*panel's concerns. An initial research agenda of eight study
* areas was developed and serves as the framework for the program.
Resource constraints and flexible adaptation following the assessment
* of early findings has produced somewhat uneven progress over
the agenda. One year into the project, we have progressed deeper
* into some areas than anticipated at the price of not yet being
where we hoped to in others. Thus after briefly distinguishing
the eight study areas to you,more detailed presentations will
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be divided into showings of findings for some and discussion :.
of plans for others. If time permits, I hope to conclude with
a participative discussion of some general issues in research
on personnel security, as well as to answer your questions. \
Within the notion of research on the use of psychological
assessment techniques, three specific study areas have been
identified. At this point none of them delve into such exotic
topics as the polygraph, which is already receiving considerable
scrutiny, or the use of inkblot tests to ferret out potential
spies or security violators. Instead, we focus on more widely
known psychological techniques generally used in personnel selection
and placement and specifically utilized to greater or lesser -
extent in the services' personnel security programs. These
are such tools as interviews and questionnaires, biographical
data, personality measures, and references.
The first of these types of studies involves the evaluation
of the services' pre-screening for sensitive positions. The
* objective is to identify, compare and contrast, and assess the
various pre-screening efforts to determine how successful they
are. Existence of differing programs across services invites
questions such as-whose way is better-and-what features of theirs
should and could we adopt.
A second effort under the Ouse of psychological techniques*
heading will examine the Defense Investigative Service (DIS)
subject interview. Now a key component of the background
investigation, the relative effectiveness of different DIS agents
and various techniques will be studied. Through observation
and survey methods, these studies will develop materials to
enhance the general guidance contained in the DIS manual and
the brief treatment given the subject interview in agent training
at the Defense Security Institute. Interviewing has received
much study within the field of personnel psychology. If the
interview is, as a leading scholar has described, a search for <
negative information, then the IBI subject interview can surely
be thought of as the ultimate search for negative information.-
The final aspect of the psychological assessment procedures
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type studies in the Personnel Security Research Program involves
the development and validation of new psychological tests.
U A first priority here will be to adapt a screening instrument -
nov under development by the Navy, acting as DOD executive agent.
The intent is to blend the types of information currently used
by each service, as well as private employers, into a DOD-wide
enlistment screening test. In addition, findings from otherIl
studies within the program may imply additional types of
psychological assessments which could improve the Personnel
Security Program.
Study of the adjudication process comprises the second
major area of research. Our agenda specifies three types of
investigation under this heading. The first of these would
seek to improve adjudicative interpretability of information
developed during the background investigation. It would do
so by converting qualitative BI results into quantitative indices
and linking these data with subsequent behavior patterns. The
* resulting statistical analyses will provide indicators of the
risk of unsuitable military beh,_vior associated with various
levels of severity and combinations of types of derogatory
information detected in the course of the background investigation.
A follow on project would combine the information developed
in the study just described with actual adjudicator decisions
and present the adjudicators with relevant probability tables
*to use in adjusting future decisions. After a time, follow-up
analyses would be conducted to determine if the valididty of
adjudicative decisions had improved. This would provide an
* empirical basis for adjustment of adjudication guidelines.
A second follow on would use the data described in the
background investigation study, along with individual adjudicator
decisions, to study the consistency of individual adjudicators,
* over time and the reliability across adjudicators of decisions
on cases with equivalent derogatory content. In personnel psychology
- this is closely related to mathematical policy capturing models.
Much of the developmental work on this analytic technique was
done by Air Force researchers at the Human Resources Laboratory
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in San Antonio. The results of such studies will reveal how ." -
various adjudicators subjectively interpret their guidelines
and therefore which guidelines may require more clarity.
Basically, the six types of studies I have just described
cover the major attributes of the DOD personnel security system. : ;": w
They include service pre-screening, DIS investigations, and
service controlled adjudication. They involve collecting new
data and reconfiguring existing qualitative information into
more analytically useful quantitative formats. In contrast,
the two remaining items on our research agenda really just involve
looking at what we already routinely have in the way of quantitative
data relevant to personnel security. For just that reason,
because its already available, and because proper scientific
analysis and evaluation dictates an understanding of what is,
before contemplating what changes could or should be made, we
have to date, concentrated on the latter two types of studies.
Both involve the linking and analyses of various automated
data bases. The primary data bases in this area are the DCII,
-4 maintained by DIS and the personnel files maintained by DMDC,
especially the periodic master and loss files and AVF enlisted
cohort files. Personnel files are available to the Personnel
Security Research Program through DMDC's role as the DOD automated
personnel data archive. Access to the DCII was made possible
by a memorandum of understanding between DIS and DMDC, which
*. provides for quarterly submission of an automated copy of the
complete DCII in return for storage as a disaster back-up and
- utilization in research studies.
• Through the creative linking and design of analyses on
• these files, it is possible to provide DOD personnel security
management with previously unavailable or difficult to obtain
basic management information and program evaluation materials, -
as well as needed input for the kinds of studies I have already -
described.
The distinction between the latter two types of studies
is one of cross-sectional versus longitudinal analysis. By
cross-sectional I am referring to point-in-time snapshots of
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Uselected populations and variables. Such questions as-what
percentage of E3 nuclear weapons specialists have had BIs-or-how3 many colonels are eligible for SCI access-can be answered by
tbese analyses.
Longitudinal studies are more complex. They usually involve
more variables and typically select a cohort of individuals,
alike in some relevant dimension, to track over time. An analysis
of this type might address the differential unsuitability attrition
loss rates from security sensitive occupations of members with
more vs. less extensive reported drug use histories.
That covers the various types of studies envisioned by
the Personnel Security Research Program. Now for some findings.
To preface this discussion, it will be useful to talk a bit
about the DCII. I have spent a good part of the past year (farS'
more than I had bargained. for) l earning about the intricacies
of this vast storehouse of personnel security information.
To most users, the DCII is simple enough. Enter a subject's
name and find out about his clearance status or which investigations
have been conducted. However, to work with the DCII analytically
and link it with other data bases has proven to be a difficult
assignment.
The problem starts with size. By vast storehouse, I am
refering to a data set with 22 million segments of information
within 15 million records. The segments are coded representations
of investigations, NACs, adjudications, and alternate subject
names. Physically, the DCII requires 9 tapes. Table 1 shows
how many of the records contained the various types of segments
in May of this year. Each record contains from 1 to 11 segments,




Type of Segment Number of Records*




*Rounded to the nearest thousand, as of May 1984.
The investigation segments, which Table 1 shows to be most
numerous, include service developed dossiers as well as over
356 types of DIS background investigation. Adjudications are
limited to Army and Air Force presently, as the Navy does not
input clearance information to the DCII. The May 1984 DCII
included one and a half million Air Force clearances with 18 .
different eligibility codes. Of these 74% were secret, 18%
top secret and 5% SCI.
But not only in terms of size did the DCII present a challenge. 2
In order to develop management information and to link various
data bases, individual level data are required. Each of the"-
nearly 15 million DCII records do not necessarily represent
complete data on an individual. In fact, about 650 thousand
individuals were found with more than a single DCII record.
In some cases duplicate segments were carried on an individual's
multiple records, while in other instances, unique segments
were found. All of these nuances had to be programmed around
before the results I will now describe could be obtained.
One set of analyses was run after an adjusted DCII was -
matched against the service master files at the beginning of * -.-
FY 84. For the Air Force, these analyses presented the clearance -
status of the members of each of the various components as shown
on table 2.
A-1 1-8
...... . .. . .."
m TABLE 2 .
Air Force Civilian 81t 11 2% 7%3 Air Force Active Duty-..-..
Enlisted 73 18 7 3
Officer 33 49 17 1
Air Force Reserve*
Enlisted 81 9 2 8
Officer 59 29 6 6
Air National Guard
Enlisted 82 11 0 6
Officer 42 55 2 1
*Ready reserve only. Excludes standby and retired reserve.
These figures document the extent to which higher percentages
of officers than enlisted personnel have top secret and SCI
status. The analyses also showed a high rate of current personnel
matches with the DCII, over 99% for active duty personnel and
Air National Guard officers and 94-95% for civilians, Air Force
Reservists, and Air National Guard enlisted personnel.
Another analysis looked at the most recent type of DIS
background investigation segment carried in the DCII for active
military members. As table 3 shows, initial BIs and SBIs
predominated for both officers and enlisted personnel. Far
more enlisted personnel than officers showed no DIS investigation
(other than a basic NAC). In percentage terms this works out
to 741 of the enlisted personnel and 44% of the officers on
board at the beginning of FY 84.
. .. .;. .- . . ::;. -
TABL 3.~
Most Recent DIS Backaround Investigation Enlisted
Initial SBI 41,574 18,547
Initial BI 40,150 16,486
Initial IBI/EBI 7,995 3,967
Supplemental SBI 9,293 19,674 .
SBI Periodic Review (limited) 4,653 3,390
Other 24,446 5,981
None 355,332 45,834
Another way of approaching the DCII is to identify a recent
temporal period of interest and frame a query of the data.
An example of this can be seen on table 4. Here, the clearance
status and type of investigation were paired for the first half
of FY 84 to study the relative frequencies of various types
of actions during this period. Table 4 shows two-thirds of
the Air Force clearance entries in the first half of the last -1
fiscal year to be secret clearances based on some variant of
a national agency check.
Air Force Clearance Actions
(October 1983-March 1984)"' i'')"
Investigation Number Percent
Secret ENTNAC, NAC, NACI 58,415 65.9
SCI SBI 9,425 1.6
Top Secret BI 8,487 9.6....
Top Secret SBI 3,553 4.0 i:
Terminated ENTNAC, NAC, NACI 2,102 2.4
Pending ENTNAC, NAC, NACI 1,231 1.4
Favorable SBI 1, 023 1.2 ..
Favorable ENTNAC, NAC, NACI 979 1.1Other Combinati ons 3,491-1-




A recently completed study of Air Force enlisted personnel
started with those specialties which currently require security
pro-screening during basic training at Lackland Air Force Base.
Our effort focused on this group's investigation and clearance
status as reflected in their DCII entries. Considerable variation
was found as table 5 shows. It rank orders the specialties
we were told require background investigation, with respect
to the percentage of personnel with top secret or SCI status.
These values can be seen to range from 3% of the liquid fuel
systems maintenance specialists to 98% of the scientific measurement
technicians and command and control specialists, and 99% of
the scientific laboratory technicians.
TABLE 5":""
Percent With To Secret Or SCI Clearance Eligibility
(October 1983)
AFSC Descriotion
Scientific Laboratory Technician 99
Scientific Measurement Technician 98
Command and Control 98
Missile Systems Analyst 96
Nuclear Weapons 94
Missile Trainer 92
Missile Electronic Equipment 91
Missile Maintenance 87
Aircraft Armament Systems 78
Explosive Ordnance Disposal 77
Missile Facilities 68
Instrumentation Specialist 65
Liquid Fuel Systems Maintenance 3
Some of the other studies made possible due to our restructuring
of the DCII and its linkage with the personnel files have produced
unexpected glimpses at potential problem areas within the overall
personnel security system. These include an ongoing study into
A- Ili-H1 '':?'
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the extent of unnecessary investigation requests resulting from
the non-mutual exclusivity of DCII records.
Another example is reflected on table 6. This table contains
the numbers of former Air Force enlisted personnel who, although
discharged for unsuitability over the past 10 years, still retain
top secret or SCI status in the DCII. A cursory glance at the
reasons for discharge indicates that many of these individuals
should perhaps no longer be considered acceptable security risks. .-.
Yet the very existence of high level clearance eligibility on
the DOD's major security data base may make them highly desireable
employees of civilian or contractor organizations. We believe
these findings may indicate the need for closer coordination -
between the personnel and security communities.
Air Force Personnel With Continued Top Secret Or SCI Status
In Spite Of Unsuitability Discharges (1974-1983)
Reason For Discharae Number
Motivational Problems 1,722
Unsatisfactory Performance 1,196
Drugs or Alcoholism 1,043
Entry Level Performance and Conduct 840
Discreditable Incidents 660
Character or Behavior Disorder 553
Disciplinary Infractions 292
Civil Court Conviction or Courtmartial 203
Unsuitability or Misconduct 195
Homosexuality 118
Financial Irresponsibility 96
Good of the Service 85
Total 7,003
These figures also imply something else about those in
Jobs of concern to the Personnel Security Program. That is
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the fact that a lot of people in sensitive jobs are being removed
for reasons of unsuitability. Specifically, they are being
lost in about the same high proportions that those in the general
enlisted population are lost. A recent study of AVF era Air
Force enlistees shows about half of the non-high school graduates
and a quarter of the high school graduates failing to complete
the first three years of their contract. Most of this attrition
is due to the kinds of problems cited on Table 6. Therefore,
such losses are not only a waste of financial resources and
productivity from a purely personnel point of view. They are
also of concern to the security community in that large numbers -
of individuals who "successfully*, and I use the term in quotes,
survived the current pre-screening and background investigation
hurdles and were then certified as acceptable risks for positions
of trust, are turning out to be not such good risks after all.
A look at some current data reinforces the point. These
data are from an ongoing longitudinal study following a group
of Air Force enlistees who received security pre-screening at
Lackland. The data are not mature yet, so the attrition rates
computed to date are not as high as the three year figures I
cited awhile ago. But it is the comparative rates that are
of most interest.
First of all, the nearly 15,000 recruits were divided
analytically into three categories: those discharged during
basic training (4%) those surviving basic training, but disqualified
by the pre-screening (33%); and those surviving both basic training
and the pre-screening hurdle (62%). I'll have nothing more
to say about the basic training discharges except to note that
a quarter of them qualified under the pre-screening criteria.
Among the major reasons for pre-screening disqualifications
for the basic training survivors were suitability factors such
as drug and alcohol abuse (32%), legal histories (11%), unfavorable
employment histories (5%), histories of irresponsibility (3%),
character disorders (2%), peer ratings (2%), financial problems
(3%), and unfavorable character references (1%).
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The two groups of basic training survivors were subdivided
based on whether they received background investigations or
not. Ten percent of those disqualified by pre-screening were
found to have had DIS background investigations, while two thirds
of those qualified at Lackland, later were investigated by DIS.
Table 7 compares the background investigation and clearance
situations of those qualified and disqualified by the Lackland
pre-screening program. Note that most of those disqualified
did not have a BI or SBI and showed only secret level eligibility.
Qualified recruits generally fell into three situations; SCI
eligibility based on an SBI, top secret status based on a BI,
or a secret clearance without a BI or SBI.
DIS Investigations and Air Force Clearances
For Basic Training Survivors
Pre-Screening Outcome
DIS Investigation Air Force Clearance nal i fiii D '-l-ifie
No BI or SBI Secret 30% 88%
BI Top Secret 24 2
SBI SCI 35 4
SBI Top Secret 4 2
SBI Secret 1 1
- SBI Other 2 -
BI Secret 2 -
BI Other 1
No BI or SBI Other 1 2
Before going on to examine the findings from this particular
study, lets step away from the numbers and think about what
we ideally expect from the personnel security process. Speaking
very generally, I think we would want the service pre-screening
and DIS background investigation to turn up any information
relevant to a subject's suitability for a sensitive position.
In turn we would expect the adjudication to correctly evaluate
this information and only pass on those who will not pose a
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threat to our security, either through willful action or 4%
irresponsible inaction. Who then are the failures of the system?
Is it just those caught after the fact?
. They are few in number, I am glad to say. But I don't
think we can take pride in their paucity, both because of the
tremendous damage even a single incident can cause and because ,
I am left to speculate that the detected failures are only some
unknown fraction of all the failures. In effect, we only find
out about the more inept; those who get caught. This leads
me to give up on the notion that our standard be the dichotomous
yes-no of actual security breach since we do not even know about
all such instances. Furthermore, to develop valid predictors
from the relatively small number of detected failures I believe
is unfeasible.
The alternative I do see as appropriate is to view security
risk assessment in probabilistic terms rather than as a dichotomous
classification problem. In doing so there would be much similarity
with the task of those who set insurance rates. While some
subjects may be totally uninsurable, at least to most companies,
most can be accomodated. However, depending on statistically
defensible grounds, not all pay the same premium. Some are
V judged to be higher risks of accident or death, depending on
whether we are dealing with auto or life insurance, than others.
This does not imply that all those in a certain risk category
will have an accident or die. Rather it accepts the actuarial .
reality that based on some set of pre-existing circumstances,
higher percentages of certain groups will end up filing a claim. "
The process operates successfully without having to worry about
which specific individuals will become failures, that is claimants.
To shift back from the insurance to the personnel security
business, this translates into using a criterion against which
we can reliably assign all subjects. This requirement eliminates
using failures, since during any given time period, we are not
sure who all the failures are. The alternative which makes
sense to me is one derived from the already available personnel
data, namely attrition. As previously mentioned, most of the
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* reasons for not completing an enlistment contract fit under
the general notion of unsuitability. If adapted slightly to
eliminate those reasons not necessarily of concern from a security
standpoint# such as medical problems and pregnancy, I believe
the attrition measure can be a key concept in improving personnel .
security in DOD.
Assuming at least your tentative acceptance of the utility
of attrition, lets see how the current process measures up by
going back to the study of those recently pre-screened at Lackland.
if the process were working perfectly we should expect differing
* attrition rates for the different categories. Those disqualified
at Lackland and not investigated by DIS should have the highest
attrition rates. In contrast, those qualified at Lackland,-
investigated by DIS, and placed in sensitive positions should
*have very low attrition. Ideally. the rate should be nil, but
assuming a point of diminishing returns in the search for the
perfect predictors, I could see something in the 2 to 5% range
as credible, given a base rate of 20-25%.
The interim attrition rates reveal only a small difference
* between basic training survivors who were qualified and those
*disqualified by the Lackland pre-screening. While 11% of those
disqualified had attrited, 9% of those who passed the pre-screening
had failed to survive to this point. This is not a large enough
difference to allow complacency with the current system. I
am not able to make a final judgement regarding this data base
since another year or two must pass before the final attrition
rates will be available and more detailed analyses need to be
done. It would seem however, that the pre-screening process
*could stand some fine tuning. Unless the over 800 individuals
qualified at Lackland, but failing to complete their term of .
service, do not present a problem to the personnel security
community.
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3 Nov that you have heard about the program in general and
have seen a sampling of the initial results, I would like to
dealI with some more ;eaneral issues and invite your input. The
first is the notion of what criteria of success make sense.
jI have introduced the concept of attrition, which seems to be
a broader measure than typically used in the personnel security
field. I think its useful because of its high correlation with
the notion of overall suitability for sensitive DOD positions
and its ease of access f rom the personnel side of the house.
But what other criteria can we be examining? Short of documented
espionage cases, what sorts of data are you aware of that reflect
failures in the system? I am thinking of such things as clearance
revocations or disciplinary actions resulting from minor security
breeches. What is available in the Air Force? At what levels
are such events documented-service wide?- base level?
A second issue that follows from the concept of assuming
that some cleared individuals will present higher risks-than
others is the importance of continued monitoring after initial
clearance. Obviously there is the periodic review. But with
a shortage of resources to conduct such formal investigations
leading to very limited PR quotas, that's obviously not enough.
I have been told that commanders of personnel in sensitive
* positions have a general responsibility for insuring the continuing
suitability of their troops. But I have also been told that
* how well this is accomplished varies considerably. That is
not hard to understand. Between having to fight the daily fires
and not wanting to intrude on the personal lives of others beyond
what is appropriate, insuring continuing suitability is not
easy.
Yet I think much more is called for in this area if we
* are to feel more comfortable with the personnel security of
our organizations. You heard it mentioned yesterday by one
%I2.
of the speakers that most serious incidents don't occur early
on anyway. What having identified early on as a higher risk
group can do for a commander is to allow her or his attention
to focus on the weaker links in the system. Good continous
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monitoring can identify problem cases in their early stages,
before a serious incident has occurred or enough repetitions
of the types of behavior necessary to generate a separation-
action through the personnel system have been documented. After
all, if these personnel really do need clearance, then our standards
for them should be higher.
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IDENTIFICATION OF UNNECESSARY BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONSc
The Personnel Security Program in DOD is currently f aced
with severely limited investigatory resources. This occurs -
in a period when minimizing case completion times is a key system -
performance criterion and the importance of periodic review
is increasingly becoming recognized. Quotas are in effect,
limiting the volume of reinvestigations and administrative
enhancements are urgently sought to reduce completion times
for investigations. In such an environment there is no room
for duplication in the form of unnecessary investigations.
Yet recent incidents have led to the conclusion that a number
of unnecessary background investigation requests may have been
forwarded to DIS.
The stimulus for this suspicion and for the resulting analyses -
reported here was the detection of a request for background
-~ investigation only six months after one had been completed on
the same individual. Current policy does not require/permit
another such investigation for five years. It was determined
that a routine search of the DCII did not reveal either the
initial investigation or the resulting Army clearance and so
the second investigation was initiated. A second specially
* requested search of the DCII also did not turn up the existence
of the initial investigation. Therefore, in spite of the
* frustrations of both the special agent who recalled the initial
investigation, and the subject, it appeared that the second *
investigation would have to be conducted.
In this instance, the duplication of effort was avoided
only after a search of the SSN based research version of the
* DCII did in fact locate the initial record of investigation
and clearance. Beyond the specific implications for this case, -.
- the incident documented the reality of what had only been
speculation: that because of the way in which the DCII is
structured, it is possible that a search may not fully reveal
* the complete file contents on an individual. Recent analytical
work on the DCII has revealed over 511 thousand individuals
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with more than one record in the data base. Some were noted
to contain duplicate segments, otherSunique segments.
In view of the possibility and undesireability of unnecessary
investigations, it was decided to more thoroughly explore those
situations where more than a single DCII record was found for
an individual. Specifically, by examining cases where more
than a single DIS investigation was found, it would be possible
to explore the extent to which unnecessary background investigations
had been conducted. A total of 21,529 individual SS'1s that .
had more than one unique DIS type I (investigation) segment,
were identified from the May 1984 DCII. This represents about
1% of the almost two million records with a DIS investigation
segment.
In this analysis "unique" was defined relative to the entire
contents of the 27 segment positions. A difference in any position
was considered to constitute a unique segment. Cases where two
identical segments were located represent bookkeeping problems
not of concern here. The 21,529 figure represents only the
instances where more than one unique 27 )osition segrent was
* .. ~ found. These represent anomalies because routine procedure
is designed to allow only the single most recent ')IS investigation
to reside in the DCII. Previous investigations are to be overwritten
by a lore recent segment.
This report will describe the results of the examination
* of the characteristics of the DIS investigations found aroung
the 21,529 identified individuals. All but 475 of the.i had
exactly two DIS segments, while 453 had three ank! thirteen had
four unique segments. Those with more than two will be described
S. separately later. O)f specific interest here were military background-
investigations and special background investigations. Table
1 shows the frequencies with which other case category codes
were found when one of the two segments was either an initial
T31 (lAl) or SRI (IA2).
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In the case of initial BIs the most common situation was
for both segments to be coded lAl. Other frequent pairings
with an initial BI were added coverage Bis, initial and supplemental
S131s, and file and expanded 'ACs. With regard to initial SBIs, -
the most frequent pairings, in addition to a second 1A2, were
added coverage SBIs, supplemental SBIs, 7Is, periodic reviews,
and file MACs.
W7hile all of these instances reflect segments not intended
to be or remain in the DCII, not all of them identify unnecessary
investigations. There are situations where two different types
of DIS investigation within a five year period may be quite
proper. For example, a file NAC followed by a 3I or an ,331
followed by a supplemental SMI can be legitimate. Therefore
our analytical focus was next put on individuals with either
two initial BI segments or two initial SM segments. For such
cases, tne completion codes were ascertained, since only if
two completed investigations were found within a short time
period (less than five years) would we have identifiied a potentially .....
unnecessary investigation. Completion codes are shown on Table
2 for those individuals with two initial 31 or S31 segments.
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For both those .'tatwo B~I segments an.] those with two
SBI segments, the most frequent combination of completion codes
was for one segment to show an "F" or com-pleted status and the
other to have no comoletion code. Individual examination of
such cases generally revealed both segments to refer to the
same investigation rather than two separate investigations.
* In ab)out a t".ir3 of the cases Oepicted on Table 2, both
sersients haO an "P" comoletion status. It wan these individuals1
I records that ware given further scrutiny. Table 3 shows the
results of investigation Alate comnarisons for the 344 -21 pairs
and the 2'91 S-'I -3airs.
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With respect to the data on Table 3, three leneral
categorizations can be maae. First are those, amounting to
nearly half the totals, for which the calendar year and~ julian
date was exactly the samea, as well as the care control number.
InI
In these instances the separate segments refer to exactly the
same investigation. Curiously, many of these cases shared the
date of 81284 which happened to be October 11, 19891. In all,
116 of the 151 Mis and 64 of the 101 SBIs showed this date.
A second category of cases consists of those with five or more
years between the completed investigations. While technically
the more recent should have overwritten the earlier, the gap - -
between dates removes these cases from concern over their
justification.
Finally to be considered are those instances of two BIs
or SBIs per subject within a five year period. It is these
cases which may involve unnecessary investigations. Table 3
shows 152 such MIs and 74 SBIs.
As previously mentioned, a separate analysis was made for
the 476 SSNs with more than two DIS type I investigation segments.
A total of 74 of these cases included at least one BI (lAI)
segment, while of the 74, only seven were found to have two
BI segments with completion codes indicating finished
investigations. Of these seven, all but one pair contained
the same date and case control number. The exception was an
SSN with two 11s conducted six years apart. Thus, this analysis
did not add a single suspect case to the 152 31s identified
earlier.
With regard to SMs, 53 of the 476 SSls had at least one
1A2 segment, while 31 had two or more. Of this 31, a total
of nine showed two completed IA2 segments. Analysis of the
dates showed five of these nine pairs to be non-unique invest igations
and another to reflect an eight year period between investigations.
The other three showed separate SlIs less than tbree years apart.
So the search for unnecessary SIs yielded a total of 77 :pair
which had occurred less than five years apart.
In summary, the relatively small number of ootentially
unnecessary military 31s and SDIs identified by these analyses "
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SErVICE DTFFERM'CES FOR I SVILAR OCCUPATIO,"S
Each Service has its ovn occupational coding systemi to
best reflect its unique 7ission. 11owever, analytic requirements e
of a variety of OSD manpower and personnel studies have reslultned
in the development of a consistent DOD-wide framewor% identifying
similar military jobs. The corion officer and enlisted occup.ational
groups and subgroups Ale f in in,, this f ramework are described in
the DOD Occupational Conversion "lanual (')OD 1312 .1-1) . All1oc at io n
of specialties from each Service, with different titles and
c o de s, was based on an analysis of the si-milarity of duties
and responsibilities reflected in position descriptions and
related documents.
This occupat ional system can be of use to mnanagers of DOD's
Personnel Security Program. Using- this common occupational
structure to view the Services' requirements for DIS investig-ations
can reveal to what extent and in iwhich types of positions different
notions of security sensitivity 7:ay have evolved. The bas ic
q ues tion of how do the Services dif fer occupat ionally in their .
personnel security investigation requiremnents can be addressed.
uigThis report describes the major f inJ'ings From such an analysis,
ui-personnel on. active duty at the be -inning of FY 84 as
the study population. D-'DC master f7iles were linlked with rolevant
DCI I data to d1eterm ine which 11-ersonnelI had been invest i ated
by DIS. In the contcxt of this report, "investigate" implies
the existence of the "type 0" DTS segment in the DCII. or
the most part suclo segments reflect 71 and STB1 level invest i-,at ions,
althou-gh sone file and expanded_ -ACs are also ircluled.
Enlisted Personnel
A total of 150 occupational Sub ;roU5) -:0-r0 e::a-.ined . 7ersonnol
rere found in tw.o or :-ore ^ervicos In 132 of these su*roups.
Append ix I i s ts these -nd f or each 'nerv ic e, t 1e pe rc ntac_ ,
with :IS inves tit ion codecEs For eachb sOurouO. the-"
percentage discrepancy anon., Services as coputedi. Thyis value
could range from zero to 100. If the nerclntae with a DI
invest iat ion was exactly then sa-e in each ervice ten thare
would be no discrepancy. Alternately, if no one in one Service
an everyone in another Service hain ' a rIS invest idation, ten -
the computeeld discrepancy would be 10an , ref lectin the a i.u'-'
Po sseib e difference between tnd'.o Services.
Teie o of te discrepanc\' values o n apener o s o
considerable variance across occUin thtional sub rou- . In soi
sor example te medical relaedurous foI, the Services are
quite siilar. Y et in others the inter-2ervice differtnces
A-13-2
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are dramatic. Summarizing the discrepancy values shows 76 (over
half) of the subgroups with a maximum difference under 10%,
indicating close agreement among Services. On the otlher extreme
14 subgroups were identified with reater than 50% differences
between Services. Of the remainin; 42 enlisted sub7rou. s 30
had maximum discrepancies between 10% and 25%, and 12 had differences
between 25% and 50%. . .,
Table 1 shows the extreme Services for those sub-roups
with larger than 50% discrepancies. The Air Force is most notable
as the Service with relatively hig' percentages of personnel
. with DIS investigations, while the "arine Corps stands out as
having the least coverage.
Table 1- Enlisted Occupations W'ith Ili-hest Inter-Service
Discrepancies In DIS Investization Rates
Lowest , With Uighest ' W:ith
DOD Occurational Subgzroup. DIS Investizations DIS Investiizations
121 Missile Guidance and Control M.arine Corps 6.5% Air Force 67.1%
122 '!issile Checkout Equipment
Test Equipment and Calibration Ar, y 9.0% Air Force 77.2%
150 ADP Computers, General "Marine Corps ?.5% Air Force 76.3%
160 Teletype and Cryptographic
Equipment General 'arine Corps 35.3% Air Force 96.7%
2CI 7,adio Code Ar-y 22.3% navy 91.3%
202 -on-Code !.adio "arine Corps 7. 1' ;avv 37.5%
233 Electronic Countermeasures "avy 19.7% Air Force 93.4%
250 Combat Cperations Control Ar.;iy 16.4% Air Force 72.2%
260 Co:unications Center Operations "arine Corns 42.7% Wavy/Air 96.5%'7rc 96.5"'
491 PThysical Science Laboratory "avv 10. 2 Air Force 00.3-
532 Data Processin; Progra.-ers I:arine Cor s 13.9' Air Force 35.5%',
532 M!issile echanic 'arine Cor :s 4.37'. Air 7orce 32.3%•
645 A:runition Renair "arne Cors i?.4.  Air Force 1). Z,
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Officers
Representatives of two or more Services were found in 60
of 63 DOD officer occupation groups. Occupation descriptions,
Service specific DIS investigation rates, and maximum discrepancies
are listed on Appendix II. In 18 officer groups the maximum
discrepancy was under 10%. In 21 others it was between 10%
and 25%, while 16 occupations had maximum discrepancies between
25% and 50%. The five DOD officer occupation groups with
discrepancies exceeding 50% are presented on Table 2. Again
the Marine Corps tends to show up on the low end, while the
Navy and Air Force have the more complete DIS coverage in these .
occupat ions. -'
Table 2- Officer Occupations W7ith Fighest Inter-Service
Discrepancies In DIS Investigation Rates
Lowest % With Highest % With
DOD Occupational Group DIS Investigations DIS Investigations
4F Missile Maintenance :Marine Corps 3.3% Air Force 79.3% J.
5A Physical Scientists Army 20.7% Navy 75.0%
5B Meteorologists MIarine Corps 12.5% Air Force 83.0.%
7F Pictorial Administrators Marine Corps 12.5% Navy 72.6%
8G Supply, Procurement and
Allied Officers (other) Marine Corps 23.6% N7avy 83.3%
Conclusions
These analyses, while providing a needed starting point,
raise more questions than they answer. The finding of major
differences between Services in DIS investigation rates, for
certain types of occupations, indicates a need for nore detailed
study. A key question to be answered is whether the jobs defined
as sim-ilar in the DOD occupational coding structure are sufficiently
alike with respect to personnel security considerations. Other
methodological issues involve the notion of inter-service
discrepancies and how they are best characterized. Is the maxium
value, as used in this study, a good measure or should a -.iore
complex computation, involving a DOD average and Service deviations
from that average, be used?
If the occupations are similar enough, a case could be
made for more consistent investigation requirements. Then questions
would be appropriately addressed to the individual services
regarding the need for some investigations currently requested
and the rationale for not now requesting background investigations
in other jobs. In this way OSD would be exercising its management
oversight responsibilities over the DOD Personnel Security Program.
Such responsibilities certainly include seeking the difficult
balance between minimizin,-, both the use of limited investigatory -
resources and intrusion on personal privacy on the one hand,
and on the other, insurin- that personnel in a l jobs of a security
sensitive nature have had sufficient investigative attention.
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APmDIx I
Percent of Enlisted Personnel With DIS InvestigationsU
Marine Air maxim" .
D0 Occumtional Subkrowv A Naw Cos Force Discreancy
010 Infantry, General 11.8 - 11.8 - 0.0
012 Military Training Instructor 23.3 18.6 - 12.8 10.5
020 Armor and Amphibious, General 9.2 - 10.3 - 1.1
030 Combat Engineering, General 16.2 - 9.6 - 6.6 . ,
, 041 Artillery and Qmnnry 19.0 22.6 16.6 - 6.0 ,... ,
050 Air Crew, General - - 12.9 38.6 25.7
062 Small Boat Operators 9.7 21.5 - 12.0 11.8
100 Radio/Radar, General - 27.0 11.6 - 15.41- 01 Cosminicationts Radio 30.5 41.0 9.5 42.0 32.5"--'.
102 Navigation, Ccmz ication ar
Comntermasure 43.1 36.0 6.6 16.4 36.5
103 Air Traffic Control Radar - 18.1 7.4 12.9 10.7 .,
104 Surveillance/Target Acquisition
and Tracking Radar 11.4 18.6 6.9 13.2 11.7
111 Boob-Navigation - 7.8 -7.9 0.1
112 Airborne Fire Control - 9.4 - 9.2 0.2
113 Shipboard and Other Fire Control 12.1 36.1 - - 24.0
121 Missile Guidance and Control 13.8 61.6 6.5 67.1 60.6
122 Missile Checkout Equipment,
Test Equipment, and Calibration 0,0 - - 77.2 77.2
140 Ibclear Weapons Equipment Repair,
General 92.6 - - 81.7 10.9
. 150 ADP Computers, General 43.3 23.5 9.5 76.3 66.8
160 Teletype and Cryptographic
Equiment, General 60.2 65.8 35.3 96.7 61.4
191 Training Devices - 14.9 29.3 29.9 15.0
198 Electronic Instnments 16.0 21.3 16.6 13.9 7.4
201 Radio Code 22.0 91.8 34.4 81.7 69.8
202 Ion-Code Radio 10.6 87.5 7.1 - 0.4
221 Radar 17.5 17.9 9.2 33.3 24.1
222 Air Traffic Control 15.6 11.2 9.3 10.5 5.8
230 Signal Intelligence/Electronic
Warfare, General 99.6 73.6 1C0.0 - 26.4
231 Intercept Operators (Code and
232 Analysis 98.8 99.4 98.1 99.3 1.3
233 Electronic Cointermeasures 92.9 19.7 - 98.4 78.7
241 Language Interrogation/Inter-
pretation 41.0 - 66.4 79.0 38.0
242 Image Interpretation 92.7 98.9 98.2 98.2 6.2
243 Operational Intelligence 93.0 98.7 93.5 98.6 5.6
244 Counterintelligence 96.5 - 99.2 - 2.7
250 Corbat Operations Control,
General 16.4 36.2 72.2 55.8
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Marine Air M7xini ". '
Doi OD untional SUA= _AM& Nw Cors Fgre Discrea ..
260 Commicatione Center Operations,
General 60.3 96.5 42.7 96.5 53.8
300 Medical Care and Treatment,
General 10.4 8.2 - 8.4 2.2301 Operating Pbom 8.3 6.6 - 7.1 1.7 -,-,
302 IMtal Care 10.3 9.0 - 11.9 2.9
301~erti Ron7.3 6.6 - 7.1 1.
303 Therapy 7.5 4.1 - 11.8 7.7 .-*"
304 Orthopedic 9.5 8.6 - 5.4 4.1
311 Laboratory 9.2 5.1 - 7.0 4.1 7 f-A'
312 Pharmcy 8.0 7.3 - 9.0 1.7
113 Radiology 9.0 6.5 - 8.5 2.5
321 Food Inspection and Veterinary
Services 9.3 - - 8.0 1.8
322 Preventive edical Services 12.5 15.6 - 10.4 5.2
330 Dental Care, Ceneral 8.4 5.3 - 8.7 3.1 , ,
331 Dental Laboratory 9.2 4.2 - 6.3 5.0 -,
400 Photography, General 24.3 22.4 17.3 56.7 39.4
411 liapping 27.6 - 11.6 - 16.0
412 Seying 18.3 12.4 13.2 18.2 5.9
413 Drafting 17.8 - 13.8 - 4.0
414 Illustrating 27.3 51.5 15.8 61.9 46.1
420 -eather, General 16.7 20.8 7.9 27.7 19.8
431 Qrdnxe Disposal and Diving,
HD/ITDr 79.2 - 73.6 84.0 10.4
450 isicians, General 18.5 28.1 29.2 21.2 10.7
491 Physical Science Laboratory 14.6 10.2 - 80.3 70.1
492 .enrial Activities and13 02 -.
Ebalming 11.3 00- 11.3.,-'-"""
493 Safety - 21.4 73.4 2.0
494 Niaclear, Biological,
and Cherical 'arfare 20.0 22.0 37.3 17.3495 Firefighting and 1~nwage Control 11,9 9.2 8.0 3.9
496 Other Technical Sp(.ialists and
Assistants 3.6 - - 17.2 13.6
500 Persomel, General 17.3 21.7 - 22.0 4.7
501 Recruiting and Counseling 23.0 17.9- 19.3 5.1
510 Administration, General 28.0 39.2 15.2 38.3 24.0
511 Stenography 37.2 33.0 - - 45.3
512 Legal Mnministration 19.6 29.7 9.9 25.3 19.3
513 tedical Lnistratio j 12.0 - - 14.2 2.2
521 First Sergeants, Sergeants lbjor,.-
and loading Chiefs 30.6 - 27.2 24.5 6.1
531 D ta Processing Operators/
Analysts 39.3 46.6 12.2 56.8 43.6
532 Prograniers 48.0 64.9 13.9 65.5 51.6
541 Auditing and Accounting 23.4 - 10.1 14.9 18.3
542 Disbursing 11.8 7.9 9.9 6.3 5.0
551 Supply Mministration 11.6 14.3 11.3 16.3 4.7
553 Transportation 17.9 17.8 S.6 10.2 9.3





DOD Otcuatiwml h n Navy Corps Force iscr e-'n:
555 Miatigm intenace Records and
Reports - 11.0 10.9 - 0.1
556 Flight Operations 13.9 - 17.7 28.1 14.2
561 Chplain's Assistants 12.2 19.1 - 14.0 6.9
562 Recreation ,a Welfare 18.6 - 13.0 18.8 5.8 ..-.
570 Informtion and Fducation
General 21.1 19.9 19.5 24.3 4.8
600 Aircraft, General 11.7 9.6 10.7 10.2 2.1
601 Aircraft Engines 8.5 11.0 9.5 8.2 2.8
602 Aircraft Accessories 13.0 11.2 8.9 10.7 4.1
603 Aircraft Structures 10.4 9.9 8.8 7.8 2.6
604 Aircraft Launch Equipment - 11.0 7.1 - 3.9
610 Automotive, General 9.3 - 7.9 9.6 1.7
611 Tracked Vehicles 9.5 - 8.8 - 0.7
612 Construction Equipment 9.3 9.7 6.0 7.3 3.7
4 N 621 Wire Cmmunications, Linemen 12.2 21.2 8.7 28.2 19.5
1 , 622 Wire Commmications, Central
Office 35.0 42.1 7.6 29.7 34.5
623 Wire Ccmmications, Interior - 14.5 7.1 36.2 29.1
632 Missile Mechanic 15.9 - 4.3 82.6 78.3
633 Missile Launch and Support
Facilities - 50.4 - 64.9 14.5
640 Armmnt Mainteamne, General 18.9 - 12.0 - 6.9
641 Small Arms Repair 6.8 7.8 18.2 11.4
642 Artillery Repair 7.1 - 7.0 - 0.1
643 lbrret Repair 9.8 - 16.0 - 8.2
644 tclear Weapons liaintenance
and Assembly 95.3 80.9 - - 14.4
645 hiamition Reair 20.7 - 10.4 68.6 58.2
A 646 Aviation Ordnace 10.9 13.5 12.6 77.6 66.7
652 Auxiliaries, Shipboard Propulsion 15.2 10.6 - 12.8 4.6
662 Electric Power 14.0 7.8 - 16.1 8.3
670 Precision Equipment, General 11.2 18.4 8.2 - 10.2
690 Other Fechanical and Electric
Equipment, General 8.4 11.6 0.0 - 11.6
' 700 Metalwrking, General - 7.1 8.7 8.8 1.7
701 Welding - 12.0 - 10.1 1.9
702 Machinists 11.0 10.0 8.8 18.7 9.9
703 Sheetmetal - 14.7 - 9.8 4.9
704 Metal Body Repair 6.9 - 6.2 13.9 7.7
710 Construction, General 20.2 13.2 - 13.6 7.0
712 Woodworking 5.9 23.1 - 11.3 17.2
713 Construction Equipment
Operation 8.1 8.7 8.6 9.9 1.8
720 Utilities, General 8.2 12.6 9.7 11.2 4.4
721 Electricians 10.0 15.8 6.2 15.0 9.6
740 Lithography, General 29.4 39.2 21.6 45.7 24.1
750 Industrial Gas and FuIel
Production, General - 6.1 8.0 - 1.9
760 Fabric, Leather, and Rubber,




ID QO atiwal Sjbmm Army Navy Corps Force Discreancvy
800 Food Service, General 13.2 10.0 8.2 10.5 5.0
801 Stema r and Enlisted Aides - 8.8 - 20.7 11.9
811 tbtor Vehicle Operators 11.5 - 7.0 15.5 8.5
821 Missile Fuel a Petroleu 8.6 - 6.7 10.4 3.7
822 Warehousing and Equipnent
Haindling 10.4 - 8.0 12.6 4.6
823 Sales Store - 9.9 12.0 16.9 7.0
830 LIw Enforcemnt, General 15.5 21.2 15.0 15.2 6.2
831 Corrections 9.2 - 14.6 - 5.4
832 Inestigatioms 87.8 - 86.4 90.4 4.0 . :
840 Landry and Personal Service, 
: .
General 8.0 10.3 6.5 - 3.8..
860 Forard Area Equipment Support 12.2 10.9 9.8 10.2 2.4.-
911 Cadets and Other Officer
Candidates 8.1 - - 6.4 1.7
920 Undesigated Otcupatios,
General 0.0 - - 29.0 29.0
950 Nlt Occupationally Qialified,
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APPED II 1
Percent Of Officers With DIS Investizat ions
Marine Air maximm" "
DOD Occatinnal Grout) Aj ay o Force Discrenancy
IA General Officers and Executives,
General and Flag 98.3 90.0 93.8 97.4 8.3
lB General Officers and Executives,
Executivs 61.5 66.7 82.4 75.1 20.9
2A Fixed-Wing Fighter and B:mer
Pilots - 88.4 71.4 86.1 17.3
2B Other Fixed-Wing Pilots 49.6 65.2 29.8 53.6 35.4
; 2C Helicopter Pilots 33.2 33.9 31.3 31.1 2.8
21) Aircraft Crews - 84.1 74.0 84.3 10.3
2E Ground and aval Arcs 44.4 81.1 52.0 - 36.7
,". 2F Missiles - 79.0 - 96.8 17.8
2G Operations Staff 61.7 79.7 42.8 73.3 36.9
3A Intelligence, General 98.6 98.1 98.4 99.2 1.1
3B C=nwications Intelligence 98.3 99.4 100.0 99.3 1.7
3C Counterintelligence 98.6 97.2 98.7 93.6 5.1
4A Construction and Utilities 25.8 39.0 24.6 28.3 14.4
4B Electrical/Electronic 39.8 73.8 33.9 47.7 39.9
4C Ccxumnications and Padar 67.1 87.9 74.5 91.9 24.8 " .
4D Aviation Maintenance and Allied 32.8 54.5 17.6 43.0 1.9
4E Ordnance 67.8 61.8 48.4 81.3 -'.9
4F Missile Maintenance 39.7 44.j 8.3 79.3 71.0
41 Shaip 1achinery 21.5 67.1 - - 45.6
4J Safety - 66.3 - 61.0 5.3
4L Automotive and Allied 21.0 - 17.5 - 3.5
4.4 &srveyin and 1,apping 68.6 - 54.6 78.1 23.5
41! Other Engineering and Maintenance 35.4 47.9 - 58.5 23.1
5A Physical Scientists 20.7 75.0 - 56.8 54.3
5B lieteorologists 31.7 72.9 12.5 83.0 70.5
SC Biological Scientists 15.5 11.7 - 19.2 7.5
5D Social Scientists - 79.6 - 89.1 9.5
5E Psychologists 14.4 22.8 - 24.4 10.0
5F Legal 27.7 29.7 20.0 31.5 11.5
5C Chaplain 17.6 14.0 -
26.1 12.1
5H Social Workers 7.9 23.1 - 15.2 15.2
" 51 iathematicians and Statisticians 63.6 64.7 - - 1.1
5K Educators and Instructors - 70.8 - 46.4 24.4
5L Research and Development
4 Coordinators - 80.0 - 36.0 6.0
%f Ccmmnity Activities Ofricers - 69.3 - 43.4 25.9
6A Physicians 8.0 6.2 - 9.7 3.5
6C Dentists 6.7 4.0 - 4.7 2.7
6E General &nises 6.0 3.1 - 2.9 3.1
6F Nursing Specialists 3.6 2.8 - 4.8 2.0
6G Veterinarians 13.8 - - 11.9 1.9
6H Allied Medical 11.2 8.0 - 8.7 3.2
7A Adrninistrators, General - 69.6 51.4 51.9 18.2
73 Training Administrators - 73.7 36.4 35.7 38.0
A-13-9 ..
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DOD accunatimnl Grono Arm r~ on Force Discrevancy .
7C Nr~ommr and Personnel 46.2 66.7 - 44.8 21.9
7D) Ccuptrollers and Fiscal 35.0 32.4 17.2 35.2 18.0-
7E Data Processing 50.5 63.7 33.0 64.3 35.7A
7F Pictorial - 72.6 12.5 57.0 60.1
7G Thdoriation 33.3 63.9 35.9 41.2 30.6
71! Police 49.2 65.7 35.1 63.4 30.6
7H Medical Administration 19.1 24.2 - 32.7 13.6
7R Mbcale and Welfare 20.0 48.1 29.4 29.7 28.1
SA lIngistics, General - 48.3 36.8 61.9 25.1 '
BSupy31.5 43.4 22.3 42.9 21.1
8C Tr-ansportation 39.0 53.2 18.5 37.9 34.7
8D Procuremen t and Production 46.7 42.3 33.3 39.4 13.4
8E Food Service 30.0 25.4 18.2 20.3 11.8
8F Eccharge anid Cocissary - 25.7 18.2 32.3 14.1 .-
80 Other Supply, Procurenent and
Allied Officers 64.3 83.3 28.6 37.3 54.7
9B Sbudents 11.1 44.0 6.6 18.9 37.4
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MOST RECENT DIS INVESTIGATION AND CLEARANCE INFORMATION
IN THE DCII
AT THE BEGINNING OF FISCAL YEAR 1985
- ,.
Background
Previous reports in this Personnel Security Research Program
series were based on end of FY83 and mid-FY84 versions of the '
DCII. This paper documents the edited contents of a more recent,
end of FY84 version. Forthcoming reports will describe the di
results of linkages of this data base with other automated personnel " -
files maintained by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DIDC)
such as the master inventory files and enlisted accession cohort
f i e s. 
This report presents the content of key DCII data elements
and compares current distributions with those from the end of
FY83. At both times, only the most recent DIS investigation
segments (type 0) and Army and Air Force adjudication segments - ..
(type 3) with SSI.s were considered. A further exclusion criterion
eliminated DIS investigations with victim or cross-reference -
codes. Therefore the resulting edited DCII does not contain
ITAC history, pending NAC, AKA, or current nare segments. Also,
it does not contain any tracing segments (type 0) of investigative
agencies other than DIS. The resulting file contains, at most,
a single DIS investigation segmert and a single Arry or Air
Force adjudication segment for each individual with identifying "° ..
information.
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DIS Investigations
The edited end of FY84 DCII contains a total of 1,957,997
DIS investigation segments with a total of 354 different case
category codes. This is an increase of about 145,000 individuals
from the previous fiscal year. A relatively small number of
DIS case category codes accounted for most of the investigations,
as Table I shows. The 20 most frequent types of investigation
include over 90% of the DIS segments in this file. The most
notable differences between this ordering of DIS investigations
and that of one year ago are the increases in initial military
IBIs (IA3/C - over 31,000), industrial IBIs C1C3/C - over 18,000),
and military periodic reviews (ID3/C - over 16,000). To more
fully contrast current DIS investigative activity with the cumulated
data in Table I, a distribution was obtained limited to investi-
gations initiated during FY84. Table 2 lists the most frequent
types of investigation for this time period. In comparison
with the overall inventory of most recent DIS investigations,
Table 2 shows initial military and industrial IBIs and military
periodic reviews to be among the most frequent types of DIS
investigations initiated during FY84. Other types of investigations
that were far more prominent in FY84 than in previous years
were expanded industrial NACs with suitability issues, expanded
industrial NACs, and civilian and industrial periodic reviews.
Three other attributes of DIS investigations were examined.
These were completion status, retention period, and year of
investigation. Most segments (93.4%) show an "F" code, indicating
a completed investigation, while 2.6% had no completion code,
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TABLE 1
Most Frequent DIS Investigations
(As of 1 October 1984)
Case Percent of Cumnulative .- , "'
Catea.WJ. Description Subiect Number Total Percent
lAI/A Initial BI Military 317,479 16.2 16.2
IA2IB Initial SBI Military 279,277 14.3 30.5
IGI/A File NAC (entrance) Military 222,865 11.4 41.9
IG2/B File IMAC (standard) Military 176,598 9.0 50.9
IKI/A Expanded VAC (entrance) Military 129,271 6.6 57.5
IA3/C Initial IBI 11ilitary 78,354 4.0 61.5
iCl/A Initial BI Industrial 67,529 3.4 64.9
1A7/G Supplemental SBI Military 64,315 3.3 68.2 "..
IC2/B Initial SBI Industrial 57,571 2.9 71.1 -
lJ2/B File MAC Industrial 55,897 2.9 74.0
1B2/B Initial SBI Civilian 44,763 2.3 76.3
NM2/8 Expanded NIAC Industrial 39,630 2.0 78.3
IC3/C Initial II Industrial 39,513 2.0 30.3 ,
lV9/I Expanded TAC (suitability) Industrial 36,127 1.8 32.1
1BI/A Initial BI Civilian 34,317 1.8 83.9
105/E Limited s131/PR Military 30,793 1.6 85.5
IK2/n Expanded NAC (standard) Military 25,649 1.3 36.8
ID3/C Periodic Review Military 24,690 1.3 38.1
IE5/E Limited SRI/PR, Civilian 19,737 1.0 39.1
1P3/C SBI (suitability) Military 19,292 1.0 90.1
--- All other DIS codes 194,230 9.9 100.0
Total 1,957,997 100.0
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TABLE 2'
Most Freauent DIS Investigations Initiated During Fiscal Year 1984
Case Percent of Cummulative
Categories Description Subject Number Total Percent
IA2/B Initial SRI Military 38,608 17.0 17.0
1A3/C Initial IBI Military 36,054 15.9 32.9
1C3/C Initial IBI Industrial 21,414 9.4 42.3 .- .-. ,-
1D31C Periodic Review 1!ilitary 19,059 8.0 50.3
IC21/ Initial SBI Industrial 11,953 5.3 55.6
1G2 File NAC (standard) Military 11,790 5.2 60.8
IV9/I Expanded NIAC (suitability) Industrial 11,104 4.9 65.6
IKI/A Expanded ITAC (entrance) Military 10,083 4.4 70.1
IM2/B Expanded 1:AC Industrial 9,039 4.0 74.1
[ B2/B Initial SBI Civilian 3,122 3.6 77.7
IE3/C Periodic P.eview Civilian 6,735 3.0 80.6
1J2 File M!AC Industrial 6,116 2.7 83.3 "
1F3/C Periodic Review Industrial 6,092 2.7 86.0
II/A Initial BI Civilian 4,310 2.1 88.1
1GI File TAC (entrance) 11ilitary 4,630 2.1 90.2
1V2/B Expanded !'AC (standard) Military 3,293 1.5 91.7
1P3/C SBI (suitability) ,ilitary 2,623 1.2 92.3
-W9/I Post Adjudication
(suitability) Industrial 2,453 1.1 93.9
1R3/C IBI (suitability) 'ilitary 2,372 1.0 94.9
1P9/I IBI (suitability) Industrial 1,309 0.3 95.7
lVX Initiated by other agency --- 1,723 0.3 96.5
1112 File NAC Civilian 1,619 0.7 97.2
--- All other DIS codes --- 6,326 2.8 100.0
Total 226,942 100.0
A-14-5
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implying an open investigation. Most of the open cases were
initiated during 1984. Of the remaining cases 2.1% were cancelled,
1.0% suspended, and 0.9% showed a changed case category code.
With regard to retention period, 96.2% of the segments
are to be retained for 15 years. Another 0.8% have retention -.
codes of 25 or 30 years while 0.4% have codes ranging from one
to ten years. A total of 2.6% do not have a retention code,
most of these being the open investigations.
Table 3 presents a frequency distribution of the years
in which the most recent DIS investigations, currently on the
DCII, were initiated. Other than 1972, DIS's initial year of
operation, over 100,000 investigation segments remain from each
year. Over half of these investigations date prior to 1980.
Security Clearance Adjudications
Only the Army and Air Force currently input adjudicative
information into the DCII. At the end of FY34, the edited DCII
contained over 1 .4 million Army and 1 .5 million Air Force segments .
These figures represent increases of over 145,000 Army and 34,000
Air Force personnel since the end of FY33. Table 4 shows the
clearance level distributions for these two Services. A major
difference between Services is the Army's use of two separate
Secret (S and M) and Top Secret (T and N) codes, while the Air
Force uses single designations for its Secret and Top Secret
adjudications. Most clearances in both Services are at the
Secret level. The most notable differences are at the Top Secret
level where a higher percentage of Air Force (17.4%) than Army
A-14-6 _e
---- * W ,,-- - - - - r.. .
TABLE 3
Year DIS nvestigation Initiated
(As of 1 October 1984)
Percent of Cumulative
Year Number Total Percent F
1972 88,620 4.5 4.5
1973 154,003 7.9 12.4
1974 165,875 8.5 20.9
1975 143,364 7.3 28.2
1976 116,907 6.0 34.2
1977 127,524 6.5 40.7
1978 127,956 6.5 47.2
1979 148,990 7.6 54.8
1980 180,521 9.2 64.0
1981 163,983 8.4 72.4
1982 167,449 8.6 81.0
519313 197,432 10.1 91.0
1984 175,371 9.0 100.0










Army and Air Force Clearance Adiudications
(As of 1 October 1984) "
Army Air Force
Clearance Level Code Number Percent Code Number Percent
Secret S 388,647 27.4 S 1,120,963 73.8
M 761,108 53.6
Top Secret T 48,747 3.4 T 263,756 17.4
N 39,202 2.8
SCI V 123,873 8.7 V 81,318 5.4
* Other R 35,664 2.5 F 20,990 1.4
X 21,737 1.5 z 18,532 1.2
all other 2,063 0.1 all other 13,737 0.9
Total 1,421,041 100.0 1,519,296 100.0
..
TABLE 5
Army and Air Force Clearance Adjudications Durin:;, Fiscal Year 1984
Army Air Force
Clearance Level Code Number Percent Code Number Percent
Secret S 29,477 13.1 S 112,334 64.6
N 133,203 59.0
- Top Secret T 7,015 3.1 T 26,614 15.2
N 7,966 3.5
" SCI V 22,327 9.9 V 20,538 11.3
Other R 4,769 2.1 F 4,466 2.6
X 20,868 9.2 z 5,443 3.1
all other 13 0.0 all other 4,705 2.7
Total 225,643 100.0 174,600 100.0
A-14-8
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(6.2%) segments are found and SCI, where more Army (8.7%) than
Air Force (5.4%) segments are found. The most common other
codes encountered among the Army segments were "revoked/denied",
(R) and "pending adjudication", (X). In the Air Force they
were "favorable", (F) and "terminated-unfavorable", (Z).
As with DIS investigations, a separate set of clearance
status distributions were obtained for FY84 adjudications.
The results are shown on Table 5. In the Army, major differences
between FY84 and the overall file are seen with respect to more
-M and fewer S secret clearances in FY84 and the expected
much higher rate of "X' codes for FY84. For the Air Force,
most notable is the higher frequency of SCI level clearances
: and lower rate of Secret clearances during FY84 relative to
all Air Force adjudications in the DCII as FY35 began.
In addition to clearance status, several other adjudicative
segment attributes were studied. The type of investigation J-
adjudicated was one of these. As Tables 6A and 6B show, five -
7L
investigation codes accounted for rr.ost clearance segments.
In both Services virtually all Secret level clearances were
based on ENITNACs, NACs, or NACIs. Most Top Secret clearances
resulted from BI type investigations, while others resulted
from SBIs. Virtually all SCI clearances were based on SBls.
A major Service difference apparent on these tables is
the higher percentage of NACIs in the Air Force (20.8%) than
the Army (6.0% and 7 .8%) for Secret level clearances. Also,
with respect to Top Secret clearance, the Air Force shows a *.
A-14-9
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higher percentage with SBIs (28.6%) than the Army (11.6% and .
Dates of adjudication and investigation were also studied. .
Tables 7A and 7B show the adjudication date findings for the
various clearance codes. rfost adjudications in the edited DCII :- -
have been accomplished since 1930. A much higher percentage
of the Air Force adjudications 20.3%) show dates prior to 1975
than for the Army (0.6%). For the Army, far more of the .S'
Secret (39.6%) and 'T' Top Secret (43.6%) clearances were adjudicated
prior to 1980 than was the case for those with codes 'M' (0.7%)
and N' (15.7%)... .-.
Similar findings are displayed on Tables 3A and 3B for
the dates of the investigation adjudicated. More of the Air
Force (24.1%) than Army (5.2%) investigations were before 1975.
Also, more of the investigations leading to Army "S' and "T-
clearances occurred before 1980, than did those resulting in .. .
". and -'1 clearances.
A final data element studied was the reason for review, 4
which is coded only for Army adjudications. "7esults are shown
for the various clearance codes on Table 9. Lare differences
are obvious. "Surety" was the reason for review for about two-thirds
of those with '!I' and 'N' clearance codes, while most others
with these clearances showed "nuclear" as the reason for review.
For most of those with an 'S' code "clearance" was the reason
for review, while about a fourth were coded as "surety" adjudi-
cat ions. The three prominent review codes for segments with
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Two-thirds of the segments with Army SCI clearance codes had
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Continued To2 Secret and SCI Status of
Former Army Personnel with Unsuitability Discharces
Recent computer analyses conducted at the Naval Postgraduate
School, as part of the Personnel Security Research Program,
have linked the Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII),
the major DoD personnel security data base, with an enlisted
accession cohort file, containing longitudinal personnel information
on the nearly 4.2 million individuals who entered military service
between FY74 and FY84. This latter data base was developed
especially for personnel security applications at the Defense
Manpower Data Center. The focus of the present investigation
was to document the need for closer ties between the personnel .4
and security communities.
In comparing Army attrition data with clearance information
a paradox was discovered, in which thousands of individuals
who had been discharged over the last ten years for unsuitability
still retained DCII adjudication codes indicating top secret
and SCI clearance. Since those already investigated and cleared
are highly desirable new hires for DoD civilian and contractor
positions, there exists the possibility of inappropriate information
in DoD's security data base reflecting favorably on individuals
for whom just the opposite should be the case.
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The following tables describe the 2,959 former Army enlisted
personnel with top secret (I' and IT') and SCI (IV') clearance
,"- . ° % •
status codes remaining in the DCII as FY85 began, who had received
unsuitablity discharges. The tables profile these personnel
with respect to which MOSs they had entered with, what kinds
of security investigation they were given, how long they stayed
in the Army, how much time elapsed between favorable adjudication
and being discharged from the Army, under what circumstances
- they left, and what occupation they were serving in when discharged.
Table 1 shows the enlistment MOSs of these personnel.
Among those with top secret status the most frequent enlistment
MOSs are seen to be atomic demolition munitions, intelligence
analyst, telecommunications center operation, military police,
and nuclear weapons. Most frequent individual enlistment MOSs
for SCI personnel are EW/SIGINT voice interceptor, Morse interceptor,
and analyst.
. After entering the Army, Table 2 finds most with top secret
'N' clearance to have had initital BIs (74%) or IBIs (19%).
L More variability is evident among those with 'T' top secret
codes. In addition to initial BI and IBIs, 17% had initial




Top Secret (N) Top Secret (T) SCI (v)
MOS Description n _ n % n %
05C Radio Teletype Operator 2 0.7 4 0.8 81 3.8
05H EW/SIGINT Morse Interceptor 0 --- 27 5.1 184 8.5 -,.
05K EW/SIGINT Non-Morse Interceptor 0 --- 5 1.0 69 3.2
12E Atomic Demolition Munitions 63 23.0 45 8.6 1 0.0
13B Cannon Crewman 14 5.1 24 4.6 2 0.1 -
13E Cannon Fire Direction 8 2.9 2 0.4 1 0.0
32D Station Technical Controller 3 1.1 13 2.5 15 0.7 .
33S EW/Intercept Tactical System Repairer 0 --- 8 1.5 65 3.0
55G Nuclear Weapons 16 5.8 18 3.4 0 ---
72E Telecommunications Center Operator 19 6.9 62 11.8 93 4.3
720 Data Communications Switching Center 8 2.9 10 1.9 96 4.4 -
95B Military Police 18 6.6 18 3.4 91 4.2
96B Intelligence Analyst 27 9.9 21 4.0 12 0.6
96D Image Interpreter 8 2.9 7 1.3 2 0.1
98C EW/SIGINT Analyst 0 --- 6 1.1 144 6.7
98G EW/SIGINT Voice Interceptor 1 0.4 10 1.9 190 8.8
None Not Indicated 20 7.3 85 16.2 483 22.4
Other 67 24.5 161 30.6 630 29.2 . '
Total 274 100.0 526 100.0 2,159 100.0 .
Table 2
Type of DIS Investigation Shown in DCII
Top Secret (N) Top Secret (T) SCI (v)
DIS Code Description n _ n _ n %
IAI/A BI, initial 204 74.5 272 51.7 23 1.1
1A2/B SBI, initial 1 0.4 89 16.9 1,876 86.9
1A3/C IBI, initial 52 19.0 35 6.7 8 0.4
IA7/G SBI, supplemental 1 0.4 4 0.8 43 2.0
l N3/C BI, suitability issues 4 1.5 52 9.91 6 0.3
1P3/C SBI, suitability issues 1 0.4 42 8.0 88 4.1
Other --- 11 4.0 32 6.1 115 5.3
Total 274 100.0 26 100.0 2,159 100.0
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I SBI with suitability issues. Of those discharged for unsuitability
and retaining SCI status, 87% had initial SBI codes in the DCII.
Table 3 indicates the wide dispersion in total months of
service for those identified in this study. While some were
discharged within the first three months of service, others
served over six years before being discharged for unsuitability. -
Of the three clearance codes, those with SCI eligibility had
C the shortest service tenure, 50% serving a year or less and
only 10% serving over four years.
Also computed was the period between adjudication and separa-
tion. This analysis revealed that in a small fraction of the
Ucases, the clearance was granted well after military separation,
based on a DIS code indicating that the subject was not in the
military at the time of the investigation. However, as Table
4 and the military DIS codes on Table 2 confirm, in most cases,
'the investigation and adjudication occurred before separation.
- Thus the nature of the discharge is not reflected (as perhaps
it should be) in the top secret or SCI eligibility indicated
in the DCII. Table 4 finds the time period between adjudication
-- and discharge to be between l and 24 months for a majority of
those studied. Por the top secret groups this figure was 65%,
while it was 59% for the SCI group.
A-1 5-5
NIN- . . -
-- . *~* . * 5 - ..-
-7: ... .. ,.* .' z ~':.~-'.:
• . ..
Table 3 , .%, b- a.o,
Months of Military Service .
Top Secret (N) Top Secret (T) SCI (V)
Months %l n % n %
3 or less 31 11.3 24 4.6 282 13.1 A '-
4- 6 24 8.8 26 4.9 344 15.9
7- 12 39 14.2 64 12.2 459 21.3
13- 24 58 21.2 130 24.7 424 19.6
25- 36 38 13.9 111 21.1 286 13.2
37- 48 20 7.3 51 9.7 142 6.6
49- 72 39 14.2 61 11.6 120 5.6 "" ""
73-127 25 9.1 59 11.2 102 4.7
Total 274 100.0 526 100.0 2,159 100.0
Table 4.-_)
Months Between Clearance Adjudication and Discharge
Top Secret (N) Top Secret (T) SCI (V)
Months n % n % n %1
Adjudication Drior ---..
to discharge by: over 60 0 --- 4 0.8 33 1.5
49-60 6 2.2 8 1.5 36 1.7
37-48 18 6.6 20 3.8 87 4.0
25-36 31 11.3 49 9.3 199 9.2
13-24 51 18.6 93 17.7 330 15.3
7-12 45 16.4 94 17.9 307 14.2
1- 6 81 29.6 156 29.7 631 29.2
same 17 6.2 29 5.5 149 6.9
Adiudication after
discharge by: 1- 6 11 4.0 46 8.7 322 14.9
over 6 14 5.1 27 5.1 65 3.0
Total 274 100.0 526 100.0 2,159 100.0
A 15-°6
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On Table 5 are the reasons for discharge. Perusal of the
discharge descriptions reveals that each is related to the sort
of suitability issues dealt with in prescreening and security
investigations for sensitive positions requiring top secretI and SCI clearances. Therefore# it is not unreasonable to believe
that in at least some of these cases, review of the circumstancesJ:
surrounding discharge would result in a revised adjudication
of clearance status other than top secret or SCI. For those
with top secret Army adjudications, the most frequent unsuitability
discharge codes reflect unsatisfactory performance, performance
and conduct problems, discharge in lieu of court martial and
drugs. These codes account for 72% of those with 'N' and 70%
with IT' clearances. Among SCI personnel with unsuitability
discharges, unsatisfactory performance, performance and conduct
problems, and general unsuitability account for 72% of the 2,159
cases.
Duty occupation at separation was the final data item examined
for these personnel. Table 6 lists the most frequently identified
occupations, in which these individuals were performing at the
time of their unsuitability discharges. Under the common DoD
occupational coding system, the jobs with the most top secret
* personnel were combat engineering, artillery and gunnery, conmun-
ications center operations, and law enforcement. Highest proportions L:




Top Secret (N) Tov Secret (T) SCI (V)
DoD Code Description % n % n %
60 Character or Behavior Disorder 14 5.1 21 4.01 61 2.8
61 Motivational Problems/Apathy 12 4.4 45 8.6 113 5.2 *
64 Acohoism8 2. 9 17 9 0.4
65 Discreditable Incidents 2 0.7 11 2.1 9 0.4
67 Drugs 20 7.3 66 12.5 58 2.7
76 Homosexuality 5 1.8 8 1.5 46 2.1
78 In Lieu of Court Martial 28 10.2 58 11.0 144 6.7
82 Unsuitability 22 8.0 35 6.7 267 12.4
84 Basic Training Attrition 1 0.4 0 -- 103 4.8
86 Unsatisfactory Performance 95 34.7 199 37.8 798 37.0
87 Performance and Conduct 53 19.3 48 9.1 493 22.8
Other -- 14 5.1 26 4.9 58 2.7-
NTO tal, 274 100.0 526 100.0 2,159 100.0 .
Table 6
Duty Occupation Code at Separation
* DoD
Occupat ion Top Secret (N) Too Secret CT) SCI CV)
*Code Descriiption of Occupation n % n % n % .
*000 None 68 24.8 70 13.3 533i 24.7
010 Infantry 10 3.6 18 3.4 31 1.4
030 Combat Engineering 43 15.7 44 8.4 7 0.3
041 Artillery and Gunnery 20 7.3 29 5.5 13 0.6
043 Missile Artillery, Operating Crew 9 3.3 5 1.0 8 0.4
201 Radio Code 7 2.6~ 11 2.1 49 2.3-
*231 Intercept Operators 0 2 0.4 209 9.7
232 Analysis 0 -- 1 0.2 82 3.8
250 Combat Operations Control 10 3.6 8 1.5 9 0.4
260 Communications Center Operations 18 6.6 [62 11.8 86 4.0
510 Administration 3 1.1 22 4.2 89 4.1
610 Automotive 1 0.4k 11 2 .1 59 2.7
644 Nuclear Weapons Maintenance/Assembly 8 2.9 9 1.7 2 0.1
830 Law Enforcement 17 6.2 19 3.6 L 57 2.6
950 Not Occupationally Qualified 11 4.0 56 10.6 533 24.7
Other -- 49 17.9 159 30.2 32 18.2
To-t al 274 100.0 526 100.0 2,159 100.0
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U in intercept operations, administration, communications center
- operations, and analysis.
The analyses in this study have identified a lack of consistency
in Army personnel and security programs. Nearly 3,000 former
enlisted personnel were identified, all of whom had been discharged
for various types of unsuitability between 1974 and 1984, yet
still retained Army top secret and SCI clearance codes in the
primary DoD security data base, as FY85 began. Occupational,
n investigatory, and adjudicative data on these individuals were
examined. Results indicated that many or most had enlisted
for and served in sensitive positions, been investigated by
the Defense Investigative Service and cleared by the Army, and
discharged for the same types of reasons that investigators
and adjudicators consider derogatory from a security standpoint.
Yet no adjustment had been made in any of their clearance codes
in the DCII, even though this would be one of the first places
searched if these same "unsuitable" individuals seek DoD contractor
or civilian employment. This indicates a need to review the
circumstances of discharge for such people to determine if
different clearance codes would be more appropriate.___
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Continued Too Secret and SCI Status of .. ,
Former Air Force Personnel with Unsuitability Discharges ,
Recent computer analyses conducted at the Naval Postgraduate
School, as part of the Personnel Security Research Program,
have linked the Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII), ill
the major DoD personnel security data base, with an enlisted .,7
accession cohort file, containing longitudinal personnel information
on the nearly 4.2 million individuals who entered military service
between FY74 and FY84. This latter data base was developed -
especially for personnel security applications at the Defense
Manpower Data Center. The focus of the present investigation
was to document the need for closer ties between the personnel
and security communities.
In comparing Air Force attrition data with clearance information
a paradox was discovered, in which thousands of individuals
who had been discharged over the last ten years for unsuitability
still retained DCII adjudication codes indicating top secret
and SCI clearance. Since those already investigated and cleared
are highly desirable new hires for DoD civilian and contractor
positions, there exists the possibility of inappropriate information .-
in DoD's security data base reflecting favorably on individuals
for whom just the opposite should be the case.
~~A-1 6-2"--'
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The following tables describe the 6,108 former Air Force
enlisted personnel with top secret and 985 others with SCI clearance
3 status codes remaining in the DCII as FY85 began, who had received
unsuitablity discharges. The tables profile these personnel
with respect to which AFSCs they had entered with, what kinds
of security investigation they were given, how long they stayed
in the Air Force, how much time elapsed between favorable adjudi-
06 cation and being discharged from the Air Force, under what circum-
stances they left, and what occupation they were serving in
when discharged.
Table 1 shows the enlistment AFSCs of these personnel.
* While over 40% entered with a non-specific code, relatively
high percentages were found who entered for jobs such as aircraft
.., armament systems, munitions maintenance, or missile maintenance
and ended up with a top secret clearance. Among those receiving
SCI clear nces, many had come in for cryptology, Morse or printer
systems, or telecommunications operations jobs.
After entering the Air Force, Table 2 finds 74% of the
top secret group with initial DIS background investigations
and another 15% with initial SBIs. Over 88% of the SCI group
had inital SBI codes in the DCII. Note also in Table 2 that
A-16-3
L.- %° 4" ,
. ... ".-'-'...-.




ALE Description Z n Z 
202XX Radio Communications Analysis 34 0.6 24 2.4 "
2061X Imagery Interpreter 14 0.2 23 2.3 .
2073M Morse/Printer Systems 103 1.7 98 9.9
208XX Cryptologic Linguist 91 1.5 140 14.2
2911X Telecommunications Operations 148 2.4 66 6.7
306XX Electronic Coumunications/Crytographic Equipment 49 0.8 33 3.4
307XX Telecommunications Systems Control 36 0.6 18 1.8
316XX Missile Electronic Maintenance 106 1.7 0 ---
44"3XX Missile Maintenance 259 4.2 0 ---
461XX Munitions Maintenance 528 8.6 0 ---- '
462XX Aircraft Armament Systems 1,205 19.7 2 0.2
811XX Security Police 81 1.3 19 1.9 ' '_
990XX Basic Airman 2,445 40.0 430 43.7
None Not indicated 298 4.9 19 1.9 .-
Other --- 711 11.6 113 11.5 %
Tota1 6,108 100.0 985 100.0
Table 2
Tyve of DIS Investization Shown in DCII
Top Secret SCI
DIS Code Descrivtion n Z n %
IAI/A BI, initial 4,542 74.4 21 2.1
1A2/B SBI, initial 893 14.6 871 88.4
IA7/G SBI, supplemental 98 1.6 36 3.7
1N3/C BI, suitability issues 287 4.7 0 ---
1P3/C SBI, suitability issues 98 1.6 34 3.5
Other 190 3.1 23 2.3
Total 6,108 100.0 985 100.0
A-16-4
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some individuals had BI and SBI suitablity issue cases, but
still received top secret and SCI clearances.
Table 3 indicates the wide dispersion in total months of
service for those identified in this study. While some were
discharged within the first three months of service, others
served over six years before being discharged for unsuitability.
~ Most of the top secret (88%) and SCI (90%) personnel lasted
between 4 months and 4 years.
Also computed was the period between adjudication and separa-
tion. This analysis revealed that in a small fraction of the
cases, the clearance was granted well after military separation,
based on a DIS code indicating that the subject was not in the
military at the time of the investigation. However, as Table 4
and the military DIS codes on Table 2 confirm, in most cases
the investigation and adjudication occurred before separation.
qThus the nature of the discharge is not reflected (as perhaps
it should) in the top secret or SCI eligibility indicated in
the DCII. Table 4 finds the time period between adjudication
and discharge to be between 1 and 24 months for most of those
studied. For the top secret group this figure was 64%, while
- it was 70% for those with SCI eligiblity.
On Table 5 are the reasons for discharge. Perusal of the
discharge descriptions reveals that each is related to the sort
A-16-5
Table 3
Months of Military Service
Top Secret SCI
Months nl %
3 or less 108 1.8 32 3.2
4- 6 578 9.5 128 13.0
7- 12 843 13.8 224 22.7 '.'
13- 24 1,919 31.4 286 29.0
25- 36 1,285 21.0 175 17.8
37- 48 736 12.0 72 7.3
49- 72 428 7.0 49 5.0
73-120 211 3.5 19 1.9
Total 6,108 100.0 985 100.0
Tablce 4'.: : ']!
Months Between Clearance Adiudication
and Discharge
Too Secret SCI
Mont- h A n
Adiudication Drior
to discharge by: over 60 209 3.4 2 0.2
37-60 630 10.3 42 4.3
25-36 828 13.6 95 9.6
13-24 1,647 27.0 219 22.2
7-12 1,035 16.9 178 18.1
1- 6 1,234 20.2 291 29.5
same 225 3.7 56 5.7
Ad iudicat ion after ": -
discharge by: 1- 6 258 4.2 96 9.7
over 6 42 0.7 6 0.6
Total 6,108 100.0 985 100.0
A-16-6
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of suitability issues dealt with in prescreening and security
investigations for sensitive positions requiring top secret
and SCI access. Therefore it is not unreasonable to believe 0
that in at least some of these cases, review of the circumstances
surrounding discharge would result in a revised clearance status
other than top secret or SCI. For those with top secret Air
Force adjudications the most frequent unsuitability discharge
-" codes reflect motivational problems/apathy, unsatisfactory perfor-
mance, drugs, performance and conduct, discreditable incidents,
and character or behavior disorder. These codes account for
85% of the 6,108 former Air Force enlistees. Among SCI personnel
with unsuitability discharges the same six codes account for
78% of the 985 cases.
Duty occupation at separation was the final data item examined L
for these personnel. Table 6 lists the most frequently found
• - occupations in which these indviduals were performing at the
time of their unsuitability discharges. Under the common DoD
occupational coding system the jobs with the most top secret . .
personnel were aviation ordnance, ammunition repair, administration,
communications center operations, and missile mechanic. Highest
• proportions of the SCI group were found in cornzunications center
*; operations, analysis, administration, intercept operations,
and teletype and cryptographic equipment.
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DoD Code Description n % n
60 Character or Behavior Disorder 459 7.5 90 9.1
61 Motivational Problems/Apathy 1,565 25.6 142 14.4
64 Alcoholism 62 1.0 10 1.0
65 Discreditable Incidents 584 9.6 81 8.2
67 Drugs 878 14.4 80 8.1
68 Financial Irresponsibility 83 1.4 11 1.1
71 Civil Court Conviction 98 1.6 10 1.0
73 Court Martial 85 1.4 4 0.4
76 Homosexuality 82 1.3 37 3.8
78 In Lieu of Court Martial 71 1.2 13 1.3
80 Misconduct 117 1.9 37 3.8 .
83 Disciplinary Infractions 221 3.6 69 7.0
86 Unsatisfactory Performance 1,037 17.0 156 15.8
87 Performance and Conduct 652 10.7 220 22.3
Other 114 1.9 25 2.5
Total 6,108 100.0 985 100.0 -. .-
Table 6
Duty Occupation Code at Separation
DoD '4.".
Occupation Top Secret SCI
Code Descriot ion of Occupat ion n n _
101 Radio Comunications 172 2.8 29 2.9
122 Missile Checkout Equipment,
Test Equipment, and Calibration 185 3.0 2 0.2
160 Teletype and Cryptographic Equipment 108 1.8 50 5.1
231 Intercept Operator 55 0.9 69 7.0
232 Analysis 40 0.7 109 11.1
242 Image Interpretation 24 0.4 26 2.6
260 Communications Center Operations 344 5.6 121 12.3
400 Photography 36 0.6 23 2.3
510 Administration 562 9.2 74 7.5
632 Missile Mechanic 315 5.2 0 ---
633 Missile Launch and Support Facilities 161 2.6 3 0.3
645 Ammunition Repair 720 11.8 0 ---
646 Aviation Ordnance 1,344 22.0 1 0.1 4
823 Sales Store 42 0.7 26 2.6
950 Not Occupationally Qualified 134 2.2 148 15.0
Other --- 1,866 30.0 304 30.9
Total 6,108 100.0 985 100.0
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* The analyses in this study have identified a lack of consistency
in Air Force personnel and security programs. Over 7,000 former
enlisted personnel were identified, all of whom had been discharged
for various types of unsuitability between 1974 and 1984, yet
still retained Air Force top secret and SCI clearance codes
in the primary DoD security data base, as FY85 began. Occupational,
investigatory, and adjudicative data on these individuals were
examined. Results indicated that many or most had enlisted
for and served in sensitive positions, been investigated by
the Defense Investigative Service and cleared by the Air Force,
- anddischarged for the same types of reasons that investigators
and adjudicators consider derogatory from a security standpoint.
U Yet no adjustment had been made in any of their clearance codes
in the Or!I, even though this would be one of the first places
.[ searched if these same "unsuitable" individuals seek DoD contractor
or civilian employment. This indicates a need to review the
circumstances of discharge for such people to determine if
"_ different clearance codes would be more appropriate.
A-16-9
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Security Investigations and Clearances in the DCII
at the End of Fiscal Year 1984:
A Profile of 2.1 Million Active Duty Military Personnel
A previous report in the Personnel Security Research Program
series described the investigation and clearance status of military
personnel on board at the end of FY83. This paper updates the
previous information by one year and compares the two sets of
results. It also provides greater detail by presenting paygrade
level, as well as overall Service distributions.
These analyses were conducted on an automated file which
combined an edited version of the DCII with end of FY84 DoD
master and loss personnel tapes. The edited DCII contained -. -
the most recent DIS investigation (type '0') segment and Army
or Air Force clearance (type '3') segment for all individuals
identified by SSN. Clearance data were limited to these Services
because Navy and M1arine Corps adjudications are not input into
the DCII. Note that the DIS investigations covered in this 64
study do not include National Agency Checks which did not produce
derogatory information, as such routine security inquiries are
found in the DCII as type '2' segments.
The end of FY84 investigative profile for the enlisted
force is shown by Service on Table 1. Actual numbers and percentages
of total figures are provided to facilitate comparisons. Overall,
. 20% were found with a DIS investigation (other than a non-derogatory
A-17-2
%41 0%mn 0 00 aV 0 00 NO' ' N 0 0
%0 N* a'L-.t.% ( 0 n ( c - l Y M (
Lft.-ON o -%0 %t~ LA ema CN' Nm XT Om o%
o L L~- %O0 oA I-- % ma '0 NO o L 0 O
LA~~L CA 0o _r 0m ( rI
aa %40c o -
aw 0% w0 m0 NinN ' -m U N -' -L
bCJ (l 0 ! '- 0 ' I 0 t U- 0 0 0 N 0 T 0 0 %- 0 0D
ra(M- N Cc 00 ' 0 40~ aM CO '0 ON 0 nL
co W LM N~ t- '0r t-0 N t- mo N - N N
.4 % W- M - N LA t-- t- C% NM N ON
A a
43 mC
- N CU w- N Nm 0 0 N 0 N 0- LA =r- N -T
. ~O N~ 00 0 N 000-0''' 0
4)
M ~m '-a '0 mD '-L ma U -a 0 t. - r-
0% C 0 t-~ ON - U- n %0 0 - ' N '0 Nm M
oo 0 m. ma 0%j N- '- m LCYN U % c N co
44 a c'! a, ml 'I "t N 0- LA
.4 LA U
a. '0 ta a a. r'-.- a 0 a - - m
0~%4 % o 0 oo o o >.1'N 0
LA LAN-' > -- mo a- ON4 N4 a LAN)
-H0 c )- 1 o.q c ao a a a a a a a a
ma : LA N 3 a 4 "'0 LAO. .LA ' t a am
00 0 )c 0 = 4 u 0
~In a 000 NO I 00' 0'-' mo9o r
4)4
.4 C CU 4 0 0 Na -N N -cc M0 amL




NAC) in the DCII. This figure varied by Service, from 12% in
the USMC to 27% in the Air Force.. These findings are virtually
identical with the situation at the end of FY83.
With regard to ipecific types of DIS investigations, Table 1 
shows nearly 94 thousand inital SBIs, 81 thousand initial BIs
and 41 thousand initial IBIs. The only other type with such
a large number was the 41 thousand file NACs. These four types
of DIS investigation, were among the most numerous in each Service.
Other relatively frequent investigations in specific branches
of Service were expanded ENTNACs for Army and Marine Corps members -
and supplemental SBIs and periodic reviews of Air Force personnel.
The only notable changes here, relative to the earlier report,
involve the large increase in the number of personnel with inital
IBIs and the decrease in those with inital Bis. This was to 21
be expected as the IBI has replaced the BI as the type of investi-
gation generally required for top secret clearance.
Table 2 shows distributions of DIS investigation codes
by enlisted paygrades for each Service. Any type of DIS investi-
gation (excluding non-derogatory NACs) found for at least 1%
of those in any paygrade is included in this table. For each
Service, Table 2 shows the percentage with no type '01 DIS investi- .. -
gations to drop substantially between grades El and E5 or E6
and to stabilize from that level through E9. Less than 10%
A-I 7-4
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TABLE 2.
Percentage Distributions of Enlisted
DIS Investigations by Paygrade
(As of 1 October 1984)
~ ARMY
DIS
Codes El E2 ElI 1 E E8 A
1A2/B 1.41 2.4 3.3 4.14 6.8 5.4 41.14 4.4 4.4 V..- ,
IA7/G ... ... 0.0 0.2 0.6 1.2 1.8 2.4 2.9
1D5/E 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 1.5 1.8 1.5
1D3/C . .. 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.2 1.7 2.2 2.3
1P3/C 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.14 0.14
1A1/A 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 2.9 6.4 8.6 10.3 9.9
1A3/C 0.6 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.9 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.1
1GI/A 0.6 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.5 1.9 1.0 0.2 0.4
1G2/B 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.5 4.0 8.7 11.2 8.7 6.0
1KI/A 2.2 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.2 0.4 0.1 0.0 ---
Other 0.2 0.14 0.4 0.8 1.6 2.7 3.3 3.3 2.4
None 94.8 92.3 91.1 87.0 77.9 68.6 63.8 64.1 67.7
Total % 10.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number 57,527 51,910 98,854 183,660 118,450 86,779 50,459 15,600 4,177
AIR FORCE .
DIS
, Codes El1 E2 El 4 ES E6 EB
1A2/B 4.6 6.7 8.8 9.6 9.2 9.0 8.6 9.3 9.8
1A7/G --- 0.0 0.1 0.6 2.3 3.7 4.3 5.0 5.2
1D5/E 0.0 --- 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.7 2.3 2.6 3.4
1D3/C . .. 0.0 0.4 2.0 2.4 2.9 3.5 4.4
1AL/A 0.2 0.2 1.6 9.5 12.7 9.9 7.6 7.5 7.7
1 -A3/C 0.7 2.1 3.8 2.1 2.5 2.6 2.8 3.0 2.9
1G2/B 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.9 2.3 2.1 1.4 1.0 0.4 _____
* 1K1/A 0.7 0.8 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.0 --- ---
' -j.Other 0.7 1.4 1.5 2.9 3.7 4.0 3.5 3.7 3.3
None 93.1 88.8 83.0 73.1 64.1 64.3 66.6 64.4 62.9
p Total 1 00.0 100.0 100..0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number 20,835 22,022 124,652 102,760 108,860 56,262 36,523 9,667 4,84-4
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Codes El E2 _ E E6 8_
1A2/B 0.8 1.8 2.7 4.1 4.8 4.1 4.7 4.5 4.5 ,
1A7/G 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.9 1.6 2.6 2.8 3.0
1D5/E --- 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.5 2.0 2.1 2.3
1D3/C 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.3 1.5 1.6 1.8
l1/A 0.4 0.3 1.0 4.0 7.8 9.7 9.0 7.7 6.4
1A3/C 2.7 4.o 4.0 3.6 2.3 1.7 2.0 1.6 1.6
1G1/A 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.9 2.7 1.0 0.2 0.2
1G2/B 0.3 0.2 0.6 1.6 3.3 4.0 4.2 4.6 3.8
1KI/A 2.8 3.0 2.8 2.3 1.4 0.6 0.2 --- 0.0
Other 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.7 2.5 2.9 3.3 3.7 2.5
None 90.1 88.0 86.3 81.0 74.4 69.9 69.5 71.0 73.9
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 ' .
Number 35,709 37,367 98,688 104,223 97,344 72,993 30,716 8,802 4,025
HARINE CORPS
DIS
Codes El E2 E4 E6 E8
1A2/B 0.3 0.9 2.0 2.5 3.6 3.6 2.8 3.3 3.0
1A7/G -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.7 1.3 1.4 1.2
1D5/E --- 0.0 . .. 0.0 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.0
1D3/C --- 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.5
1A1/A 0.0 0.1 0.2 1.2 5.4 10.0 11.8 9.7 8.4
1A3/C 0.1 0.3 1.5 2.9 2.8 2.3 2.6 2.6 1.7
1G1/A 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.5 2.8 1.2 0.1 0.1
1G2/B 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.7 2.1 2.9 3.9 4.3 3.6
1K1/A 1.6 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.3 1.5 0.4 --- ---
Other 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.7 2.1 3.3 2.8 2.1
None 97.0 95.8 93.3 89.5 81.2 72.9 70.8 73.3 76.4
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number 15,762 25,847 47,677 31,964 25,072 15,434 9,177 3,732 1,262
P ~~A- 17-6 "--
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of the Els in each Service had a DIS code, while about a quarter
to a third of those in the senior grades were found with one.
Several findings with regard to specific investigation
codes also generalize across Service. Few in the lowest three
grades have initial BI (1AI/A) codes, while much higher percentages
were found in the higher grades. With respect to the IBI (IA3/C),
which recently replaced the BI, much less paygrade variation
is found. This indicates that many enlisted personnel did not
have their initial background investigation until reaching the
more advanced paygrades.
Percentages of inital SBIs (IA2/B) were higher at the upper
paygrades, while not being negligible at the lower grades.*
Most supplemental SBIs (1A7/G) and periodic reviews (1D5/E and
.D3/C) were found in the upper five grades, with very few among
El to E4 personnel. With respect to derogatory national agency
checks, higher percentages of file .NACs (IG2/B) appeared in
the upper paygrades, while expanded ENTNACs (1K1/A) were generally
-. -more prevalent at EI to E4 than the higher enlisted grades.
The officer profile is presented in Table 3. Over half
of the officers were found with a DIS type '0' investigation
in the DCII. More of those in the Air Force (58%) and Nlavy
-'" (56%) had such DCII information than Marine Corps (44%) and
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gation included initial SBIs (47 thousand), BIs (41 thousand),
and IBIs (19 thousand), along with supplemental SBIs (23 thousand).
These four kinds of DIS investigation were also the ones most
frequently found among officers in each Service. Compared to
U the end of FY83 findings, these figures reveal a 1-2 percent
increase in each Service, of those with a DIS type '0' investiga-
tion. Also noteworthy, as was found for the enlisted personnel,
is the drop in BIs and rise in IBIs.
Table 4 presents the paygrade level findings for officers
by Service. As in Table 2, any DIS code was included that applied
to 1% or more of those at any paygrade. Again there was a positive
correlation between the percentage with DIS codes and paygrade
level. This was true for the officers in each Service. In
p the Army for example, while 23% of the Ols had a DIS investigation
code, over 98% at 07 and above were found with one.
In the Army and Marine Corps, initial SBIs (IA2/B) were
most frequent in grades 04 to 06, while in the Air Force and
Navy the percentage with initial SBIs was more uniform across
all paygrades. As would be expected, a strong positive correlation
S,.was noted in all Services betweeen officer paygrade and the
percentage with supplemental SBIs (IA7/G) and periodic reviews
(ID5/E, and 1D3/C). In the Air Force, while 1% of the Ols had
'a any of these codes, 80% of the 07s and above had them. Percentages
S.A17.9
' ' A-17-9 ":
TABLE 4
Percentage Distributions of Officer
DIS Investigations by Paygrade
(As of 1 October 1984)
ARMY
DIS Warrant 07 and
Codes Officer 01 02 0 04 2 06 above
1A2/B 8.0 9.0 10.7 10.9 23.0 24.6 17.9 10.4
1A7/G 3.5 0.2 0.6 2.1 10.9 20.7 24.9 27.9
1D5/E 2.5 0.1 0.1 0.9 1.7 4.2 6.7 28.9
1D3/C 3.2 0.2 0.3 2.1 3.6 8.2 10.6 28.9
1AI/A 7.0 1.1 10.4 19.9 12.4 4.9 2.4 0.2
1D2/B 0.1 0.0 --- 0.0 0.1 1.7 2.1 0.5
1A3/C 1.3 9.1 9.3 4.2 3.6 1.5 1.2 0.5
102/B 6.6 1.6 1.9 1.4 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.2
Other 3.6 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.2 1.0
None 64.2 76.7 64.4 56.0 41.3 31.0 31.4 1.5
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 10000.0 1.0 100.0
Number 15,348 12,614 12,289 34,895 16,926 10,817 4,843 412
AIR FORCE
DIS 07 and
Codes 01 02 01 O4 06 above .-
1A2/B 15.5 21.2 19.8 21.0 19.9 23.6 14.8
1A7/G 0.5 2.0 5.7 13.9 18.5 23.3 27.0
1D5/E 0.3 0.4 1.0 3.2 5.6 7.0 24.3
1D3/C 0.3 0.3 2.0 3.4 6.3 10.4 29.1
1P3/C 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.2
1AI/A 1.9 12.7 22.9 12.8 6.7 4.1 0.3
1A6/F 0.0 0.2 0.5 1.2 1.2 o.4 ---
1D1/A 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.0 1.0 0.5 ---
1A3/C 12.5 14.7 5.1 3.3 2.1 1.6 0.9
1G2/B 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.2 ---
Other 1.5 1.5 2.1 2.3 2.3 1.8 1.2
None 65.9 45.0 39.3 37.3 35.9 26.8 1.2
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 _
Number 14,316 14,400 39,613 19,521 12,551 5,508 337
A-17-10
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(Continued)
NAVY
DIS Warrant 07 and
Codes Officer 01 02 03 4 05 06 above
1A2/B 6.7 9.1 15.1 13.0 15.0 17.0 15.7 16.8
1A7/G 4.0 0.6 3.0 6.8 13.4 19.0 18.7 25.6
1D5/E 3.3 0.2 0.5 0.6 2.6 5.3 8.8 24.4
1D3/C 2.5 0.2 0.4 1.6 4.7 8.8 12.8 19.1
1AL/A 11.6 3.5 13.2 26.7 19.5 6.3 3.2 1.9
1A6/F 0.6 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.8 1.0 0.4
1D2/B 0.2 --- 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.6 1.9
1A3/C 4.3 20.5 20.6 5.1 2.9 2.0 2.0 0.8
1G2/P 4.2 1.4 1.4 1.3 0.6 0.2 0.2
Other 3.1 2.3 2.6 1.9 2.4 2.2 1.5 0.3
Nlone 59.5 62.2 43.0 42.7 37.9 38.0 36.1 9.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
.umber 3,082 9,501 10,170 21,124 13,133 7,849 3,752 262
:t'RINE CORPS
DIS !Iarrant 07 and
Codes Officer 01 02 04 05 06 above
1A2/B 3.9 1.5 4.1 11.3 20.8 24.6 23.8 18.2
1A7/G 1.9 --- 0.4 2.1 3.3 22.4 31.3 31.8
D5/2 1.1 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.9 2.4 6.2 31.8
103/C 2.5 0.1 0.4 1.2 2.6 5.0 11.3 6.1
1A1/A 14.7 1.2 7.4 25.5 25.0 9.3 2.1
1D2/B ...... ...- 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 3.0
1D1/A --- 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.5 4.6
1A3/C 5.0 5.0 12.0 7.5 5.7 2.7 --- ---
" 1C2/B 4.4 1.4 1.4 1.2 0.3 0.1 --- ---
L IK2/B 0.6 1.2 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.1 --- --
Other 3.5 0.7 1.1 1. 5 2.4 2.1 1.7 ---
NIone 62.4 88.9 72.4 48.7 33.4 30.2 17.1 4.6
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 I i
-Number 1,412 3,290 4,212 5,049 3,051 1,651 626 66
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with BI (lAI/A) and IBI (IA3/C) codes were higher in grades
11 to 04 than in the more senior officer paygrades.
DCII Army and Air Force clearance codes for end of FY84
active force members are displayed in Table 5. As at the end K' -
of FY83, the clearance status of many Army ?ersonnel was not
found in the DCII at the end of TY84. 'Thile the Army rate of -
unknowns rose from 38% to 41% for enlisted members, it drooped
from 41% to 32% of the officers. T3y far the most frequent clearance
among Army enlisted personnel was the secret ',l', which 34%..
had at the end of FY84. This was followed in frequency by the
secret 'S' (15%) and SCT 'V' (5%) codes.
These figures represent no major changes from a year earlier.
For the officers, 22% had SCI 'V' codes, 1 % secret '.1' codes, -
1.".% each secret 'S' and too secret 'N' codes, and 5% the top
secret 'T' code. The only pronounced change here is a 5% increase '.'
of officers with secret I' clearances.
DCII clearance coverage in the Air Force continues to be
virtually complete. Less than 1% of their officers and 2% of
their enlisted personnel were found without a clasrance segment.
"'ost enlisted Air Force members (72%) had secret 'S' clearances. -
Nnother 17% show to- secret 'T' codes and 8% CI 'V' codes. -




DCII Clearance Codes for Current
Army and Air Force Personnel
(As of 1 October 1984)
Army Air Force
Adjudicating Clearance Enlisted Officer Enlisted Officer
Branch Code - _ _ _
None 266,349 39.9 34,794 32.2 7,715 1.6 569 0.5
Army M 226,677 34.0 19,169 17.7 247 0.1 32 0.0
3 97,688 14.6 10,797 10.0 28 0.0 8 0.0
N 10,745 1.6 10,634 9.8 2 0.0 3 0.0
-4 T 15,485 2.3 6,369 5.9 6 0.0 4 0.0
" V 33,518 5.0 24,125 22.3 11 0.0 34 0.0
X 10,690 1.6 1,771 1.6 2 0.0 17 0.0
R 4,481 0.7 90 0.1 3 0.0 0 ---
Other 308 0.0 59 0.1 0 --- 0 ---
" Air Force S 1,493 0.2 258 0.2 350,834 72.1 36,604 34.5
T 60 0.0 34 0.0 80,718 16.6 48,636 45.8
I V 8 0.0 17 0.0 38,355 7.9 19,760 18.6
Y 0 0 2,275 0.5 192 0.2
. F 33 0.0 11 0.0 4,180 0.9 122 0.1
w 0 --- 0 --- 968 0.2 59 0.1
Other 49 0.0 16 0.0 1,081 0.2 206 0.2
Total 667,584 100.0 108,11 100.0 486,425 100.0 106,246 100.0
A-17-13
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* Nearly 46% of Air Force officers had top secret 'T' codes
in the DCII, while 34% were found with secret 'S' clearance
and 19% SCI 'V' codes. These results represent a 2% SCI clearance
increase and 3% top secret decrease from the end of FY83.
Paygrade level clearance distributions are shown on Table
• .6 for the enlisted personnel and Table 7 for the officers in
the Army and Air Force. Enlisted personnel were found to differ
substantially in clearance status as a function of paygrade.
While the overall Army rate without a DCII code was 40%, it
"< varied from a high of 77% of the Els down to 21% of the E4s.
The percentage with SCI codes rises with paygrade from less
than 1% at El to 9% at E9. This was also true with respect
- to top secret (N or T) status, found for under 1% at El and
18% at E9. The percentage of Army enlisted personnel with secret -
*' (M or S) codes was highest among E4s (70%) and lowest among
E9s (8%).
Air Force data in Table 6 show that only at the entry level,
El, did a large fraction of enlisted personnel (23%) lack a
DCII clearance code. As in the Army, the highest percentage
*-. with SCI status was found at the E9 level (12%), while the lowest
*" was the 1% of Els. Also, while only 2% of the Els had top secret
*status, 51% of the E9s had this level of clearance eligibility.
,2 was the paygrade with the highest perc:entage of secret clearances
*° (85%), and E9 the lowest (36%).
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TABLE 6 '.
Percentage Distribution of Enlisted
Clearance Status Codes by Pavi rade
(As of 1 October 1984)
I AMY
ClearanoeI Code E4 E lIL6 E 7 E8
M18.8 31.0 41.6 56.6 30.4 15.9 8.2 4.1 2.6
S 1.14 3.6 41.5 13.2 28.3 27.3 18.2 8.3 41.9
N 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.9 3.2 -4.0 5.5 6.8
T 0.2 0.4 0.5 1.1 2.6 4.9 6.7 9.3 11.2
V 0.5 1.9 3.0 4.4 7.6 7.3 8.0 8.8 8.9
4 X 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.1 0.9 0.7
R 0.2 0.3 0.41 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.0
Other 0.1--- - - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4
None 76.6 60.3 47.6 21.4 26.5 39.0 53.3 62.8 614.5
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number 57,527 51,910 98,854 183,660 118,450 86,779 50,459 15,600 4,177
AIR FORCE
Clearance
Code El E2 E14 E6 8
S 71.0 85.1 82.5 75.7 69.2 62.4 55.2 46.1 36.4
T 1.7 3.2 6.6 13.3 21.3 27.7 34.3 141.7 51.0
V 1.4 5.5 7.3 8.2 8.1 9.0 9.9 11.9 12.5
F 0.8 1.3 1.6 1.2 0.4 0.1 0.0 --- 0.0
y 1.6 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1
Other 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.1 ---
None 22.8 3.6 1.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number 20,835 22,022 124,652 102,760 108,860 56,262 36,523 9,667 4,84"4'-
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Por Army officers, Table 7 shows 42% of warrant officers
and 03s without DCII clearance codes, but only 1% of the 07s
and above. Most of the generals (95%) showed SCI status, while
01 was the paygrade with the lowest percentage (8%) of officers
with a 'V' code. Only 1% of the 07s and above had top secret
(N or T) codes, while 21% of the 03s had one of these codes.
The percentage of Army officers with secret DCII codes (M or S)
ranged from none of the generals to 75% of the Ols.
Sizeable differences are also apparent in the Air Force
officer figures in Table 7. The percentage with SCI status - .J
increases as paygrade increases. The range was from 7% (01)
to 86% (07 and above). 04s had the greatest percentage of top
secret (57%), 07s and above the lowest, 14%. The percentage
of Air Force officers with secret level codes decreases with
increasing paygrade. Seventy percent of the Ols had secret
clearances and less than one percent of the generals had them.
A-17-16
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* TABLE 7
Percente Distribution of Officer
Clearance Status Codes by Paygrade
(As of 1 October 1984)
Clearance Warrant 07 and
Code Officer 01 02 03 04 0016 above
M 15.5 61.4 24.7 12.5 7.0 3.2 2.3 ---
S 16.4 13.2 24.2 8.6 3.6 1.9 1.8 ---
N 4.1 5.6 14.0 14.7 9.6 5.7 4.4 0.7
T 5.9 2.0 4.4 6.4 7.8 7.8 6.5 0.7
V 14.5 8.5 11.2 13.5 35.9 52.1 54.6 94.7
x 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.6 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.7
Other 0.2 --- 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 i- 0.2
None 42.4 8.4 20.4 42.5 33.2 26.7 28.2 1.0
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number 15,348 12,614 12,289 34,895 16,926 10,817 4,843 412
AIR FORCE
Clearance 07 and
Code 01 02 04 06 above
" S 70.2 47.2 36.9 17.7 9.7 9.0 0.3
T 21.2 41.3 48.8 57.4 55.3 39.1 13.6
V 6.7 10.4 13.3 23.9 34.3 51.5 86.1
Other 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.3 --.
None 1.2 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0











A Census of Key Data Elements
In the Defense Central Index of Investigations
(As of 1 April 1985)
The Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII) is currently
the largest automated DoD data base in the area of personnel
security. Its primary operational use is as a repository for . .'
individual level security related information. The standard user
interface with the DCII is in the form of on-line name searches
of its contents. However, recent initiatives to provide personnel
security policy makers with data useful for management information
purposes and to support a personnel security research effort,
have identified an additional role for the DCII. In order to . --
insure that maximum yield is mined from this vast and valuable
data resource, a detailed examination of its aggregate contents
is necessary. This report presents the results of such an effort,
conducted on a recent (mid-FY85) copy of the constantly updated file.
To comprehend the size and scope of the DCII, it is necessary
to become familiar with the structure of the file. The DCII .- .,.
contains nearly 15.5 million variable length records. Each
record consists of a master section and one or more content
segments. The most significant contents of the master section
are individual identification characteristics. These include
first, middle and last name, social security number, date of
birth and place of birth.
There are six types of content segments. These are known as -.
pending NAC, NAC history, tracing or dossier, clearance, current
name, and AKA segments. This report will explore the key data
elements of each segment type. In all, about 22.8 million segments
are now part of the DCII. While this is an average of about one
and a half segments per record, most records are found to have
only one or two segments while a few have as many as ten or more.
A further complicating factor, in addition to the variable
length nature of DCII records, is that over 4.7 million of them
contain overlapping and redundant individual level information.
Individuality, as inferred from uniqueness of social security
number (SSN), was assessed and while 8.4 million records were
found with SSNs occurring only once, some individuals were identified
with over 100 different records in the DCII. Some of these
contain identical segments and others different segments. Further
complicating management information and research uses of the DCII
is the finding that 2.3 million DCII records do not have valid
SSNs. This is a critical factor in linking DCII data with other
data bases.
Pending NAC Segments
As of 1 April 1985 the DCII contained just over 100 thousand
segments reflecting ongoing national agency checks. Table 1
shows the type of NAC as a function of the requesting agency.
These, along with the date of initiation, are the key data elements
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in pending NAC segments. Most ongoing NACs requested by the
Services were ENTNACs, with most of the remainder being standard
military NACs. DIS requested NACs were equally spread among
military, civilian and industrial subjects. These reflect the NAC
component of more extensive background investigations. All of
the DISCO requests were for standard industrial NACs.
I With regard to the initiation dates of ongoing NACs, Table 2
shows most (92%) to have been started since February 1985. Less
than one percent had been pending since before October 1984 and .
less than a tenth of one percent since before August 1984.
Further analyses revealed 25% of the cases pending on April first
1985 to be more than 30 days old. Seven percent were over 60 days
old and under one percent over 180 days old.
MAC History Seament.
The DCII segment describing completed NACs includes space
for the identities of up to 11 agency files that may have been
checked during a NAC. A total of 52 such files are described in
the DCII documentation. This type of segment also contains the
completion date and a status code indicating whether the segment
is a MAC history or an incomplete history. Almost 7.4 million of
these segments were encountered.
Table 3 summarizes an analysis of the agency identification
codes. It shows 24.2 million file checks, 3.3 per NAC history
segment. Most had only three: DCII, FBI-headquarters and either
FBI name check or fingerprint. Some segments had up to ten:-" -
agency file codes. In all, 38 different agency codes were identi-
fied. However, the four just mentioned accounted for 92% of the
total number of file checks.
Analyses of the year of NAC completion yielded the data shown
on Table 4. A large number of segments appear for every year
since 1973. Just under half (49%) of the DCII NAC history segments
have completion dates since 1980. with regard to the status code,
98% were coded as "NAC history" and the other 2% had an "incomplete
history* code.
Tracina or Dossier Seagment.
This type of DCII segment is the most numerous with 8.6
million in the file. In addition to the submitting agency, key
data elements are the context, retention and status codes and the
year of the file. Context codes are displayed for each submitting
agency on Table 5. Most dossier segments (83%), reference subject
-0 investigations. This is most true for DIS segments and much less
the case for Army and Air Force submissions. AIRR (28%) and Air
Force eel (20%) segments are the only ones with a significant
fraction of cross reference segments, while ACRD submissions
(21%) have the only sizeable portion of victim segments.
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most dossier segments also have a retention code indicating * :
the length of time they are to remain in the DCII before being
purged. As Table 6 indicates, the predominant code varies by
submitting agency. Most of the DIS, Air Force OSI, and Air Force
investigations transferred to DIS are to remain in the DCII for
15 years. Most Naval Investigative Service segments (94%) have a -
25 year retention code. Almost all Army Criminal Records Division
segments are coded for forty year retention, while most (83%) of -
the AIRR dossier segments have no retention code.
Overall, over 99% of the status codes refer to tracing
segments, with the remaining segments coded as open cases. Only . -
for DIS segments (3%) were more than one percent coded as open
cases. Table 7 summarizes the year indexed information for the
dossier segments. Overall, about two-thirds of the dossier segments
show dates in the seventies and eighties. DIS segments (48%)
have the highest percentage of recent (since 1980) dossiers.
AIRR segments had the greatest fraction (55%) with pre-1970 codes -
and also the highest rate (24%) of segments with no date of
indexing indicated. --
More detailed analyses were performed on DIS dossier segments.
Case category codes were examined for the 2.1 million DIS investi-
gations in the DCII. For most segments these codes specify the
subjects' status as military, civilian or industrial. Analysis
showed 71% of the segments to refer to military subjects, 20% to .4
industrial subjects and 7% to civilian subjects. These codes
also indicated the level of investigation involved (NAC, BI,
SBI) and whether the case contained security, hostage or suitability
issues. A total of 374 different case category codes were found.
Table 8 carries the most frequently encountered types of DIS
segments. When combined, these relatively few category codes -.
account for 95% of the DIS dossier segments. Military non-issue
BI/IBI/SBIs alone represent 34% of the segments, while military
file NACs and ENTNACs along with expanded ENTNACs comprise another
26% of the total number of DIS dossier segments.
Clearance Segments
A total of 3.2 million clearance segments were found in the
DCII. These included 1.5 million Army segments and 1.7 million
Air Force segments. The key data element included with clearance
segments is a code defining the clearance status. Distributions
of clearance status codes are presented on Table 9. Note that
code definitions vary somewhat between the Army and Air Force.
Of the Army clearance segments, 81% were at the secret level, 9%
SCI and 6% top secret. In contrast, 74% of Air Force segments
reflected secret, 17% top secret and 5% SCI eligibility.
A-18-4
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Other noteworthy constituents of DCII clearance segments are,,.
clearance basis, adjudication date, investigation date and review
action codes. Clearance basis codes identify the level of inves-
tigation on which a clearance decision is based. Table 10 shows
that variations of the national agency check account for 81% of
Army and 761 of Air Force segments.
Review action codes only pertain to Army segments, and
along with the status and basis codes, fully define an Army clearance
action. A frequency distribution of these codes is presented on
Table 11. This table shows 90% of Army clearance segments covered
by one of three review action codes: surety (49%), clearance
(21%) or nuclear (19%).
Adjudication and investigation dates on clearance segments
are shown on Tables 12 and 13 respectively. Most of the adjudi-
cations have been accomplished since 1980. More Air Force (44%)
than Army (17%) adjudications prior to 1980 are shown on Table
12. Similar investigation distributions are presented on Table
13, with somewhat greater percentages appearing in the categories
before 1980.
Current Name and AKA Segments
These two types of segments are quite similar in format, the
only difference being the nature of the name (current or AKA)
contained in the segment. The only data element relevant to this
paper is the contributor code. Table 14 shows the current name
and AKA contributor code distributions. Note how closely the two
distributions parallel one another. Just over half (51%) of
these segments resulted form NAC information. Another third came
from DIS and the Army's Investigative Records Repository.
Social Security Numbers
It was mentioned earlier that 2.3 million DCII records do
not include valid SSNs. This presents difficulties in linking
the DCII with other data bases for various personnel security
analyses. Since DCII records can contain multiple segments,
further analyses were performed to assess whether the magnitude
of the lack of SSN problem varied by segment type. Table 15
summarizes the results. Overall, 20.0 million of the 22.8 million
(88%) segments have valid SSNs. But there was considerable
variation in this rate by segment type. It was 99.5% or higher
Ul for NAC history, DIS dossier, Army clearance and Air Force clearance
segments. Much lower rates were found for AIRR dossier (42%),
ACPD dossier (73%) and Air Force OSI dossier (75%) segments.
Valid SSN percentages ranged from 86% to 95% for the other segment
types listed on Table 15.
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Nat-ional Agency Check Backlog
(As of 1 April 1985)
Percent of Cumulative
Month initiatedNmb To.ta Pre
1985 -April 3,184 3.1 3.1
March 75,762 73.1 76.2
February 16,880 16.3 92.5
January 3,245 3.1 95.6
1984 -December 2,143 2.1 97.7
November 959 0.9 98.6
October 651 0.6 99.2
September 322 0.3 99.5
August 397 0.4 99.9




(As Of I April 1985)
Percent of Percent of
Number NAC all files
Aagncy File Checked of Checks Sgmens Checked
DCII 7,388,909 100.0 30.6
FBI-Headquarters 7,380,875 99.9 30.5
FBI-Name Check 4,779,185 614.7 19.8
FBI-Fingerprint 2,595,700 35.1 10.7
Army-Prior Service 406,697 5.5 1.7
OPN 399,4180 5.14 1.7 -
CIA 174,513 2."4 0.7
Navy-Military Personnel 173,137 2.3 0.7
Air Force-Military Personnel 158,383 2.1 0.7
State Department-Passport 121,150 1.6 0.5
Army-Enlisted Personnel 109,439 1.5 0.5
I & NS-Alien 102,594 1.4 0.14
j
I & NS-Citizen 74,678 1.0 0.3
Army-Officer Personnel 55,670 0.8 0.2
Army Investigative Files 53,933 0.7 0.2
Marine Corps Personnel 39,135 0.5 0.2IDIS 38,303 0.5 0.2
Air Reserve Personnel Center 31,028 0.14 0.1
State Department-Birth Abroad 29,701 0.4 0.1
Air Force Investigative Files 23,060 0.3 0.1
Navy Investigative Files 19,821 0.3 0.1
All other file checks 25,331 0.3 0.1
Total 241,180,722 100.0
A-18-8
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year NAC Completed
(As of 1 April 19.85)
- Cumulative
Year Completed Nub ecnPre
1985 199,443 2.7 2.7
1984 718,047 9.7 12.4
1983 666,451 9.0 21.4
1982 670,451 9.1 30.5
1981 655,754 8.9 39.4
1980 684,222 9.3 48.7
1979 573,293 7.8 56.5
1978 518,657 7.0 63.5
197587,544 7.9 71.4
1 3976 581,387 7.9 79.3
1975 564,344 7.6 86.9
1974 538,952 7.3 94.2
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Table 8
Most Frequent DIS Investigation Segments
(As of I April 1985) t
Percent of
DIS Codes Description Number Total
Military: 1A1/A BI-non issue 319,563 15.4
1A2/B SBI-non issue 295,807 14.3
1G1/A ENTNAC-file 230,639 11.1 .
12 NAC-file 184,192 8.9
1KI/A ENTRAC-expanded 135,850 6.5
1A3/C IBI-non issue 94,477 4.6
1A7/G SBI-supplemental 62,157 3.0
1D3/C Periodic Review 31,639 1.5
1D5/E SBI-PR (limited) 28,718 1.4
1K2/B NAC-expanded 27,363 1.3
1P3/C SBI-suitability 20,391 1.0
1N3/C BI-suitability 12,952 0.6
1D2/B BI-Bring up (special coverage) 11,969 0.6
Subtotal 1,455,717 70.2
Industrial: 1C1/A B-non issue 67,630 3.3
1C2/B SBI-non issue 63,258 3.0
1J2 MAC-file 59,459 2.9
1C3/C IBI-non issue 50,583 2.4 . .a
1M2/B NAC-expanded 43,557 2.1
1V9/I NAC-expanded (suitability) 41,671 2.0
1Z9/I Limited Inquiry 12,724 0.6
1T8/H Periodic Review-hostage 11,755 0.6
1C7/G SBI-supplemental 11,670 0.6
1F3/C Periodic Review 11,661 0.6
Subtotal 373,968 18.0
Civilian: 1B2/B SBI-non issue 48,833 2.4
.B1/A BI-non issue 39,129 1.9
1E5/E SBI-PR (limited) 19,072 0.9
1E3/C Periodic Review 12,021 0.6
- Subtotal 119,055 5.7
Other: 1xx Investigation transferred to DIS 20,097 1.0
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(As of 1 April 1985)
ARMY AIR FORCE
ENTNAC 834,686 54.5 635,696 38.1
NAC 311,683 20.3 377,381 22.6
NACI 93,314 6.1 256,582 15.4
BI 92,173 6.0 199,035 11.9
SBI 146,045 9.5 179,210 10.7
Other 54,191 3.5 20,563 1.2,IJ
Total 1,532,092 100.0 1,668,467 100.0
! Table 11 "";
Army Review Action Codes
(As of 1 April 1985)
Qafemaning jiiamz Percent
P Surety 752,037 49.1
A Clearance 329,274 21.5
D Nuclear 294,035 19.2
C Special Intelligence 98,270 6.4
X Review Required 31,217 2.0
B Revalidation 16,169 1.1
P Military Intelligence 4,981 0.3
W White House 1,876 0.1
*G AGO (General Officer Review) 1,097 0.1
- Other 2,051 0.1





(As of I April 1985)
Year of ARMY AIR FORCE I% 1
1985 62,346 4.1 67,485 4.0 Ib
1980-1984 1,215,486 79.3 873,051 52.3 .. 7
1976-1979 252,886 16.5 537,901 32.2 " ,'...
1960-1969 773 0.1 152,703 9.2
1950-1959 3 0•.0 36,495 2.2 _- -" -
Other 598 0.0 832 0.0 '-
.. .
T otal 1,532,092 10. F,668,467 100 .0"- i:::.:
* -. '
Year of Investigation
(As of 1 April 1985)
Year of ARMY AIR FORCE
Investigation Number Pecn Nupber Percent ;1 .
1985 29,346 1.9 42,504 2.5
1980-1984 1,255,685 68.9 771,696 46.3
1970-1979 423,126 27.6 633,052 37.9
1960-1969 21,530 1.4 173,739 90.4
1950-1959 2,228 0.0 45,775 2.7
Other 177 0.0 1,73 8.1
Total 1,532,092 100.0 1,668,467 100.0
A.-1.8 1
19529361-9 42,042.
1980-984 ,055685 6.9 71,69 46.
19701979423,26 2.6 63,05,37.
-' -. -. 1. ~,. -- -- - - --.-
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Contributor Codes for Current Name and AKA Segments
(As of April 1985)
Seament Tye-
Contributor Current Name AKA . -
NAC 894,789 51.1 893,805 51.2
DDIS 320,749 18.3 320,280 18.3
AIRR 251,640 14.4 250,846 14.4
FOSI 145,653 8.3 142,051 8.1
NAVY 89,157 5.1 88,615 5.1
ACRD 50,775 2.9 50,759 2.9
DODIG 1 0.0 1 0.0
NSA 1 0.0 1 0.0
Total 1,752,765 100.0 1,746,358 100.0
_Tbl I.
Social Security Number Validity of DCII Segments
(As of 1 April 1985)
Segments With Total Percent
NAC History 7,353,541 7,389,167 99.5
NAC Pending 98,376 103,681 94.9
DIS Dossier 2,065,618 2,075,067 99.5
AIRR Dossier 1,025,197 2,467,720 41.5
ACRD Dossier 1,664,732 2,274,643 73.2
NIS Dossier 811,506 945,137 85.9
AFOSI Dossier 531,647 705,311 75.4
Air Force-DIS Dossier 108,162 119,987 90.1
I Other Dossier 141 148 95.3
Army Clearance 1,527,036 1,532,092 99.7
Air Force Clearance 1,664,863 1,668,467 99.8
Current Name 1,569,609 1,752,765 89.6
AKA 1,561,341 1,746,358 89.4
Total 19,981,769 22,780,543 87.7
A-18-17
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Cleaning Up the Periodic Review Backlog! Estimates ot the
Numbera and Location ot Mlitary Sun-iects
Bacground
Current interest in increasing the number ot periodic reviews
among those with high level security clearances raises two key
questions. Who are the likely subjects and where are they located?
The tirst is a previously irrelevant matter tor DIS, since under
the recent quota system, it was up to the services to identity
the subjects in their periodic review requests. Now, with the
presumption ot sutticient additional resources to augment the
tield agent statt, it is important to know how many investigations
are required under various criteria and over projectable time
Pp periods.
Anticipation ot subjects' locations is equally important,
both to optimize hiring decisions and minimize temporary reassign-
4ment ot current statt. In an organization such as DIS, with a
large number ot widely dispersed tield units, it is critical to .
* pinpoint the relative proportions ot expected additional workload
across the various tield elements.
This paper represents an initial attempt to answer these w="
and where questions. A prev:ous report (84-7) in the Personnel
Security Research Program series (Appendix A) determined the
teasibility ot such analysis by means ot linking automated military
A-19-2
personnel master tiles with the DCII. This ettort includes an
additional ingredient--Navy and Marine Corps clearance data tromp!
their respective personnel data tiles.
As a starting point tor this analysis, it was assumed that
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those active duty military personnel with the tollowing general
characteristics would be most liKely to require a periodic review:
a) Top secret or SCI clearance,
b) based on a DIS military BI or SBI level investi-
gation,
c) which is more than 5 years old.
Previous tindings in this area have documented the extent ot
incompleteness ot clearance data tor the Army and Navy. For this
and other reasons, it was decided to detine the PR target groups
in two steps, so that a range ot values could be identitied.
While this is not as desirable as a single (correct) tigure, it
is a limitation dictated by the quality ot current security dAta --
bases.
All data used in this study were current as the second halt
ot FY85 began. The 2.1 million active duty otticers and enlisted
military personnel served as the starting population. A pass
A-19-3
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through this population tirst selected those with DCII segments
indicating a military BI or SBI initiated by the end ot FY81.
This subset would, in ettect, detine the maximum number who might
be eligible tor a PR by the end ot FY86. A total ot 198,170
such individuals were tound. Table 1 sorts them by service and
otticer-enlisted status. It shows more enlisted personnel than
otticers in each service and the Air Force, with over 86,000,
to tar outnumber the other three branches.
Additionally, Table 1 splits these service members into
three categories, approximating the tiscal year during which the
member could have initially entered the PR queue. This is less
than exact since the DIS investigation date in the DCII is an
initiation rather than completion date. Those with investigations
begun prior to FY80 (a maximum estimate ot the backlog at the
beginning ot FY85) predominated with over 110,000 ot the total
while nearly 41,000 could have entered during FY85 and most ot
the remaining 47,000 will be due during FY86.
The specitic DIS investigation codes entered into this
analysis are listed on Table 2. This table represents the relative
distribution ot these background investigations by otticer-enlisted - -
status within service and tor the DoD aggregate. Initial non-
issue BI and SBI investigations torm the bulk ot these codes, 80% -
ot the enlisted members and 72% ot the otticers. Supplemental
and PR-SBIs and suitability issue BIs and SBIs comprised most
A-19-4
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TA3 E 1
Active Duty MIlitarv Personnel with Military BI Or SBI
DIS Codes Showin a Investloation Initiated Prior to FY82
(As of 1 April 1985)
Marine Air
Investigation Initiated _ArmX Nv _ Force DoO
During or before FY79 15,610 17,698 3,838 31,441 68,587
FY80 6,438 6,637 1,111 10,972 25,158
FY81 7,541 .148 1-130 1-0 30027
TOTAL 29,589 31,483 6,079 56,621 123,772
Ofice~r
Marine Air
*Investigation Initiated Ar.my. Nay Corps ForceD
During or before FY79 13,662 8,826 2,493 16,808 41,789
FY80 5,273 3,511 769 6,110 15,663
FY81 ,279 773 68 16-,-.9-.




TA3BLE_ 2- :. .
Percentage DIstributions Of Pre-FY82 DIS
B) and SBI Codes Of Active Duty Military Personnel
(As of 1 April 1985)
BI/SBI Marine Air "
Code Arm Nav Corps Force DoD
1A1/A 45.6 58.0 65.0 50.6 52.0
1A2/B 32.9 21.7 19.2 30.7 28.4
1A3/C .6 .2 3.1 .6 .6
1A6/F .3 .5 .4 .4 .4
1A7/G 5.1 5.8 3.4 7.5 6.3 .
1D1/A 1.1 1.0 .7 1.0 1.0
1D2/B .5 .2 .2 .6 .4
1D5/E 4.7 6.0 2.6 4.1 4.7
1N3/C 4.1 3.8 3.0 2.1 3.1
IP3/C 4.6 2.3 2.0 2.1 2.7
1U3/C .2 .2 .1 .2 .2Others* .3 .3 .3 .1.2 ;.
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
BI/SBI Marine Air I
Code Ay N Cs Force Do"
1A1/A 42.5 49.3 60.7 39.9 43.9
1A2/B 29.6 21.0 17.2 33.0 28.4
1A3/C .3 .2 1.7 .2 .3
1A6/F .4 .6 .4 .8 .6 l
1A7/G 16.3 18.3 13.6 16.7 16.7
1D1/A 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.4 1.2
1D2/B 1.2 .5 .3 .6 .8
1D5/E 6.6 7.3 3.5 6.1 6.4
1N3/C .8 .8 .8 .6 .7
1P3/C 1.0 .6 .6 .6 .8
1U3/C .1 :1 .1 .0 .1
[:::: ~~Others* . I. I. ";:
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
* Includes 1A8/H, 1D3/C, 1N1/A, 1N2/B, 1P1/A, 1P2/B, 1Q1/A,
1Q3/C, 1R1/A, 1R2/B, 1R3/C, 1U1/A, and 1U2/B.
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(17%) ot the remaining codes tor the .enlisted personnel. Supple-
mental SBIs and SBI periodic reviews are the only other signiticant
U otticer investigation codes, covering 23%.
Having examined this subpopulation, a second analysis was
pertormed to identity those with two additional characteristics--
a top secret or SCI clearance code and an investigation completion
bdate ot September 1981 or earlier. Table 3 subdivides the 151,512
remaining personnel by service, officer-enlisted status, and
investigation date. As in the first analysis there were more
enlisted members than officers by a three to two margin. Also,
the Air Force contributed halt ot the total personnel with these
characteristics. Nearly 83,000 reached the tive year point
betore FY85, 44,000 did or will during FY85, and the remain-
ing 24,000 are due by the end ot FY86.
Army and Air Force clearance data used in this report were -_"
taken from the DCII. Army personnel with the following clearance
codes were considered to have top secret or SCI status: G, J, N,
P, T, V. Ot these, the SCI code V was held by 53%, while 24% had
a top secret N code and 23% a top secret T code. Air Force
personnel with clearance codes E, N, T, U, V, or W were included.
Here the top secret T code (76%) and SCI code V (23%) dominated.
Navy and Marine Corps clearance data were obtained from
personnel data tapes routinely submitted by those services to the
A-19-7
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Active Duty Military Personnel with Pre-FY82 DIS BI/SBI Codes.
Top Secret Or SCI Clearances, and Investigations Reaching
Five Year Point Bv The End Of FY86 --
(As of 1 April 1985)
!
] ~Mar ine A ir"
Investigation Comleted A Mare Force DoD .
During or before FY79 8,930 10,619 2,300 27,034 48,883
FY80 7,401 5,677 917 13,206 27,201
FY81 3.j,831j 2,2 410. 8,004 14,96
TOTAL 20,162 19,019 3,627 48,244 91,052
Off icer .
Marine Air---:
Investigation Completed A N Carps Force DoAir
During or before FY79 9,416 6,483 2,200 15,962 34,061
FY80 6,177 2,939 716 7,224 17,056
FY 3.32f 345 4.15-
TOTAL 18,914 10,940 3,261 27,345 60,460
-18
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Defense Manpower Data Center. Three Navy clearance codes (A, K,
and P) were accepted. The K code (top secret based on a BI)
accounted tor 62% ot these Navy clearances, while 38% had top
secret based on an SBI (code A). The only Marine Corps code used .- .!
for top secret or above (T) was used in this analysis.
The investigation completion dates used in this analysis
were extracted from the DCII clearance segments in the cases ot
the Army and Air Force. For the Navy and Marine Corps, personnel
data submission sources were utilized.
Having developed two estimates ot the numbers ot active duty
military personnel needing periodic reviews by the end of FY86,
" it remains to specity their current locations. The most critical
data element at this point became the members' zip codes, which
* are found on the DDC master files. A check ot this data tield
revealed zip codes present tor all but about 3,000 ot the 198,000
individuals described earlier in this report. Scanning ot the
codes spotted two general types--U.S. and non-U.S. locations.
For the U.S. locations, individuals were tound in all 50 states
and the District of Columbia. Non-U.S. zip codes (military
APO/FPO) identitied personnel in 69 ditterent countries or
territories.
A-19-9
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U.S. zip codes were sorted into states by aggregating the
postal sectional service centers represented by the first three
zip code digits. This produced the tirst page ot Table 4 showing
state by state counts ot those with DIS military BIs and SBIs -.- 
initiated before FY82. Note that the largest numbers ot these
personnel were tound in Calitornia, Texas, Virginia, Florida,
and Washington, D.C. These locations contained 42% ot the 137,693
individuals with U.S. zip codes.
The second part ot Table 4 shows the country or territory in
which the remaining personnel were assigned. To do tnis, the
tive digit APO/FPO zip codes were aggregated by country. Those
countries with the most military personnel on 1 April 1985 were
Germany, Korea, England, and Japan. Collectively these countries
had 72% ot the 41,334 personnel with such zip codes.
Table 4 also documents the finding o nearly 16,000 personnel
with zip codes assigned to ships and other mobile units with no
tixed location. Overall, then, ot the 198,170 personnel ot.
interest, 69.5% were in the U.S., 20.9% in other countries or
territories, 8.0% on ships or with mobile units, and 1.6% without
valid or any zip codes.
State and country distributions ot those included in the
more restricted PP candidate estin:ate are shown on Table 5. For
U.S. located personnel, Calitornia, Texas, Virginia, Florida, and
A-19-1O
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j r HBL. 4 .:"::
STATE AND COUNTRY LEVEL -I1-51RIbUTIIN UF ACTIVE DUT'i LT-",
PERSONNEL WITH PRE-FY82 :'IS 61," 81 LEEL LNE I ATLON:'
,: LII- O AF1:IL . 
NORTHEAST NUMBER NORTH CE'.AL
CONNECT I CUT 1181 1 i.,.H
S I INE 678......
* 'MASSACHUSETTS 1340 'rNTHNH 57
NEW HAMPSHIRE 5L2 NORTH DAOT6
NEW JERSEY 1N4 .OUIH DFIKU 1' 44;
RHODE I SLAND 55- :S.- H V.u 168"
VERMONT 27 WISCONSIN
----------------- --------------------- ------
AREA TOTAL 5745REA r IL
MIDDLE ATLANTIC NUMBER SOUTH ... CENFTAL NUMBER
--------------------------- - -- - -- - -- - -- - --------------------------DELAWARE 3:39 R A .
LOUISIANA .:L 9
NORTH CAROLINA 5469 1OKL1HO:1
SOUTH CAROLINA 31:30
VIRGINIA 11142 REA TOIAL 179:34
WASHINGTON D.C. S91 A. "1.
-. WEST VIRGINIA 92
-- ---------------------
AREA TOTAL 3'',:. 13, MUNTH I N NUMBER
----------------------------------------------- ------AP' R.I 2ONAI :-7?
SOUTHEAST NUIIBER COLORHAO 8"..'
----------------------- ------ IDH 5
ALABAMA 2.379 NEW IEX i'i 24:34
FLORIDA :3' NEVADA 15 2'795 IJTH 1049GEORG I A 4694 WYOMIG -
rl SISIPPI 1492
TENNESSEE 97:3 -REA T-----
--------------------- .- RE- TOTL 124'6
AREA TOTAL 179:3:3
PAC IF IC NUMBER
--------------------------------------------------GREAT LAKES NUMBER -------
--------------------- ------ LSK:A '4
I NO I ANA , :HL I FORN I A 18044
KENTUCKY 1707 HWAI 4::-.14
r IC:HI GAN 1205 WASHIN'FroN :G:TO0
NEW YORK 235--,









- - 0------------------ ---AREA rOTAL 86-38 A-19-11
STATE HNL. CuUNI.'" LE 'vEL L:ThiIUIIFH ' H'TIE LI"JY HILL IH,-.
PERSONNEL WITH FRl-I "(8.'i i'. .:BI LEVEL INV.STIGHTIOt.'-
(HS UF I APRIL 1985.
NORTH ATLANT IC NUM ER 0 I.L;,LE E Z r.."Fi .1CH NUMjL1;) -__
----------- --------------------- -------
AZORES 1.9 1 1,
BAHMS 5 Ri
BERMUL:, 104 EGYPT 47-
CANADAI SRHEL
CU A 165




PUERTO RICO :35: 
MRICCJO
WEST INDIES 8 LIU[,N 1- - - - - - - --- -- - ------'1 ;
AREA TOTAL 122 TURREY
CENTRAL/SOUTH AMERICA NUMBER R TOTIL 1c14'
ARGENTINA ASIAiPACIFIC HIrlbE,HsL HH I F I C...... .j
BOLIYZA 3 - - - - - - -- - - - - - -
BRAZIL 15ANTARC TICA
"CHILE 2 HUSTRALIA 124• COLOMB IAR3[,IEOGR Ri5 :-...
COSTA RICH ;2 GUAM R118ECUADOR :3 'HINr* IUC 1. ".'-
HO:NG~ KONG 9
EL SALVADOR to I .ONE:3. I A
GUATEMALA 1 JHPN .- 91
HON[:,iRA$ " IHtl. TUi I SLAN:'
NICARAGUA 2 IREA : ...
PANAMA 856 AIHF...AHHLL I':;LANDSA 10
PfARAGUAY 5MIDWA, I$LAN' 1
PERU 9 NEW ZERLAN, 1-7




AREA TOTAL -4:37 WAKE ISLAN 1
W......... /,
AREA TOTAL IEU ROP'E NUMBER.
BELG I UM 344 "H" '"• ', r iTHEP NUNE. -.
DENMARK 15 " •---.
ENGLAND .1387NO FIXED LOCATION 15913 - -
FI NLAND 25 UNLI:TE' HPOF,+PJ., 1 .15 -- I
FRANCE 20 NC .I 01., . 44
GERMRNY 18,429 - - -
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Washington, D.C. had 41% of the 107,034 military members. Ot the
32,240 in non-U.S. countries or territories, 72% were in Germany,
England, Japan, or Korea. Overall, 70.6% ot the 151,512 personnel
included on Table 5 were in the U.S., 21.3% in other countries
and territories, 6.4% on ships or with other mobile units, and
1.7% without valid or any zip codes.
Future Related Work
While it is usetul to identity the states or countries to
which future military PR subjects are assigned, it is recognized
that additional analyses are needed to provide DIS with information
S,necessary tor planning purposes. Currently, ettorts are underway
" in several directions. With regard to the military personnel
. "described in this report, an analysis is underway that will
allocate U.S. personnel to specific DIS field ottices rather than
the state level display presented here. To date, zip codes have
been matched with DIS field organization data. Two problems
-' have been identitied which must be overcome before field ottice
level results can be provided. First, about 500 U.S. zip codes
were identitied with no DIS tield element code. The locations
* must be identitied and the appropriate tield elements specitied.
Secondly, about 500 zip codes were found to have more than one
DIS field element code. These must be examined individually and
the most appropriate DIS tield element selected.
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STATE AND COUNTRY LEVEL [ T:,II:I'E:UTJUNI'.I F HI .',,, U I flL, rHI.Y V1::,UHI4L
WITH PRE-FY8 DIS 61/S81 LEVEL INESTIGRTIUNb. FINL. IuP :ECRET OR : lL
CLEARANCES BASED ON I NLST iGAfIO F I E "EARR, OLD BY' END OF FY86
AS OF 1 APRIL 1985,..
NORTHEAST NUMBER NORTH CENTRAL NUIBER
CONNECTICUT .44 IOW :3 17,
MAINE 524 MINNESOTA 116
MASSACHUSETTS 109 MONTANA 510,
NEW HAMPSHIRE 444 NORTH DAKOTA 160? "
NEW JERSEY 109 SOUTH DAKOFTA 875
RHODE ISLAND 350 WISCONSIN i
VERMONT 2:3
-------------------------- ------ AREA TOTAL :3272
AREA TOTAL 4282
SOUTH CENTRAL NUMBER
MIDDLE ATLANTIC NUMBER ----------------------------
ARKA NSAS 800
DELAWARE 295 LOUISIAINA 1727
MARYLAND :3175 OKLAHOM*A 39
NORTH CAROLINA 3935 TEXAS 8749
SOUTH CAROLINA .454 "--"-. "
VIRGINIA 8401 AREA TOTHL 14372
WASHINGTON '. C. 767
WEST VIRGINIA 3 MOUNTA IN NUMBER.
------------------------------------ ------ --------------------- ------
AREA TOTAL 25:3 9 ARIZONA 44;2
COLORADO 2729
SOUTHEAST NUMBER I DAHO 475
NEW MEXICO 2069 2
ALABAMA 1:812 NEVADA 1 84
FLORIDA 6511 UTAH 896
GEORGIA --475 WYOMING 502
MISSISSIPPI 121 E. --- ------
TENNESSEE 7A38 AREA TOTAL 10:397
------------------------- ------
AREA TOTAL 1:3752 PACIFIC NUMBER
-------------------------------------------- ---
GREAT LAKES NUMBER ALASKA 1526
CAL I FORN IH 1:3086 "
INOIANA 591 HAWRII 3604
KENTUCKY 100 OREGON 96
MICHIGAN 1015 WASHINGTON 25:3
NEW YORK 1907 ".- --.---
OHIO ;412 AREA TOTAL 20845
PENNSYLVANI A 689
-------------------------- ------
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THbLE 5
STATE AND COUNTRY LEVEL DI$TRIBUTION OF AL lI'vE DUT", i MILITHR" PERO.:ONNEL
WITH PRE-FY82 DIS EI"SBI LEVEL INVESTIGATIONS AND TOP SECR.ET OR 
S'-1
CLEARANCES BASED ON INVES-TIiGTIONS FIVE "YEHRS OLD 8'-t' END 
OF F8,";.-
(AS OF 1 APRIL 1985)
- NORTH ATLANTIC NUMBER MIDDLE EHAT/AFRICA NUMBER
------------------- ------ ---------------------AZORES 15 BAHRAIN 11
BAHAMAS 4 CYPRUS 2
BERMUDA 66 EGYPT 39
CANADAR Ib IRAEL 22
CUBA 112 JORDAN 5
SDOMINICAN REPUBLIC 4 KENYA :3
GREENLAND 36 LIBERIA I
ICELAND 190 MOROCCO 5
SPUERTO RICO 223 SAUDI ARABIA 133
i WEST INDIES 6 SUDAN 1------ ------ ------.--- - TURKEY
AREA TOTAL 814 ZAIRE 5-------------------- ------
CENTRAL/SOUTH AMERICA NUMBER AREA TOTAL 867
-------------------------------
ARGENTINA 3 IS I A/'PRC I F I G NUMBER
BOLIVIA---------------------------------------------- ------* BOLIVIA 2 
,,,
BRAZIL 12 ANTARCTICA 3 - .
CHILE 1 AUSTRALIA 83
COLOMBIA 2 DIEGO GARCIA 108
COSTA RICA 2 GUAM 92-'
ECUADOR 2 HONG KONG 7
EL SALVADOR 10 I NDONE-I a
GUATEMALA 1 JAPAN 2i17
HONDURAS 5 JOHNSTON ISLHND 6
NICARAGUA 2 KOREA 3022
PANAMA 626 MARSHALL ISLANDS 8 3PARIGUAY MI DWRY I SLRND 1
PERU 9 NEW ZEALAND 11
_RUGUA4 PHILIPPINE! 1361
VENEZUELA 10 SINGAPORE 6
THAILAND 26
AREA TOTAL 694 WAKE ISLAND 1
EUROPE NUMBER AREA TOTAL 826 --J
BELGIUM 277 OTHER NIJMBER
DENMARK 14 
.--..--- -- --- -- -- --
ENGLAND 3296 NO F I XED LOCAT I ON 96589
FINLAND 21 UNLISTED APt/'FPO 155 - -
FRANCE t9 NO ZIP CODE 2:304
GERMANY t4263 
---------------------------
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Military personnel are only one. ot three types needing DIS
periodic reviews. DoD civilian employees and industrial contrac-
tors are the others. An analysis is now underway to provide -
state and country level, as well as selected city distributions, .
tor civilian employees. The DCII and master personnel tiles have
already been matched. Limitations here are the lack ot Navy and
Marine Corps clearance data in the DCII and lack ot zip codes in
the civilian master tile.
In the industrial area, preliminary discussions have identi-
tied several data elements in the automated DISCO tiles that
should be ot use in this general ettort. Attempts are underway
to have the DISCO tiles made available to DoD Personnel Security
Research Program personnel so that they may be matched against
other relevant data bases. A possible limitation is the lack ot
specitic worksite zip code in the case ot some companies with
multiple locations. It appears that only the headquarters zip
code is provided.
A-19-16
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Appendix A
DOD PESONNEL SECURITY RESEARCH PROGRAM4 REPORTS
1. Personnel Security Investigation and Clearance Contents of the
2. Defense Central Index of Investigations, 84-1, March 1984
2. Defense Investigative Service Investigations and Army and Air Force
Adjudications Contained in the DCII, 84-2, May 1984
3. Army and Air Force Adjudications During FY83 and DIS Investigation
and Clearance Status of DoD Personnel as of the End of FY83, June
1984
4. Investigation and Clearance Status of Those in Army Personnel
Security Screening Program Occupations, 84-4, July 1984
5. Iden..ification of Army Top Secret and SCI Eligibles Not Included in
W DCII Clearances, 84-5, July 1984
6. Navy Security Clearances, 84-6, August 1984
7. Projections of Military Periodic Review Requirements, 84-7, August
1984
8. Security Clearances Among Army and Air Force Reserve Component
Personnel, 84-8, September 1984
9. Comparison of Investigations and Adjudications During FY83 and the
* First Half of FY84, 84-9, September 1984
10. DIS Investigations and Clearance Eligibility of Air Force Enlistees
Requiring BIs and SB1s, 85-1, October 1984
11. The DoD Personnel Security Research Program: Initial USAF Findings
and Future Areas of Study, 85-2, November 1984
12. Identification of Unnecessary Background Investigations, 85-3,
December 1984
13. Personnel Security Investigations: Service Differences for Similar
Occupations, 85-4, December 1984
14. Most Recent DIS Investigation and Clearances Information in the DCII
at the Beginning of Fiscal Year 1985, 85-5, March 1985
15. Continued Top Secret and SCI Status of Former Army Personnel with
Unsuitability Discharges, 85-6, April 1985
16. Continued Top Secret and SCI Status of Former Air Force Personnel
with Unsuitability Discharges, 85-7, April 1985.
17. Security Investigations and Clearances in the DCII at the End of
Fiscal Year 1984: A Profile of 2.1 Million Active Duty Military
Personnel, 85-8, May 1985
18. A Census of Key Data Elements in the Defense Central Index of
Investigations (As of 1 April 1985), 85-9, June 1985
19. Cleaning Up the Periodic Review Backlog: Estimates of the Numbers
and Location of Military Subjects, 85-10, August 1985
20. Extent of National Agency Checks on Active Military Personnel, 85-
11, September 1985
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EXTENT OF NATIONAL ACEICY Cf'ECt'S ON
ACTIVE MILITAPY PE:PSO1NrEL
Current DoD policy calls for "lational Agency Checl:c (!NACz)
to be run on all m~ilitary personnel entering active d uty. These
are generally accomplished either as entrance N? Cs or, for per-
sonnel reqjuiring top secret or higher clearance, as p~art of a
6etailed background or special background investigation. rece-nt
esnionace cases involving persons only recuirinc clearance at the *:
secret level have raised questions about -the adecuacy of thc "AC
as a :%ey element of the personnel security system.
This paper reports on the results of analyses made possible
by the matching of the Defense Central Index of Investiqation
(DCII) with the Don active duty master files maintained by the
Defense Man*power Pate Center (DNPC) . -he iE~r*; computer system at
the !Naval Postgraduate School ias used to -rocess the massive
data fLiles used in this study. All results reflect the situation
at the beginnina of the second hnalf of fiscal year 19E5. Specif-
ically, thec following issues were examined; have all current
military :iersonnel been subjected to a NC, and. how many and wa
kind, of files are searcheC dturing a 'C
As described in a recent report in this oeries, one of the
six: types of segm.1ents in the. -CII is thec "AC History seC7e nt.
Currently, over seven million 'NAPCs involving over 24 7illion.
ccency file searchies are identified in this- ;-ortion of the DCII.
DachL entry incluees a cor-nlction date and coc-e along with identi-
fication of u-3 to eleven a,'-encv fles that '-v a e been, searched_
C urinc' the -Z C. The DCII (foes not however, identify the em,!lover
or status of the subject of the 1NAC. This study matched the 2.1
million re corc. active m~ilitary personnl finventory against thce
T'Acs. The tables cnC dis-cussion in the follo'-irng pacezs describesc
the results of this -atching.
T!he first -uostion asked: of the d.ata wzhow -man- 7ilita-rv
Dersonnel have rDCII "AC :istory segnients. AsCbe1snows, that
answer ranges fro- S2% for Air 7orce and ' 'avy officers to f % of
enlisted I'arines. The overall roD Ciure was FA' at the end of
the first half of FPS. -'able 1 c',ow s fLo r e ach service a clict"tlv
oger percentage of cnlistec :cembors wih-AC "istory segmentzs
than officers. This diffcrence varied from~ 1.11; in the -avy to
2.6% in the *arine Corps. -_
'o deotermine if2 lack of a *'AC 11iStory seg.-ent is r,-ore -'ro-
nounced at certain paygrac~es, thie analysis -presented on. 'e:ble 2
*asconducted. It was s-,;culateC that thc T~crcent .jith.out a -VAC
17istory seg;ment woul' '-e hlicher at thuc ulpper zr.-.' lo,.wect pay? ra.z..--
This would be expected- since "ACn on all nwrecruits -,ay not yet
be completed and entered into the system.. -:le,'revious analyzes-
h-ave shown co~mpl.etion d-ates rcn(,in-. zetw.een 1 73 and 11%5.
Personncl enterin: before 11'73 0 u C' n ot hv e a NC :1i St o r
A- 20-2
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TABLE 1I Percent With NAC 17istory DCII Segmnents
(As of 1 April 1985)
6b Arm-y S5 .5 P3.1 P5.2
- avy 83.4 C2.3 83.2
Air Force P3.4 82.1 63.2
Marine Corps P6.2 !P3.6 86.0
DoD 84.4 F2.6 84.2 --
A-20-3
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TABLE 2 Paygrade Distribution of Percentages With
NAC History DCII Segtments
(As of 1 April 1985) :
Army Navy Air Force Marine Corps DoD
Grade
Enlisted El 83.7 83.5 92.4 84.9 85.3 -
E2 92.5 91.1 96.2 90.7 92.5
E3 92.8 93.3 97.5 93.5 941.4
E4 914.0 93.7 97.2 93.8 94.8
E5 92.0 90.9 88.2 93.0 90.6
E6 76.1 67.9 52.8 77.9 67.9
E7 52.5 43.5 36.9 34,.6 44,.5
E8 42.5 38.0 37.7 29.7 38.9
'1E9 35.14 33.6 38.1 241.4 341.8
Officer Warrant 69.3 49.7 NA 66.0 66.0
01 97.0 91.2 96.7 96.4, 96.1
02 96.5 93.4 96.5 93.2 95.4
03 90.41 92.3 89.6 89.1 90.4.
04 71.41 74.41 62.5 66.4 68.6
05 73.3 62.2 61.6 65.0 65.8 -"
06 69.7 62.2 71.0 77.5 68.6





segment unless they had been checked during this more recent
period after entering service.
Table 2 generally shows what was expected. For enlisted
personnel in each service, highest percentages (over 90%) with
DCII V.AC Vistory segments were found at grades E2 - E5. Somewhat
lower rates were identified at the F1 entry level. The percent
with NAC Fistorv segments declines greatly as grade rises from C6
to E9. Cnly 24% of enlisted ::arines at the E9 level had DCII 1.1AC
History segments. For officers the pattern was different. For
grades 01-03 the percent with NAC History segments ranged from
89% to 97%. At grades 04 to C6 it ranged from 62% to 78%.
However, at 07 and above the percentage rose to 01-03 levels,
4 except in the Navy where it was only 7C%. For Army and r'arine
warrant officers the NAC History percent was similar to that
found for those at the 04-06 level, but it was only 50% for !avy
warrants.
Lack of a NAC r"istorv segment does not necessarily mean
there is no DCII evidence of a NAC. The structure of the DCII
places certain types of NI'ACs under the category of rIS dossier
segments. These are TNACs which developed derogatory findings or
information rec-uiring further clarification on a subject. This
study included an assessment of this source of "IAC documentation
for those without a NAC Kistory segment. Results are presented
after the discussion of NAC A.istory segment findings.
For those with NAC Fistory segments thc number of different
agency files checked went as high as ten (for one Army officer).
However, as shown on Table 3, most NACs involved the search of
three or four different files. This was true for from P'% of the
S Army officers to ;9; of the enlisted H arines. Consistent differ-
ences were found in each service such that officers generally had
more files checked than enlisted personnel. This is accurately
reflected in the average number of files checked during the
course of a "AC, which overall was 3.2 for enlisted m-embers and
. 3.C for officers.
Tables 4A and 4r identify the specific agency files found to
-be most often checked during a NAC. The values in these tables
indicate the percent of all "TACs which included a particular type
of file check. As Table 4A shows for enlisted personnel, al-most
all NACs include DCII and F.I 'Feadquarters checks and either an
F" Name or Fingerprint check. The only noticeable differences
dacross services were the relatively hig'her rate of 7TI Fincor-,rint
checks (31%) in the Air Force and lower rate in the ,'.arine Cor s
. (11%). These, in turn, produced higher rates of ?I Nlame checks
for the rarine Corps (89%) and a lower Air Force rate (
Other than these four files, the only ones checked for r.iore
than 2% of current enlisted Dersonnel with 7 were the Air
Force, Army, and Navy Fersonnel Center files. These checks ..ere
A-20-5
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TABLE 4A - Axency Files Most Frequently Checked
During Enlisted NACs
(As of 1 April 1985)
Percent of National Agency Checks
Marine EnlistedI Agency Files Checked ArMY Navy Air Force Corps Total
DCII 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
FBI Headquarters 99.9 99.9 99.9 100.0 99.9 ..
FBI fame Check 80.3 80.4 69.1 88.6 78.2
FBI FinGerprint 19.6 19.5 30.8 11.3 21.7
Air Force Military Personnel Center 0.0 0.0 14.5 0.0 3.8
Army Military Personnel Center (Enlisted) 9.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6
N Wavy Military Personnel Records 0.1 11.7 0.1 0.0 3.1
Army Prior Service Records 3.4 1.7 0.8 0.7 2.0
i I & NS (Alien) 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.8
Central Intelligence Agency 1.4 2.1 1.6 0.5 1.5
Office of Personnel Management 1.6 1.4 1.8 0.8 1.5
I & NS (Citizen) 0.6 1.0 0.9 0.4 0.8
State Departrnent (Passport) 0.7 0.4 1.1 0.2 0.7
Marine Corps Personnel Records 0.1 0.1 0.0 5.8 0.7
Defense Investigative Service 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.4 .
A Amy Investigative Files 1.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4
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TABLE 4BE Agency Files Most Frequently Checked
Durinx Officer NACs
(As of 1 April 1985) ~
Percent of National Agency Checks
Marine Officer
Agency Files Checked Army Navy Air Foroe Corps Total -
DCII 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
PEI Headquarters 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9
FEI Fingerprint 80.5 82.5 85.41 79.0 82.6 .-
Air Force Military Personnel Center 1.0 0.1 541.9 0.0 19.2
FBI Name Check 19.0 16.9 141.3 19.2 16.9
* Army Military Personnel Center (Officer) 39.9 0.0 0.1 0.0 141.2
Navy Military Personnel Records 0.3 58.5 0.3 0.5 13.5
* Office of Personnel Management 5.2 11.7 5.1 2.9 41.9
* Central Intelligence Agency 5.0 3.8 1.5 3.11 11.4
Army Prior Service Records 6.1 2.9 41.1 2.5 11.4
State Department (Passport) 41.5 3.41 4.1 3.2 11.0
Marine Corps Personnel Records 0.1 0.2 0.1 419.1 3.5 .J.~
Army Military Personnel Center (Enlisted) 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8
I & NS (Citizen) 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.0 1.6
Defense Investigative Service 0.7 0.6 1.3 0.7 0.9
State Department (US Citizens Born Abroad) 1.1 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 MR
Army Investigative Files 1.8 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.7
Air Reserve Personnel Center 0.2 0.1 1.2 0.1 0.5
Total Personnel with NACs 89,127 56,685 87,329 17,1417 250,288
A-0-
primarily limited to those in a particular service. For example,
while 14% of the NACs done on enlisted'Air Force personnel included
a check of the Air Force Military Personnel Center filer, less
than .1% of those in the other branches had been checked in this
Air Force file.
The only other NAC file searched for more than 4% of the
enlisted VAC recipients, in any service, was the m;arine Corps
Personnel Records file. This was searched during 6% of the
enlisted rarine Corps NACs. Table 4A shows all files searched in
4% or more of the 1.5 million enlisted DCII NAC History segments -
for personnel active at the middle of FY85.
Comparable officer data is presented on Table 42. Again the
DCII and FBI Headquarters files were checked for virtually all of
the quarter million current officer NACs, as were either the FEI
fingerprint or name files. In contrast to the enlisted findings
where four-fifths were given FBI name checks rather than finger-
print searches, Table 4r shows the ratio to be reversed for
officers, with about four-fifths getting fingerprint checks and
one-fifth name searches. Only small service differences are
shown for the officers.
Next in prominence for the officers were the service specific
searches of the Air Force, Army, and Navy Personnel Records
files. These were the only other files searched in over 5% of
the overall officer NACs. The only other frequently checked file
in a specific service was the Larine Corps Personnel Records
file, referenced in 49% of the Tarine officer !'ACs.
A second meaningful way of viewing the NAC files is to
consider each type of file as a percentage of all files checked
during NACs. Tables 5A and SS present such distributions for
enlisted personnel and officers. For enlisted mer.)ers, Table 5A
shows nearly 5 million individual agency file checks. DCII, FBI
Headquarters, and FBI name and fingerprint file checks account
for 93% of this total. These four files also account for 80^ of
Sthe 940,000 checks conducted as part of officer !'2.C, as indficated-.
on Table 5B. Individual service personnel record files represent
another 13% of the officer file checks.
In addition to the specific files chec'ked, :AC listory
segments in the DCII have completion status and date codes.
Completion codes reflect either comiplete or incomplete ',PC his-
tories. Almost all .ACs on current military personnel have
completed NAC history codes. Table 6 shows an overall DoD figure
of 98t. Little variance from that value is evident either across
service or Hilitary statu. -owever, in each service a slichtly
higher percentage of enlisted than officer personnel have a




TABLE 5A - FreQuency Distribution of Agency Files Searched
During Enlisted UACs
(As of 1 April 1985) 2-
Percent of Total Files Checked , * .*-
Marine Enlisted'.. :
Axency Files Checked Army Navy Air Force Corps Total
DCII 31.1 31.1 30.8 32.1 31.1
FBI Headquarters 31.1 31.1 30.8 32.1 31.1
FBI Name Check 25.0 25.0 21.3 28.5 24.3
FBI Fingerprint 6.1 6.1 9.5 3.6 6.8 .
Air Force Military Personnel Center 0.0 0.0 4.5 0.0 1.2
Army Military Personnel Center (Enlisted) 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1
Navy Military Personnel Records 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.0 1.0
Army Prior Service Records 1.1 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.6 "
I & NS (Alien) 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6
Central Intelligence Agency o.4 0.6 0.5 0.2 0.5
Office of Personnel Management 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.5
I & VS (Citizen) 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 4
State Department (Passport) 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2
4 Marine Corps Personnel Records 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.2 .. .
Defense Investigative Service 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
Army Investigative Files 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 .
All Others 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3
Total flumber of Files Checked 1,843,935 1,316,279 1,326,958 478,148 4,965,320.
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TABLE 5B - Frequency Distribution of Agency Files Searched .,-
During Officer NeACs
(As of 1 April 1985)
Percent of Total Files Checked
Marine Officer
/zency Files Checked Army Navy Air Force Corps Total
DCII 26.9 26.5 26.3 27.5 26.6
.FBI Headquarters 26.8 26.5 26.3 27.5 26.6
FPI Fingerprint 21.6 21.9 22.5 21.7 22.0
'Air Force Military Personnel Center 0.0 0.0 14.5 0.0 5.1
FBI Hame Check 5.1 4.5 3.8 5.3 4.5 L
_:.Army Military Personnel Center (Officer) 10.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8
Navy Military Personnel Records 0.1 15.5 0.1 0.1 3.6
SOffice of Personnel Management 1.4 1.2 1.3 0.8 1.3
Central Intelligence Agency 1.3 1.0 1.2 0.9 1.2
Army Prior Service Records 1.6 0.8 1.1 0.7 1.2
..State Department (Passport) 1.2 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.1
Marine Corps Personnel Records 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.5 0.9
Army Military Personnel Center (Enlisted) 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
I & iS (Citizen) 0.5 0.14 0.4 0.3 0.-4
Z.Defense Investigative Service 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2
" State Department (U.S. Citizens Born Abroad) 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
_. Army Investigative Files 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
-"Air Reserve Personnel Center 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1
All Others 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4





TABLE 6 - Percent of NACs With Completed -AC
History Status Codes
Enitd office Overall-. :
Army 98.5 97.0 98.3
Navy 98.7 97.9 98.6
Air Force 98.4 97.1 98.1
Marine Corps 99.1 97.0 98.9
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With regard to the completion dates on the military ACS,
Table 7 presents frequency distributions of the year during which
the agency checks were completed. Dates ranged from 1973 to
1985. Overall, more enlisted than officer NACs were more recently
completed. For example, Table 7 shows 50% of the officer N1?.Cs
completed since 1981 and 65% of the enlisted NACs, completed since
that time. "I I
As previously mentioned, DIS investigation segments are an
alternate DCII source of N1AC information for those with negative
or questionable &'AC findings. Table 8 contains the results of a.t
special analysis of DIS investigation DCII segments only for
those current military members without a NAC History segment.
Recall from Table 1 that this represents about 16% of the active
force. Table 8 shows that most military personnel without NAC
History segments also do not have DIS investigation segr.ments in
the DCII. This was true for 67% of the enlisted personnel ana 72%
of the officers. For the officers this finding did not differ
much by service. However there was considerable variation at the
enlisted level. Far more Army and Navy personnel without NAC
History segments were found with DIS dossier segments than was
the case in the Air Force.
rost enlisted personnel with DIS investigations described on
Table r had file or extended IACs or ETT, Cs. Overall these
investigation codes were found in 25% of such cases. All other
DIES codes applied to C% of the enlisted 7ersonnel depicted in
Table 8. Among officers, far fewer FAC an& ENTN'AC dossiers were
found (7%). Far more officer DIS segment codes (17%) reflect
initial non-issue DI/IBI/SEI and suiplenmental Sr. types of
investigations.
Thus while some current military personnel without ":AC
qFistory segments were found with 'AC type DIS invcstigation
segments in the DCII, this alternative source of .AC information
still falls short of accounting for all personnel.
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TALE 8 - Most Frequent TyPes Of DIS Investigations For ,ilitary
Personnel Vithout NAC History Segments
(as of' 1 April 1985)
Enlisted (Percents)
Marine
.*.f TyPe of Investigation A .,avy Air Force Corps DoD
None 58.6 63.0 78.5 71.3 66.7
- File tAC 15.2 8.0 3.9 4.8 9.0
Expanded EINTAC 10.9 10.5 3.9 10.2 8.7
File E!,MTAC 6.6 9.3 3.1 6.7 6.4
Initial YI (non-issue) 2.3 2.8 .1 2.9 2.7
Initial SBI (non-issue) 1.5 1.2 3.1 0.7 1.8
. Expanded "AC 1.3 1.3 0.5 1.1 1.2
Initial IDI (non-issue) 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8
Other DIZ Codes 2.4 3.0 3.0 1.5 2.7




Type of Investigation Arw a Air Force Corps DoD
N .one 72.6 74.4 69.4 70.4 71.7
Initial SrI (non-issue) 4.7 4.7 12.3 !. 7.5
Initial I (non-issue) 4.5 6.2 6.6 8.2 5.,
. File !AC 8.7 5.1 2.9 6.0 5.6
. Zupplerental S!I 1.7 1.3 2.2 1.c 1.9
" Initial IEI (non-issue) 1.2 1.S 1.8 1.14-
Expanded I*AC 1.5 1.1 0.8 2.3 1.2
File EITAC 0.8 0.3 0.1 1.1 0."
Other DIS Codes 4.3 4.6 4.5 3.8 '4..4





SOFTWARE DEVELOPED TO AUDIT
AND EDIT THE DCII
DCII JOIN Al
14 NOV IiZ5 2:1, .PA-
/IMWS0b~XXX JO'> (3-
- ~/1*4AIN
II*EF EXEC 0 F1
D1 0Lh=V ) vo " i rX X X.
IEXEC PLI
/IPLI.SYS:N D) - I.iA7 - *-TFL f
1* THI ?FC,'.tAv T*c:. 1 T. - T - N T-F'
/* ELIMIANAT.V A! L A~ 7 A''. T 2nZNT A~' T~ Y~:
START:
7 PRO CED URE IDTI C (AI~ 1% R>;
DCL
IN6 FILE IINPjT :C~
130C FILE INPUT ~I I.
IN2 FILi !NFU' qcCr;
JN3 F IL '! NPJT
syspe~Iih FILL' CJT--jT E
1 AECc EA A? (-l),
2 £SN. CmAq(;)j 1 1 -%
2FILC CtA(.) * 1 - ~ ~ i
1 iiEC2 6AS:D (PZ),r
2 S S N2W C AA R U)~ f 1 1-
2 FIL2 C "A(3) P * I~- ZT
1 REC2 3 ASED (r4).,
2 SSN3 C AP() A* 1(
2 FIL3 CH A R ( 7)v 12 t T~~
1 RECOUTP
2 SS.N CHAiCQ)p I*1- ~ ;,*
2FILI CHAR(37)p 1* 1.- A~ LSE I
C UTZ C HAF. (2 3), 4 7-c f C *
2 OUT2 C:AR(30), 72- TY? *
2 OUT.S CH4ARM), 1 Z Z) lic T Y PE
CP1,.?2.P3,#P4) POINTi~p
CE3FSEOFCpE0F2p-ECF.)) EIT (1) IN~IT 'a)
(C3,C2pC3rCi) FIXED .rIN(31 I'Tj)
OUTCNT FIXED SIN(31) INIT(O)p
MATCH bIT(1) INIT('3'E);
ON ENOFILE (1N3) ECFe = IIIF
ON ENDFILE (INO) ECFC =11E
ON ENDFILE (IN2) 4OF2=1 i
ON ENDFILE (IN3) EOf3 = 1 b;
READ FILE (INQ. SCT (P1);
READ FILE (INC) SET 02) ;
*READ FILE C1N2) SET (P3) ;
READ FILE (Ih3) Z 'T (F4);
* DO WHILE (-vEOF6);
IF (SSNO 2 REC5.SSN i ,vEOFO) THE!N D.;
MATCH 118
08TO 3 FILU;
READ FILE (IN0.i SET (P2);
ELSE OUT.)=
IF CSSNZ RECS.SSN & -EOF2) THEtK DG;
MATiN 1Ila
OTaFIL2;
READ FILE (1HZ) SET (P3);
END;
DClI JOIN Al
14 NOV 19d5 :1~
ELSE OUT2




READ FILE (1N3) SLT UF4);
END;
ELSE OUT3 I
IF MATCH TWiEN DO; *
RECOUT c REL. -Y !A
Wk~ITE FILE (CUTYi FF l() 'C~uT);
OUTCNT =3JTCNT + ; 7
MATCH 101;,
END;
Ce = C5 + 1;
READ FILE (IN.-) "-T (P1);
PUT SKIP EDI T( "C*; S C'C L
PUT SKIP EDIT('TYPz; nC~ Z.C CO
PUT 3KIP EDIT(TYP-:l( r-L0-- zeA C C.l3 A





/I DS;= CDLRCI :32S ?3: 0 -0 S
Ii VOL=SER=(u.J45)
/IGO.IN3 DD UNlT=43Ch-5,!)-5I 34;
IIV C)L= S E R = (0 0C2141J
//8O.1N3 DD UNlT=34OC.-5,DISlP=q4Q,










/ISTEPLXa DO I=htII/SYSPRINT Dt SYS)UT=A
,I$YSIN 00 ajelvY ,....
//SYSUTI OD L~V T4~ 7,:i=LA'CLv~=7:ZB
II DC=L CL4,LZ~ ~
/1 s)LD UNIT:F
IIDO L~T=FFSS'T-l
7C FD = k .4
Do UKZ. u Azr Fv:Y; T1,M. 0=CL:P.ALEL C-:P'PC~:z...'j4
ii DCa=CL 2 i.i3.,L3 ~Aj4
ii C L C 4 4~'~~ -2 -
II ~c,CL:ECL=:44,:LKS:L2',
IIDCI(LiCL3 44.j LKIE- --- CF~ ': l,,4=4
IJJ2I1, 1O T io 2 1~ iVL)T')!
IIIL
OCIIAST PLI Al
14 NOV 1w65 i:12 r-. PA 3E
//*MAIN FR~2r'rCi=,..
II*EF EXEC PGA=Iif~zI14
/ISTEPNAPIE EXEC LcL. I 14KLL V-
//PLIsSYSIN D.) 2
START: PROCEDU~r
OPTIONS CrhAlN) ;: DJ;
DCL
IN. FILE IhPUT ~c
OUT FILE OUTPUT ;ZZR-
SYSPRINT FILE V'LTPUT STRq-;"',
SSNwCHd EXTzNAL k*'TUvk- (FIX .(1),--
1 P5 SASED (A),
~SSN Hp(i,1 1-
2 FILl mn..C) Am . -)~ oT 1
LCH~La /* 20 1 T Cwi CT*/
F1L 2H41 5 C 1
2 POE A c -IA() / 2i i-LkCi ^F E.IqTkt I/
SILAST C'(2i H* 34 R L~ 2' *1
SIF IRST CHAi(10), N*~'~ A :
2 IMID CMAR(13), 1* !3 - I' l Lr NAIVE *1
1 MASTER. *
a2 SSNOUT CHARC9)f f* 1
2 LCHGOUT CrAAR(6)i /* 1 - 15 LA.T r AA;F DAT7*I
2DOaOUT CMAAt)e 1 - '1 2:
2 PO06OUT C H A R1 Z~ - 23 PLAC~ 1 30F -IFVPI R
2 OLAST CH4AR(!.), 1* :4 - LA 'T N;Iff
2 OFIRST C i. A (1) * 3 ). F 1 'T !,A;
2 OMID CHARC14, 4 t VI ZLE N~ A1
TEMPLAST C,4AR(12) -ASED.CA0''^(ILftoT)).-
TEIMPFIRST CHAR(1O) A,4ED(ADD?'(IFIST)),
TEMPOID CHAR(I ) SAS-DAZDR(!I.))p
x POINTERe
4 ~FLAG FIXED iINC15)IT()__
GODCNT FIXED tBINCQ) IIC)
TOTALCNT FIXED SIN(31) I .T (0),
LCI4GP PIC'(7)9'#. I*T.AUc VAAS APE USED TC *





ON EKDFILE (IN) EO0, *'8;
READ FILE (1h) SET CX);
* 90 WHILE (NEOF);
TOTALCN7 a TOTALCNT + 1;
FLA6 a sSNCNKCSE6..SSN);
IF FLAG a 0 THEN DO;






LYEAR SUaSTR(L CHGTEtP5e2);- -
,4' LCHGOUT x LYEAR if L"ONTH IILDAY;
DOBOUT a DOB;




WRITE FILE (OUT) FROM (MASTEP); .
END;
READ FILE (IN) SET (X);
OCIXHAST PLI Al
14 NOv 1945 2:1 Z PY A:
END;
PUT SKIP EDIT(ITOTAL 17-::Dd T ., A L Ch.T C L C15 A Z 0)
PUT SKI P(Z)
PUT SKIt, EDI-T('T3TAL ~ S A!;TT; N ='kT~) (CCL (15) PA (L1),
END;
IID L
UVOL=! 7;=(Kw1 471.-K A 5 5 ,kClt91,C 7j:53fKC3 321)
/60.00T 00 uhlT=74jc.-ooDI ;lskp
V 0L E ~C 1 3 , 1?7,,C 1 3X11)
OCIISE60 PLI Al
14 NOV 196i 2:1Z P, PGI
I/NWS#WDC3J0
1/*NAIN PROC=Of "4c 0 T3
//'FOAMATPRDAiE, T rC CZ:=
/I* DD
//* LiIT=33,CpVACL=S.3E.=
I/STEPNANE EXLC PiC~~.C1? ,F~N '.C~
/IPLIsSYSIN DC*
START: PROCL)JRE
OPTIONS C! A!%) ~~
DCL
IN FILE INPUT. ,___
OUT FILE OUTPUT iiCZR.,-.
SYSPRINT FILE CUTFL'T 4T;.
VERIFY 5UILTINP
SSNCNK EXTEARNAL T~~(I .bC$)
1 SEGO BASED CX)p
2 53N ChAi(3)f /* I - 6w
FILl CkR* /* 1C - 13 '.
2 TYPE 4I o 1 4 T Y%*
2 LOC CM4A..3) 1'I 1 LCC;T!V!-
2 YEAR C4A0(0f1 2.- :1 -;cjDAY CiA R(, /* 22 -*1
TRAC IN 3 CmARCl3)p / 5 - 4 *
1 SS CIIAR0i), Iw - ~
TP CHRl f12 TY
DATE CHAR (.)) f 11 - 1~ t ATE YY'N 1 .
2 TRACING CmAR(1:)p /* 17 - 32 1,7 ACTioN *
JULIAN p iC C ) i
EOF 3IT(1 IN!T('C,':)f
FLAG FIXEO --IN(15) I-41T(Q),
GOODCNT FIXED i Id31) lNITQ),






PUT SKIP EDIT (SEGO)CA);
(tOSTRINGSIZE):
ONSOURCE =(4) 10';
PUT SKIP EDIT (SEGO) CA);
END;
ON ENOFILE (IN) EOF I1?
READ FILE (IN) SET MX;
00 WHILE C-vEQF);
TOTALCNT =TOTALCNT + 1;
FLAG a SSNCHK CSEG0.S53%);
IF FLAG x THEN DO;
GCODCNT 0^0GO'OCNT + 1;
VSiG =SEra5, bY NAMi;
IF VERIFY (DAY.,'123.456739-) G 9 DAY > IJC'' 8 DAY <37'7
* THEN DO;




WRITE FILECOUT) FRlOM (VS EG);;
END;
READ FILE (IN) SET CX);
END;
PUT SKIP EDITC'TOTAL RECORDS READ =lpTOTALCNT)(COL(15),A(2O).,
PUT SI









vT P:'C890 _3 CAC CrF J UL:A)
DO P~Cl9',p~ ~
F I XED 1lN(1~)
fADOR*SUBSTAKfrOO) EUILTIN, "
MOTAdLEC12) FIXED iwIN(15) INIC~ K 3*s,- ;,1,I33f3)
IF MODCY4) = 0T,4EK 'TA--LEC-')







D0 1 a 1 TO 11;
TO aTO - MOTA.3LE(l);







DATE a YYI MM I
RETURN;U END GREGORY;
END;
* /IGO.IN DO IJNIT341 o~I~
I/ VOL=SEPC(0115)
1/O.OlT DO UNlT=34.3C-5p~1SP=S 4p
* // DSN=DClD.iDTOC.P?50i3,
IIV0LraERz (K01 302)
DCIISORT PLI Al J
14 NO0V 1965 2:12 P'








IN FILE IthPUT % E ' 00i--
OUT F fLE OUTPUT PiQw. 0
SYSPR INT F:'L~ OUTPUT STRc-A .
I AEC SASED (Kp




TOTALCNT iFX!D "iN(31) 1NIT(C),
OUTChT F X~ I(1 'IT G).
ON ENDFILE (IN) ECF1 *1-=
READ FILE (IN) S:T (X);
00 WH4ILE *f)
WRITE FILE~ (OUT) FkOm c~)
OUTCNT 0 UTCNhT v1;
TE9MP.Sh SSN
READ FILE('IN) SE7 CX);
4TOTALCNT = TOTALC14T + 1;
DO WHILE (teEOF1i TSMDSSN S N
TQTALCNT TOTALCNT i
READ FILE (IN) 'i=T CX);
END;
END;
IF TEMPSSN a. SSN THEN DD;
WR~ITE FILE.(OUT) FROM RcC);
OU7CNT = OUTCNT + 1;
END;
PUT SKIP EDITC'T3TAL RECORDS READ =',TC TALCNT)CCCL(1' ),.A(20),
P',zz,ZZz9');
PUT SKIP EDITVTOTAL RECORDS ,RTTE% =,%)TCNT)CCLC1L),A2Z),
P'zz,zzz,&,z9');
END; *
II6O.IN DD UNIT=3400-5,DIZ P=!Hz
II ~DSN=DCIDD.SRT4!.(,3,..




,~~~.~~~ainatujcs~~~~~~~ I' Rif tr r W~L 1rr~... gj . ~ .-
OCIISRTO PLI Al
14 Nov 1'9S5 2:12 ?e' PAGf-
//NW$XWXXl JO6  37beF~ ) ~ Z
/I EXEC PLIXCLGpR ..IONh
/IPLIsSYSIN' DD *
START: PROCEDUR :
I E ASiD W
2TYPE CA(~
FIL




READ FILE (IN) ST (X)
OTALCNT a TOALChT + 1;
DO WHILE EOFl # '.~P$ .". .-
READ FILE IN) ST W;
TOTALCT - TOTALCT + 1;
z END;
END;
IF TERPSSN ~ NTE C
WRtITE FILE (OUT) FROM (REC);
OUTCI4T z OU1CNT + 1;
END;
PUTf~pEIT('TOTAL RECORDS READ 'fT0TALCK.T)(CCL(1C).,A(Zl),





IIGO.OUT 00 UNITz3400-6,DISPS CNEW,KEEP),-
/1 DCS=(LAECL:32,eLKSI&E3273,, tsCFrF,DEN=4),
II DSNzDCIDD.SPCOO P 503#,
II VOLzSERw(3C445O)
ociI MERGE Al
14 NowV 19d5 1:12 F' Ar
I /*MAIN P RoC 1'rA , C ;,=C,~i 1&
//*FORMATPR A'j TT1, t 1
1/* DO DSN = v, QC .% .iX XL T)
IIEXEC PLIXCLG,,kErJ".~zl-
IIPLIeSSiIh L.0
STOT: PROCE)UkE PT:'%S uI~ E t >
DCL
OUT FILE CLITPUT R-Z":
SYSPRINT FIL.. .UT4';T :1EA
I OCII BASED Me)
2 s IsN 3
4 FILl (1:-17 ),p
I MASTER aASE (Y),,




2 (AR z t C 4MA, (~
2F IL5 HR(~
2 UARb! C4A; 3
2 FIL5 h 7.
2 GAR55 CHAkC0
2 FIL? 4Aq(7'
2 'AA66 CMAR C~








DCM FIXED CNC31 I JIT'2a
ONE~FIL CAA) ORQ =
OF NIL (IN) EF1
READ I (N) INET (9x;A
READ I 1N) INIT (10) -)
OUTCOT FIE DCIN ZYN? (OE.
DE LT FIXE , B 3Y1 INAME;
ON E FILE (IN) EFD (R 1 1;c~);
ON NIi =I2 CU CNT (1 -'a);
READ FIL (INI) SET (X);
READ FILE CN2) SET (Y);
ELIF NS DC I.le SS HN D"; Do
READ FILE (IrN1) St T (X);
DCNT s CNT v 1;
DCII MERGE Al
14 NOV 1963 2:1Z Py PAG-
ELii IF XSSA > c:~i n?~~
SSNd U a ASN
fECOUT.F10 (1,57)l 4);
R EC 0U T = 4 A ST : Y %A I;;*i hiIT k F I LZ CC~J T - 1 - ( i t- C
0UTChT 20Ti~iT + 1;
REAI) FILE (I-vA .) (yr);
MCNT = 1CT 1;
LIND;




DI S D 1D , "A -'i f
-. ** * *~~ EU EI'I**HHI*** L I17AVL~.I~LjUi~"i - 7 I.r.- I.
DCII BREAK AO
14 NOV 1965 -:12 PAC EA~
//IWSOSPLT JOe! C344,E7), LlpCLA'%.,
//*FORMAT P~pDDiA~tr=,?t 1=.- Ti-
/I EXEC PLIXCLG,RZaC'&i11H1- 4
IPLI*SYSil DD *,
SPLIT : PRCC CTIo.'- (!AIN~) :cE;r
DCL
IN FILE REC"R' INi'UT 0.V(T,'TAL V.),
OUT1 FILi Nc CEf: & LTzu, * Tyr 1f f :Ei,447 S
OUT2 FILE- RE:OD QLUTT, I* Ty' ~~
OUT3 FILI CEO R :-QTO'T, 1w TIY~c 3 I .: 1
OUTS& FILL ECz? )TU, * TY; U T   L *f
SYSPRiN't FILZ1 2 7'"'0:
P POIhTiR, --
I A 3ASED(2) / * :.TCv-J - s.2TPE'
2 FILl ChiAA(I3), ' 1,1 IL:
STYP4 C'4AR(1)p 14 TY?:
2FIL4 CrARCZz), ol ~ :.*
ADDR BUILTIN,
TYPEC C 4A R (t A (I1Y) ,
ON E4DFILE(IN) E .F 1'
OPEN FILi (1'4) IN2UT, .
FILE (OUTi) QijTLT,
FILE (CUT:) 0OiTPT,
4FILE (CUT.)) OJT %To
FILE COU~T4) o~jTz%,
READ FILX (IN) SETC&);
IF EOF TNN
Do;











WRITE FILE (CUTt) FROP (4);
cc2 Z=Oci 1;
TZ T2 + 1;
END;
WRITE FILE (^UTI) FRCIV (A);
0C3 = OC3 + 1;0








WRITE FILi (001) ;FCM A~
Dcli BREAK AO
14 NOV 1985 2:12 ?
OCI o c1 + 1;
I ~ ~ OIF TYPEC 'ZS'THE'.
DO;




REITD FZL" (IN)4 (0;i
IC = T-3 +
END ;
PTH KIP E #NT'TY: 1 C'.? 1;FT~ ........ ,1
RA FIE ( COL C :'Ti);~x1,'Z ZZ')
PUT SKIP(' iDIT0 CMCALTY I,' CFiT ...... 1.'OI
PUT SZPCZ .~DT('TV.. i~ ArTTEN...............,~
PUT SKIP ED IT I -.-. kf.
PUT SKIP ED IT(' TY1P: S zQ~ N' c T~ WT E .......... 'T P
PUT SKIP ED I T T~ TY-'-. sT cc : 3ITS. .... .' ..OP;
PUT SKIP =-ITF'TCT-AL TYPE1 . o 9 L-PI T T....'C4
PUT SKIP(2) Z DI C~?T T J..Z ', K -*0 T T TT~ ~ V .. 'NTY)
PIUTi SKI(2 DDIDCS.V yP5jDS=(Ki 3L'.TP34Q
PUTSKP D (CLTY~ .K OD :zr--E NSWZT='slD
*1w "i(S1R=(!0435,i(C5Sz4)
1100ol3 DD DSN=DC'DD. S:N3).? 5C3,DIS?:-,EP),UNIT=34^O.r,




DCi SPLIT AO *
14NO 96 7:2 mPAGE 1~
I/*FO A AT P I ~T i I
// EXEC PLAL 9~i"=Lx
I/PLI.SYSLN DO *
SPLIT : FROE O7':liS (4A::,) : >;
DCL
IN FILE RECORD l:PJT NV (:LK:A . :)~ (1) V E34 4) V
Ou T B FILE RaCCRD ,UTIT,
OUTT FILE l.C. UTluTp
SYSPRINT FILr S~tA~ ~NT
A CHA4(34o) VAk 1-T01),
T CHAR(344) ~~'(DV)
1 D EF A PC3 /* 1' V! 'C 3 t C Tu~ L;
2 FILl CH'~k(14), I* - 14 FiLLE
2 CPTR FIXED .N(%)o 1* If1 1. ') i.%1 -
2 Cdx CA C Q 1* it , y YT.'
2 FIL2 C 1-i.A R C* 1) o
2 DOaY P I~ , l
2 006101 PiC~~ Z 7
2O ZOD P IZ'C ,'C 1A
pb CHAF(Z)o 4* / - 41 *T 'F il:T-4 I
2LLASTX CHfARC(1), 4, LL ;~ .A-- *1.
2VARREC CtAR(3'2), 47 44 FiLL-
I BASE ALIGNED, /* ~A C.  j u T F T 17 LlC T U0.R r
SSN CHAR(;)p /* 1S
2SEGNO fKii EI1() E* 1 c C. - ~
SCOMN42 *ICv 1 15 Y ~ T
O DY PIC 792, 1 17 C 
a DOER P! C' I /* 1 o*
2 DOBD PlC'99', o 21 D C Y/
P 0POB CHAR(Z), 23 ' D4TL "F IRTm4 *
SLAST C HA R ( 20) 4* L A. S APL
2 FIRST CHAA(1j), o* 44 - 5 F!4^,T N *1
2 M~IDDLE C HA RC IC),1 4 - 3f''L \ ~ *
I SEG, /* -'MET CUTPUT -EC'- 'JTRL CTUP.- *
2 SSN CH4ARC) 00 1 c
'ECINO FIXEO EIN(31), /* 1) - 13 C ~ U:c C N'; AER..
SEMN CHARC27), 1 14 - 41 SC Il T
LNdA1E CI4AR(20),
FNAME CHARM1),
MNAME CHARC10)pI (ADDRLENGTHrSU3STR,M0D) -"UILTIN,
(SEGERRORSCOdCT FIXED '-IK(31) INIT('O),
PIU -CHARM Dif PI POS(2),
EOF aITC1) ALIGNED INIT('C'z);
ON ENOFILECIN) EOF = 11'';
OPEN FILE (IN) INPUT,
FILE (OUTS) OUTPUTP
FILE COUTT) OUTPUT,
FILE (SYSPRINT) LINESIZEC132) PAG~SIAZEC74);
/* FIRST READ TO GET RID OF GAR3AGE RECORD *
READ FILE CIN) INTO (A);
PREAD FILE (IN) INTO CA);
IC a IC+ 1;
IF EOF THEN




r 14 NOV i;? 2:15




F 14 A Pt (10' 1;
LN =% +N P1 ___
PIU 2 USv(TL~)
Ltd LN + 1;
FNAm SL%4TA(rfL'--,I
MN&ME z 01~''





WR ITE FILE (X i R
OC3 :C= +c. 1;
LA 3L NGTHCA);
LV NA - .P ;
IF LV >C THEN Z,4 LV/:7
IF (SNO > 12 1 1C.(LV.-K24 > ) -*
DO;
SSEROR; ~% + 1;
50TO RiADIT;
DO SP = (SZT + 1) TC LL -Y 747;
SEG.SEQNC : c
SEG.SEGMENWT = ;L-sTR(ToS~,.:fl;
OCT = OCT +~ 1;
READIT:
A=
READ FILE (IN) !N% (A);
END;
PUT SKIP LIST(IC-1 ~ ~ z~ ;T~~)
PUT SKIP LIST (O3 I1 w-';
PUT SKIP LISI(ZCT cII'' -i ;-T:CC r~TT\'
PUT SKIP LIST(aE,:E.7k:Rsljj ~z NT RJS- \cL N TE E'
END SPLIT;
1/60I D~ (c=4,E~I~
KI 1 4~ 3 423 p * ,
//UbDD DKU4'.3D3,iK5.K3Z41'J? F)
IIVCL E R=C KC 14 M ,&,cl o1, 0! K:7 Zl K1,, 4 3 4 k 4 c5
I/OT 00 D =DCID0C4 '
C/ a L5P L C L LK S I Z 7
30I& 5, ~ k
K05 0 ,KC71 K0z 4
FILMED
D TIC..
